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The Marine Corps must architect a tactical internet based on a software technology 
that is in transition- the Internet Protocol (IP). Development of the Marine Corps' 
tactical internetworking system (Tactical Data Network or TDN) is progressing 
concurrently with the global Internet community's development of the Next Generation 
Internet Protocol (IPv6). Current (IPv4) and next generation (IPv6) versions of the 
Internet Protocol can together meet the tactical internetworking needs of the Marine 
Corps. 
IPv4 provides universal interoperability ~th other networking technologies and 
support for a wide range of services now, but without enhancements IPv4 cannot meet the 
long-terms needs of evolving tactical applications. IPv6 is needed to meet emerging 
requirements (such as secure mobility) but is not yet ready for implementation in the 
Tactical Data Network. Therefore the Marine Corps must build the tactical internet 
architecture using IPv4 and incorporate IPv6 improvements when transition is possible. 
Marine Corps commitment to IP is essential to ensure universal interoperability 
and hardware-independent evolution of tactical applications and networking technology. 
This work presents a tactical IP addressing plan for TDN that works with IPv4 and also 
facilitates smooth transition to IPv6. In concert with the other military services, the 
Marine Corps must develop a strategy for migrating the joint tactical internet to IPv6. 
The future viability of the Tactical Data Network depends on the Internet Protocol. 
v 
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The Marine Corps is experiencing a revolution in tactical information technology. 
The Corps is fielding a generation ofC4I systems that will empower Marines at every 
tactical echelon to wage information-age warfare. The Tactical Data Network (TDN) 
weaves these various end-user systems into a tactical internetwork which permits 
seamless information exchange across the battlespace. The proposed TDN architecture 
incorporates the Internet Protocol (IP), the same technology underlying the global 
Internet. IP is itself in a period of transition to a Next Generation Internet Protocol 
(IPng), formally called Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6). Marine Corps program 
planners, network architects, and potential tactical internet users must ensure that IPv6 
transition planning is integral to the design and deployment of TDN. Formulation of an 
IPv6 migration strategy now is essential to ensure the future viability of both TDN and 
the tactical internet. 
The Tactical Data Network is a system of commercial routers, workstations, LAN 
repeaters and hubs, military encryption devices, and other internetworking equipment 
and software. TDN interconnects end-user computers via local-area networks (LANs) 
and interconnects LANs to form a tactical internet. Analysis of evolving Marine Corps 
tactical end systems and applications reveals that there are five crucial tactical 
internetworking needs that TDN must fulfill: addressing, multicasting, mobility, quality 
of service control, and security. Unique identification (addressing) of every end-system 
connected to the. tactical internet is necessary for universal communication. The method 
of allocating addresses must be logical, simple, and (ideally) automatic. Tactical 
military communications is inherently many-to-many multicast. TDN must provide 
multicast support for simultaneous dissemination of information (such as the Common 
Operational Picture) and for efficient utilization of limited communications bandwidth. 
Mobile users of TDN must be free to roam the battlespace and retain seamless access to 
network services. Emerging tactical applications such as distributed collaborative 
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planning (DCP) and distributed interactive simulation (DIS) require guaranteed minimum 
thresholds of bandwidth and latency in order to function across low-bandwidth 
intermittent tactical communications links. Priority of network resource usage must also 
be maintained across the TDN infrastructure. Security must be provided for data in 
transit across the network, and networking devices themselves must be protected from 
intrusion and/or corruption. Finally, the Marine Corps TDN must fit within the joint 
tactical internetworking architecture. A robust yet simple internetworking protocol (or 
set of protocols) is needed within TDN to fulfill these many diverse requirements. 
Internet Protocol version 4 (1Pv4) is the de facto open systems internetworking 
standard. The simplicity, robustness, and openness of1Pv4 have made it enormously 
popular in the global Internet and in many large private "intranets." Exponential growth 
of the Internet, the revolution in mobile computing, the advent of real-time, multicast 
multimedia applications, and the emergence of information warfare and electronic 
commerce are combining to expose 1Pv4's limitations .. However, enhancements to 1Pv4 
such as IP Multicast, Mobile IP, and the IP Security Architecture will satisfy most of the 
Marine Corps' short-term internetworking requirements. Indeed no suitable alternative 
currently exists. Nevertheless it is unwise to expect 1Pv4 to meet military 
internetworking needs into the 21st century. 
1Pv6 is an evolutionary step forward from 1Pv4, not a revolutionary replacement of 
1Pv4. 1Pv6 retains the fundamental connectionless packet delivery service of 1Pv4 and 
also adds new functionality to improve scaleability and to support a broader range of 
applications. The major improvements of 1Pv6 over 1Pv4 include: 
• Expansion of the IP address space and a more versatile address hierarchy. 
• A new type of addressing called anycast that is conceptually a cross between 
unicast and multicast. 
• IP address autoconfiguration that enables "plug and play" connection to the 
network. 
• Native multicast capability (IP Multicast) and an improved mechanism for 
controlling the scope of multicast sessions. 
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• A new protocol mechanism for controlling quality of service (QoS). 
• Native support for security at the IP (internet) layer. 
IPv6 formal structure is defined and it is on track to become an Internet Standard. 
IPv6 will eventually replace IPv4 throughout the global Internet and in most private 
TCP liP networks as well. Commercial software products based on IPv6 will be available 
when TDN is fielded. The Marine Corps' transition to IPv6 will be driven by the quality 
of service requirements of next generation tactical software applications. The timing of 
the Corps' migration to IPv6 will be affected by the maturity of IPv6 as well as by the 
migration plans of the other military services. When the IPv4-to-IPv6 transition does 
commence, IPv6 must be incrementally deployed in the tactical internet to ensure the 
availability of IPv6 capabilities and backward compatibility with IPv4-only systems. 
The IP addressing plan is a key element of the TDN architecture. The tactical 
addressing plan proposed in this study is based on successful IPv4 protocols and best 
current Internet practices that will facilitate a smooth transition to IPv6. 
Adoption of IP as the centerpiece of the tactical internet architecture is essential. 
The Marine Corps gains significant technology leverage by basing its tactical internet on 
the protocols of the global Internet. The current version of the Internet Protocol (IPv4) is 
highly stable and mature, widely implemented and well-understood. IPv4 adequately 
supports the internetworking demands of current tactical data systems and software 
applications. IPv6's enhanced features are needed to support tactical internetworki:J;lg in 
the next century and must be included in the long-term tactical internet architecture. 
However, basing the design ofTDN entirely on 1Pv6 is not prudent because significant 
deployment and testing of 1Pv6 implementations remains to be accomplished. Therefore 
it is recommended that the TDN design proceed based on the proven capabilities of1Pv4 
and be influenced by expected IPv6 improvements. A strategy for transitioning to IPv6 
must be mapped out now, and an IPv6 upgrade path must be designed into all tactical 





The Marine Corps is experiencing a revolution in tactical information technology. 
In the next few years the Corps will field a generation ofC4I systems that will empower 
tactical commanders as never before. Internetworking component systems will further 
leverage new technology by permitting seamless information exchange across the 
battle space. 
At the core of the tactical internetwork will be a data switching system called 
Tactical Data Network (TDN). The TDN architecture incorporates the Internet Protocol 
(IP), the same technology that underlies the global Internet. IP is itself in a period of 
transition to a Next Generation Internet Protocol (IPng), formally called Internet Protocol 
version 6 (IPv6). Marine Corps program planners, network architects, and potential 
tactical internet users must formulate migration strategies now in order to be ready to 
capitalize on these enormous tum-of-the-century changes. 
B. OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this study is to identify the major issues that must be addressed as 
the Marine Corps prepares to field a tactical internet (TDN) based on a technology in 
transition, namely the Internet Protocol (IP). This work provides specific 
recommendations for an IP addressing architecture that supports the internetworking 
requirements of tactical end systems. This work also provides strategic network planning 
recommendations to facilitate a smooth migration to IPv6. 
C. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
This thesis provides Marine Corps decision makers with information regarding the 
major issues of tactical networking affected by the Internet Protocol (IP). Following 
analyses of both the current version ofiP (IP version 4) and the next generation IP (IP 
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version 6), Internet Protocol migration strategy considerations are discussed. Finally, 
recommendations are made for issues needing further study. 
Chapter II provides background information regarding the Internet Protocol and 
describes research efforts related to tactical internetworking and to the development of 
IPv6. Chapter III presents an overview of the Tactical Data Network (TDN), the 
environment in which it will operate, and the concept of how it will be employed. 
Chapter IV identifies the internetworking requirements of the tactical data systems that 
will employ TDN as their communications backbone. Chapters V and VI contain 
analysis of how well IPv4 and IPv6 each satisfy the tactical internetworking requirements 
identified in Chapter IV. 
Chapter VII then fuses the information in the first six chapters to produce a 
recommended addressing architecture for TDN. The detailed IP addressing plan for the 
Tactical Data Network is contained in Appendix A. 
Chapter VIII identifies IPv6 migration options available to the Marine Corps and 
the key issues that must be considered in developing an IPv6 migration strategy. Chapter 
IX presents conclusions and recommendations for future work. 
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II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Internetworking technology is an enormous field of science and engineering. There 
are many active internetworking research efforts both inside and outside of the 
Department of Defense (DoD). The Marine Corps' Tactical Data Network (TDN) must 
fit within the overall joint tactical internetworking architecture [JIE0,95a] and must be 
integrated into the global Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) [DISA,95] which 
encompasses all information systems throughout DoD. Therefore, the internetworking 
initiatives of the other military services, the Defense Information Systems Agency 
(DISA), and the global Internet community, as well as general trends in internetworking 
technology must all be considered by the Marine Corps in formulating its migration 
strategy for TDN. This chapter provides an overview of the development of the Internet 
Protocol and its role in current DoD networks. Also included are brief summaries of 
several recent and ongoing studies that complement and overlap this thesis. 
B. BACKGROUND 
1. History of the Internet Protocol (IP) 
In the 1970s the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) initiated 
an effort to develop a protocol that would permit the interconnection of disparate 
computer networks, each of which used a different underlying netWork technology. The 
central protocol produced by this project was the Internet Protocol (IP). The same 
research project developed several other higher level protocols designed to work 
hand-in-glove with IP. The most important ofthese was the Transmission Control 
Protocol (TCP), and the entire group of protocols was dubbed the TCPIIP protocol suite. 
[Cerf, 90] 
The TCP liP protocols were originally implemented the ARPANET packet switched 
research data network. The popularity ofTCPIIP ballooned after the University of 
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California at Berkeley began incorporating TCPIIP into its version of the UNIX operating 
system. Since Berkeley UNIX was used in many universities' computer systems, TCPIIP 
became widely adopted. In 1986 the National Science Foundation network (NFSNET) 
was created, tying many more research facilities together using TCP liP. As the 
NFSNET-ARPANET grew into the global Internet, TCPIIP gained unstoppable 
momentum. [Comer,95] 
2. Department of Defense Adoption of IP 
Declining defense budgets, the rapid pace of computer technology advances, and 
increased need for interoperability allied the Department of Defense (DoD) to adopt a 
policy of seeking commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) solutions to its computer systems 
needs. To control software costs, there was a push to build applications on common 
operating systems instead of developing each application from scratch. UNIX was the 
operating system chosen for most tactical command, control, communications, computer, 
and intelligence (C4I) systems. 
TCPIIP's proliferation on the global Internet and the Defense Data Network 
(DDN), as well as its affiliation With UNIX, made it the logical choice for a standard 
DoD internetworking protocol suite. The sticking point was tha~ the U.S. Government 
had mandated that all government information systems use the Government Open System 
Interconnection Profile (GOSIP), a collection of protocols that did not include TCP/IP 
[JIE0,95a]. Most of the protocols in GOSIP were defined by the International 
Organization for Standards (ISO). Although they were defined in the 1970s and early 
1980s, and unlike IP, ISO protocols had never become widely implemented. In 1993 
GOSIP was modified to include TCPIIP as alternatives to the equivalent ISO protocols 
[JIE0,95a]. 
It is clear thatTCPIIP is DoD's protocol suite of choice for the near term. In 1995 
the Defense Information Systems Network (DISN), the world-Wide DoD data 
communications backbone, transitioned completely from X.25 (an ISO protocol) packet 
4 
switches to IP routers and gateways. Further, each of the four military services are 
developing and fielding tactical data switching systems based on the TCPIIP protocols 
[MCCDC,95b ]. 
C. TERMINOLOGY 
Several internetworking terms are usea so frequently throughout this thesis that 
they are explained here for clarity. Additional aconyms and definitions appear in 
Appendix B. 






a consumer of network communications services. A host 
typically executes applications and server software 
programs on behalf of users and employs network 
communications services in this function. Hosts are 
usually individual workstations or personal computers 
(PCs). [MCCDC,95b] 
a collection of packet-switching networks interconnected 
by routers. [Comer,95] 
The collection of networks that spans the globe and uses 
TCPIIP protocols to form a single, cooperative virtual 
network. When written in upper case, "Internet" refers 
specifically to this global Internet. [Comer,95] 
interconnecting many disparate physical networks and 
making them function as a coordinated unit [Comer,95]. 
a term applied to both routers and hosts [Perkins,96b]. 
a standard procedure or set of rules for defining and 
regulating data transmission among computers (or among 
different protocols) [Bradner,96a]. 
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router a 'special-purpose dedicated computer that interconnects 
two or more networks and forwards IP datagrams from 
one to the other [Comer,95] Routers are distinct from 
hosts because they are usually not the destination of data 
traffic. Routing of IP datagrams is actually done in 
software. Therefore, the routing function can be performed 
by a host that has two or more network connections 
(dual-homed or multi-homed host). [MCCDC,95b] 
World-Wide Web a world-wide virtual information space accessible via the 
Internet. Currently, the WWW or Web is composed of 
hypermedia documents (files) distributed on servers 
throughout the Internet. Users retrieve and view these 
hypermedia documents using client-server applications 
known as Web browsers. [Hughes,94] 
D. RELATED WORK 
This section contains brief summaries of recent and/or ongoing research in the 
internetworking field that is relevant to the Tactical Data Network. 
1. Tactical Internet Protocol Addressjng Studies 
Two recent studies completed within DoD have direct bearing on the TDN. 
• Integrated Tactical-Strategic Data Network (ITSDN) Internet Protocol (IP) 
Addressing Plan [llE0,95b] - Study undertaken by DISA's Joint Interoperability 
Engineering Organization (JIEO). The ITSDN plan assigns IP addresses for the 
routers at DISA communications facilities around the world where the tactical 
internets of deployed forces can be connected to the DISN and (by extension) to 
the Internet. 
• IPAddressing Study [NCCOSC,95] - Study commissioned by Navy Space and 
Naval Warfare Systems (SPA WAR) directorate and carried out by the Naval 
Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center (NCCOSC) to determine how 
IP addresses should be allocate~ am~mg Navy ships and shore communications 
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facilities. Completed in December 1995, the results of study are documented in a 
series of papers under the main title "IPADD." The main paper within the series 
assigns specific IP addresses to each ship and shore station. Other supporting 
papers discuss the implications and considerations of routing, security and 
bandwidth limitations on the Navy's IP network. 
2. Internet Protocol version 6 (1Pv6) Research 
The development of IPv6 affects many other protocols. Although IPv6 research is 
not confined to the group cited here, this group maintains connections with all other IPv6 
research efforts and is therefore a clearinghouse for current work in this area. 
• Internet Protocol Next Generation (/Png) Working Group [IETF,96]- working 
group of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), a voluntary organization of 
technical professionals who develop and refine protocols used in the Internet. The 
IPng Working Group is active in developing the detailed specifications for the 
next generation Internet Protocol, now formally called IP version 6 (the current 
version ofiP is IPv4). The working group maintains two home pages on the 
World Wide Web. One is a subsidiary of the IETF's Web page and contains the 
group's official charter and a report of current status ofiPv6 protocol 
specifications documents. This page is available at 
http://www. ietf. cnri. reston. va. uslhtml. charters/ipngwg-charter. html [IETF ,96]. 
The other IPng Working Group Web page contains more general information 
about IPv6, an on-line overview, and a report on the current status ofiPv6 
software implementations. This page is available at 
http:/ /playground sun. com/publipng/htmllipng-main. html [Hinden,96]. 
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3. Related Internetworking Studies 
This sections lists a number of internetworking studies completed by military 
officer students at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) who are members of the NPS 
Information Infrastructure Research Group (IIRG) [IIRG,96]. 
• Interoperability of Palmtop Computers with the U.S. Marine Corps Data 
Automated Communications Terminal (DACT) to Rapidly Disseminate Combat 
Order Message Packets Over Wired and Wireless Channels [Cummiskey,96]-
Masters thesis proposing new software applications that can effectively 
disseminate operations orders using wireless links across the Marine Corps' 
tactical internet. 
• Internetworking: Economic Storage and Retrieval of Digital Audio and Video 
for Distance L(!arning [Tiddy ,96] - Masters thesis comparing the various existing 
multimedia compression methods and their potential use in creating multicast 
on-demand multimedia across an internet. 
• Internetworking: Planning and Implementing a Wide-Area Network for K-12 
Schools [Bigelow,95] - Masters thesis detailing how to get connected to the 
Internet, including comparison and analysis of the many LAN/WAN design 
choices that must be made in internetworking. 
• Internetworking: Recommendations on Network Management for K-12 
Schools [Trepanier,95]- Masters thesis detailing the many aspects of managing 
networks that are connected to the Internet. 
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III. TACTICAL DATA NETWORK (TDN) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Tactical Data Network (TDN) is a data routing system designed to interconnect 
end-user computers via local-area networks (LANs) and interconnect LANs to form a 
tactical internet. TDN equipment will extend this internet to every Fleet Marine Force 
unit, battalion level and above. This chapter describes the Tactical Data Network and 
how it fits into the overall Marine Corps tactical C4I architecture. 
B. FLEET MARINE FORCE STRUCTURE 
Since the 1930s the fighting forces ofthe Marine Corps have collectively been 
called the Fleet Marine Force (FMF). This emphasizes the fact that operational control of 
Marine forces is exercised primarily by Navy fleet commanders. Marines fight in 
composite units called Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF, pronounced 
"mag-taff'). Each MAGTF is comprised of a Command Element (CE), a Ground 
Combat Element (GCE), an Air Combat Element (ACE), and a Combat Service Support 
Element (CSSE). The size of the MAGTF dictates the size of each of the elements. 
Currently, there are two basic MAGTF organizations used throughout the Marine Corps: 
the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). The 
doctrinal organizational structures of the MEF and the MEU are shown in Figure 3 .1. 
There are three standing MEFs located throughout the world: I MEF in Camp 
Pendleton California, II MEF in Camp Lejeune North Carolina, and III MEF in Okinawa 
Japan. There are also standing MEU command elements within each MEF. Each MEU 
is subordinate to its parent MEF and is comprised of forces taken from among the MEFs 
units. MEUs normally deploy aboard Navy amphibious shipping to provide forward 
presence and an initial amphibious strike capability to Unified Combatant Commanders. 
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Figure 3.1 Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) organizational structures. 
C. MAGTFC41 
MAGTFC4I is the Marine Corps' strategy for achieving the midterm goal ofthe 
Joint Staffs C4/for the Warrior concept [Joint Staff,93]: a joint network of networks 
based on a common network operating environment using commercial standards. 
MAGTF C4I is the conceptual framework within which the Marine Corps is developing, 
acquiring, and employing command, control, communications, computers and 
intelligence systems. [MCCDC, 95b] 
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D. MAGTF C41 COMMUNICATION ARCHITECTURE 
The Tactical Data Network (TDN) will fit within the existing and planned MAGTF 
communication architecture. The MAGTF architecture (Figure 3.2) is composed of 
transmission systems, multiplexing equipment, switches, ·and subscriber equipment. At 
the top of the layered architecture are the end systems which interact with tactical users 
and host the applications software. The end systems gain access to the data or voice 
networks via either switches or dedicated lines. TDN is the only data-switched network 
in the planned architecture. The multiplexing equipment and transmission systems are 
the physical communications means used to interconnect switches and end systems 
[MARCORSYSCOM, 95a]. 
Subscriber Equipment & Systems 
Telephones*FAX*Workstations*TCO*AFATDS*IAS*PCs 
Message Voice Data Dedicated 
S\J\tftches Switches Switches Circuits 
TTC-42 TDN Hotlines MSC-63 SB-3865 TADILS 
Multiplexing & Link Management 
Analog lSQ-184 Digital Tech Control TSQ-188 
Transmission Systems 
Single Channel 
Radio Multichannel Radio Cable 
.. ~ 
To Other Nodes 
Figure 3.2 MAGTF C41 Communications Hierarchy. After [MARCORSYSCOM,95a] 
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1. External Network Connectivity 
TDN is designed to provide seamless internet services within a tactical joint task 
force environment. It will intemperate with the other services' tactical packet-switching 
systems, as well as with strategic-level networks. Some of the specific networks that 
TDN will intemperate with are briefly described below. 
a. Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) 
DISN is an evolving world-wide data network that will ultimately provide the 
communications path for electronic mail, the bulk of DoD message traffic, and 
long-distance client-server applications such as browsing the World Wide Web. DISN is 
comprised of several networks, each operated at a different security classification: 
• Non-secure Internet Protocol (IP) Router Network (NIPRNET) - NIPRNET 
is the unclassified packet-switched network operated by DoD. It has 
interconnections with the global Internet. Some tactical Marine Corps users will 
use TDN to access NIPRNET. [DISA,95b] 
• Secure IP Router Network (SIPRNET) - SIPRNET is the SECRET packet-
switched network of DoD. SIPRNET provides the communications backbone for 
the Global Command and Control System (GCCS), which will extend down to 
Marine Corps units via the TDN. [DISA,95b] 
• Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS)- JWICS 
replaced DSNET3 as the TOP SECRET SCI data network of the DISN. There is 
currently no requirement for TDN to provide SCI-level data services. The 
network connectivity for SCI traffic will be provided by dedicated systems such 
as Trojan SPIRIT. [DISA,95b] 
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• Automatic Digital Network (AUTO DIN) - AUTODIN is DoD's secure record 
message system. It will be phased out in the coming years as the Defense 
Message System (DMS) is phased in. In the near term AUTODIN messages will 
enter the tactical area via special message-switching equipment (AN/MSC-63A). 
The DMS Multi-Function Interpreter (MFI) will translate AUTO DIN messages 
into electronic mail which can be delivered via tactical packet-switched networks. 
Therefore, there is no need for TDN to interface with AUTODIN. [DISA,95b] 
b. Integrated Tactical-Strategic Data Networking (ITSDN) 
ITSDN is not a specific data-switching system. It is an umbrella term for the 
interconnection of all tactical packet-switched networks and their interconnection with 
with DISN. ITSDN will consist ofiP routers at specific DoD communications facilities 
around the globe which will provide DISN entry points to deployed tactical commands. 
TDN is considered part of ITSDN and must be able to interface with the entry-point 
equipment. [JIE0,95b] 
c. Tactical Secure Data Communications (TASDAC) 
TASDAC is the data-switching system employed by the Joint Communication 
Support Element (JCSE) in Joint Task Force Headquarters. This system is also currently 
used by the Air Force for tactical data switching. TASDAC currently employs Wellfleet 
routers and is based on TCPIIP protocols. TDN must intemperate with TASDAC. 
[MARCORSYSCOM,95a] 
d. Communications Support Systems (CSS) 
CSS is the Navy's data communications system which extends IP networking to 
ships. TDN must intemperate with CSS both afloat and ashore. 
[MARCORSYSCOM,95a] 
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e. Tactical Packet Network (TPN) 
TPN is the Army's tactical packet-switched network. TPN is overlaid on the 
Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) system and operates at the SECRET classification 
level. TDN must be prepared to interconnect with TPN. [JIE0,95a] 
2. Tactical Data Systems and End Users 
The end users (i.e. customers) ofTDN are primarily the tactical data systems 
(TDSs) that are being developed and fielded concurrently with TDN. These systems and 
corresponding requirements on TDN are examined in the next chapter. 
E. TACTICAL DATA NETWORK SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
1. TDN Functions 
The mission of TDN is to provide the MAGTF Commander an integrated tactical 
internet forming the communications backbone for all MAGTF tactical data systems 
[MARCORSYSCOM,95a]. This network will facilitate the seamless exchange of 
information across all echelons of command. TDN will be capable of supporting file 
sharing, information exchange, electronic message handling, and transport protocol 
translations. TDN must handle transparent routing of messages among LANs, circuit-
switched networks and radio networks. [MARCORSYSCOM,95c] 
2. TDN Subsystems 
Two subsystems comprise the Tactical Data Network: the TDN Gateway and the 
TDN Server. Each of these subsystems has a different purpose and a different equipment 
configuration. Together a network ofTDN Servers and TDN Gateways fulfills the TDN 
functional and operational requirements. 
a. TDN Gateway 
The primary purpose ofthe TDN Gateway, subsystem is to connect Marine Corps 
internal networks to the external networks described in Section C. The TDN Gateway 
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a. TDN Gateway 
The primary purpose of the TDN Gateway subsystem is to connect Marine 
Corps internal networks to the external networks described in Section C. The TDN 
Gateway will also interconnect multiple TDN Servers at Division, Wing and FSSG 
command posts. Subscriber LANs can also be connected directly to the Gateway, but 
that configuration is not recommended by the concept of employment. 
Each TDN Gateway consists of two complete but physically separate suites of 
network equipment in one shelter. This allows a single TDN Gateway to support both a 
SECRET and an UNCLASSIFIED network simultaneously. The actual security 
architecture has not yet been decided, but it is likely that one physical network will carry 
data traffic of different security classifications [JIE0,95a]. Separation of the data traffic 
by classification level is accomplished by encrypting at least one of the data streams 
before injecting it into the shared network. This technique is called tunneling and is 
commonly used in packet-switched networks to allow two or more virtual networks to 
share a common physical network. TDN will transport TOP SECRET traffic by 
tunneling it across either the SECRET or UNCLASSIFIED networks. 
The TDN Gateway is a shelterized system mounted on its own High Mobility 
Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV). The Gateway has its own environmental 
control unit (ECU) and a pair of uninterruptable power supplies (UPSs). The internal 
logical layout of the Gateway subsystem is depicted in Figure 3.3. 
At the heart of the system are two Cisco 7000-series enterprise routers. There 
are five UNIX workstations in the TDN Gateway that are capable of acting as LAN 
servers, providing network management functions, and hosting Domain Name System 
(DNS) and Defense Message System (DMS) software. The four Tactical Communication 
Interface Modules (TCIM) in the TDN Gateway provide the capability to connect remote 
and mobile hosts via half-duplex radio nets. Dial-in access interfaces are included to 




Figure 3.3 Tactical Data Network Gateway Block Diagram. From [MARCORSYSCOM,95c]. 
equipment suite is rounded out by KJV -7 encryption devices, serial wire line adapters, 
several LAN repeaters, a printer, and signal/patch panels. Although it is shown in 
Figure 3.3, the Motorola Network Encryption System (NES) is not a standard component 
part of the TDN Gateway. 
b. TDN Server 
"Server" is really a misnomer for this subsystem. The TDN Server provides 
functions similar to the TDN Gateway but on a smaller scale. The primary purpose of 
the TDN server is to connect individual subscribers to the tactical internet. Whereas the 
TDN Gateway can be thought of as a wide-area networking system, the TDN Server is a 
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local-area networking system. Each TDN Server provides the capability to establish a 
single LAN at a single security classification. Users operating at other security levels 
will have to connect to the TDN Server via an inline encryption device such as the 
Motorola NES. 
The logical layout ofthe TDN Server is shown in Figure 3.4. The TDN Server 
is transported in three transit cases. One case contains a Cisco 2500-series router and 
UNIX workstation. The TDN Server provides radio access to the network via TCIMs, 
but does not provide any facility for dial-in access. The four removable LAN hubs allow 
each TDN Server to connect up to 48 network subscribers in four clusters of twelve. The 
hubs can be daisy-chained or connected directly to the router with Ethernet cable via the 
repeater. The TDN Server workstation functions as a LAN file server or groupware 
server, Domain Name System (DNS) server, and a Defense Messaging System (DMS) 





Figure 3.4 Tactical Data Network Server Block Diagram. From [MARCORSYSCOM,95a] 
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3. TDN Concept of Employment 
The Tactical Data Network will provide a means to internetwork all of the tactical 
data systems within the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). It will also 
internetwork deployed Fleet Marine Force units with in-theater joint information 
systems, strategic level defense networks, and (optionally) the global Internet. Figure 
3.5 depicts the logical interconnection of command posts using TDN. TDN will make it 
technically possible for a company commander using a hand-held computing device to 
exchange data with the National Military Command Center (NMCC). Operationally, 
TDN is expected to fulfill more limited needs. 
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Figure 3.5. Tactical Data Network (TDN) interconnectivity to joint networks. From 
[MARCORSYSCOM,95a] 
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TDN Gateway subsystems will be deployed only at Marine Expeditionary Force 
(MEF), Marine Division, Marine Air Wing (MAW), and Force Service Support Group 
(FSSG) headquarters. TDN Server subsystems will be fielded to all units battalion-level 
and higher. 
F. SUMMARY 
The Tactical Data Network will bring about a quantum leap forward in Marine 
Corps tactical communication. Serving as the primary data switching system within the 
MAGTF, TDN will interconnect all end-user tactical data systems and all local-area 
networks into a seamless tactical internet Although the general type of equipment that 
will be used in TDN has been decided, TDN's concept of employment and precisely how 
it will interface with all of its constituent end systems is not yet clear. The next chapter 
discusses future requirements that tactical end users and end systems will place on the 
Tactical Data Network. 
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IV. INTERNETWORKING MARINE TACTICAL DATA SYSTEMS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Communications is driven by user requirements, not by technology. Network 
designers must look at who the users of the Tactical Data Network (TDN) are going to be 
before assessing the kind of technology that needs to be employed. The real users of 
TDN will be the commanders, staff officers and Marines of the Fleet Marine Force. 
Users will interface with TDN via applications software running on end-user computer 
systems, which may be UNIX workstations, personal computers (PCs) or handheld 
terminals. These end-user software and hardware systems are the focus of this chapter. 
Section B describes the major end user systems that are expected to use TDN for 
network connectivity. Most of these systems are still under development and will be 
fielded concurrently with TDN in the 1999-2000 timeframe. Intemetworking 
requirements of the end-user systems are then discussed in Section C. In subsequent 
chapters these requirements are used as the basis for examining the suitability of the 
current and next-generation Internet Protocol (IP) for the TDN. 
B. DESCRIPTIONS OF TACTICAL DATA SYSTEMS 
1. Common Operating Environment (COE) 
The increasing complexity of modem C4I systems makes it imperative that users 
and applications software are shielded from the details of the underlying network 
structure [MCCDC,95b]. The Common Operating Environment (COE) provides a 
common operating system and core set of software utilities that can be used by every 
tactical data system application. Software application programs need only be designed to 
the COE application programming interface (API), not written from scratch as before. 
Thus applications can be inserted as modules on any computing platform running the 
COE [MARCORSYSCOM,94]. The COE also provides the user with a common 
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graphical user interface (GUI) for all applications. As an example, Microsoft Windows™ 
is a commercial implementation of this same concept (albeit for a limited hardware set). 
The COE is fundamentally a client-server architecture. Client application processes may 
access server processes on any workstation, as long as a communications path exists 
between them. TCPIIP suite networking protocols are built into the COE operating 
system. 
All major tactical data systems now under development within the Marine Corps 
are being engineered to use the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) COE 
[MCCDC,95b]. TheGCCS COE evolved from the Navy's Joint Operational Tactical 
System (JOTS). The software underlying JOTS, known as the Unified Build, also 
formed the foundation for the JOTS successor, the Joint Maritime Command Information 
System (JMCIS). The Joint Staff selected the JMCIS COE as the "best of breed" COE 
for the GCCS. In order to both reduce its software maintenance burden and facilitate full 
interoperability with Navy and Joint TDSs, the Marine Corps decided to re-engineer 
many of its tactical data systems to incorporate the GCCS COE 
[MARCORSYSCOM,94]. Figure 4.1 depicts the conceptual structure of the COE that is 
incorporated in Marine Corps tactical data systems. The COE is built upon a common 
hardware suite and a POSIX-compliant UNIX operating system. The common GUI is 
implemented using X-Windows/MOTIF interface tools. All of these lower-level software 
components are commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products. At a higher level are the core 
services provided to all applications: 
• Communications/message processor 
• Track database manager/correlator 
• Local database manager 
• Charting and tactical plotting (mapping) 
• Security shell 
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Figure 4.1 Global Command and Control System (GCCS) Common Operating 
Environment (COE). After [MARCORSYSCOM,94] 
2. Global Command and Control System (GCCS) 
GCCS is the system developed to fulfill the midterm goals of the C41for the 
Warrior vision [DISA,96]. GCCS provides the warfighting Commanders-in-Chief 
(CINCs) and Joint Task Force Commanders (CJTFs) with automated support for 
planning, executing, and managing military operations. Fielded in 1995, GCCS replacing 
the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) [DISA,96]. 
Within the Marine Corps, initial GCCS fielding was limited to garrison headquarters of 
the Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs) and Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) 
headquarters both ashore and afloat. In the future GCCS is envisioned to extend across 
all echelons of command [DISA,96]. 
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3. Tactical Combat Operations (TCO) 
TCO will be the primary tactical data system used by commanders and operations 
officers in the Fleet Marine Force (FMF). TCO will provide a fused real-time common 
operational picture (COP) of the battlespace. Establishing and maintaining this common 
operational picture will require much communication among the TCO systems within the 
MEF. Within a command center TCO will be hosted on workstations attached directly to 
local-area network (LAN) segments of the Tactical Data Network (TDN). When properly 
configured, a TCO terminal on the command post LAN can also serve as a wireless 
access point for mobile TCO users. Mobile TCO terminals may connect to the tactical 
internet via other TCO wireless interfaces or the wireless interfaces of the TDN 
infrastructure. These interfaces may accommodate connections from Single Channel 
Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS), Position Location Reporting System 
(PLRS), cellular phone, or any combination of these. TCO's functionality is similar to 
that of GCCS, and the two may eventually become indistinguishable. 
[MARCORSYSCOM,95a] 
Among all tactical data systems, TCO will place the greatest communications 
demands on the Tactical Data Network (TDN). This is a function of both sheer numbers 
(TCO will exist in almost every tactical command center) and the types of applications 
TCO will run. In addition to maintaining the common operational picture, TCO is 
envisioned to support distributed collaborative planning (DCP). Distributed collaborative 
planning allows multiple commanders and staff members who are in separate command 
posts to collaborate in real time on the development and editing of a single operations 
plan. DCP will probably be applied tactically for concurrent development of courses of 
action and operations orders, both of which are functions of the objective TCO system. 
IP-compatible desktop videoteleconferencing (VTC) capability may also become an 
integral part ofDCP [Macedonia,94]. The particular demands that technologies such as 
these place on the TDN will be discussed later in this chapter. 
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4. Intelligence Analysis System (lAS) 
lAS provides automated support for the direction, collection, processing, 
production, and dissemination of intelligence within the MAGTF. The system is 
scaleable from a single workstation at battalions and squadrons up to a suite of nine 
workstations at the MEF command center [MARCORSYSCOM,95a]. A portion ofiAS 
will operate at the SECRET level and will therefore be incorporated into the TDN 
LAN/WAN. lAS has numerous capabilities, many ofwhich employ the tactical internet. 
One of the uses of lAS is for accessing INTELINK -S. INTELINK -S is an intelligence 
information space that uses the same Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) format 
popularized by the World Wide Web (Web). Users access the INTELINK-S viathe 
tactical internet utilizing a Web browser program. It is expected that intelligence 
personnel at the tactical level will use such methods to gather (i.e. "pull") information 
from the global infosphere. 
5. Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data .System (AF ATDS) 
AF ATDS is a computerized command and control (C2) system for artillery units 
and Fire Support Coordination Centers (FSCC). It is being developed jointly by the 
Marine Corps and the Army. AF A TDS will enable tactical and technical fire direction 
for artillery fires, as well as automated support for controlling air strikes and naval 
surface· fire support. AF A TDS will be hosted primarily on UNIX workstations in Fire 
Direction Centers (FDC) and Fire Support Coordination Centers (FSCC), but.it will also 
be fielded to the Direct Air Support Center (DASC) and the Tactical Air Command 
Center (TACC). There will also be man-portable AF ATDS terminals. The AF ATDS 
terminals within a single command center form a distributed cooperative system that 
uses a local-area network (LAN) to communicate and exchange information. A single 
command center may have as many as eight AF ATDS terminals. Although there is 
currently no definite fielding plan, it is anticipated that there will be 160-200 AFATDS 
terminals in each MEF. [Chmielewski,96] 
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Besides TCO, AF ATDS will probably generate the greatest volume of data traffic 
within a Marine Division's tactical internet. The time-sensitive nature of fire support 
communications places unique demands upon a shared, connectionless communications 
system like TDN. This issue will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter. 
6. Advanced Tactical Air Command Center (AT ACC) 
ATACC is the primary C2 system for the MAGTF's Air Combat Element (ACE) 
battle staff. It will support overall air warfare planning and execution for a MAGTF 
operation, and will interface with the Joint Task Force's air planning systems. The 
Contingency Theater Air Planning System (CTAPS) will be integrated into ATACC as 
the ACE's primary automated mission planning and analysis tool. CT APS will assist the 
ACE staff in generating, disseminating, and manipulating the Air Tasking Order (ATO). 
The ATACC system itself consists of up to 30 UNIX workstations, 20 of which will be 
used for CTAPS. Remote CTAPS workstations will be operated at all squadrons and 
other major commands within the MEF. [MCTSSA,96] 
7. Improved Direct Air Support Central (IDASC) 
IDASC provides automated support for handling tactical air requests from Forward 
Air Controllers (F ACs) and Air Liaison Officers (ALOs) within the Marine Division, as 
well as automated tools for parsing the Air Tasking Order (ATO). IDASC is hosted on 
UNIX workstations and will exist primarily at the Direct Air Support Center (DASC) in 
each MEF. [MARCORSYSCOM,95a] 
8. Marine Combat Service Support Command and Control (MCSSC2) 
The Marine Combat Service Support Command and Control system is a logistics 
and personnel support system. It allows commanders of Combat Service Support (CSS) 
units to exercise command and control over their forces. MCSSC2 will also be fielded to 
units within the Marine Division and Marine Air Wing to assist unit logistics officers in 
requesting and tracking CSS. [MARCORSYSCOM,95a] 
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9. MAGTF Tactical Warfare Simulation (MTWS) 
MTWS is a transportable computer-assisted wargame designed to enhance training 
of Fleet Marine Force (FMF) commanders and their staffs. MTWS is hosted on a 
distributed network of UNIX workstations, typically linked by an Ethernet LAN segment. 
At least five workstations must be used to run MTWS. There can be as many as 30 
workstations connected depending on the number of displays needed and the need to 
distribute the processing load of the simulation. In a deployed environment, where 
MTWS might be used to assist in course-of-action development, it is unlikely there will 
be more than five MTWS workstations deployed with each staff. [Sawyers, 95] 
lO.Other Systems 
In addition to the major tactical data systems mentioned above, there will be many 
other users of the tactical internet. Although it is not possible to predict all of the systems 
that will connect to TDN, some systems that are likely to be supported are PC Client, 
Lotus Notes™ and Windows NT Server™. 
PC Client is a software package developed by the Marine Corps Tactical Systems 
Support Activity (MCTSSA) that allows a personal computer (PC) to exchange common 
operational picture data with a TDS UNIX workstation. The purpose of PC Client is to 
reduce the number of relatively expensive UNIX workstations needed by the Fleet 
Marine Force. Whether or not the specific PC Client software is used in the future, the 
trend toward using internetworked personal computers will be fueled by the continuing 
advances of the PC industry in multitasking, processing power, memory capacity, and 
connectivity capability. 
Currently, the Marine Corps uses Banyan Virtual Networking System (VINES)™ 
to network its personal computers in both garrison and tactical situations. In this system 
personal computers are internetworked using the proprietary VINES-IP protocol. Each 
PC has a VINES-IP address, but does not necessarily have a standard Internet Protocol 
(IP) address unless the user has a need for direct NIPRNET or SIPRNET access. The 
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Marine Corps near-term plan is to migrate to a PC networking system of Lotus Notes™ 
groupware running on the Microsoft Windows NT™ operating system. Notes™ allows 
several users (who may be separated by an internet) to simultaneously access and work 
on shared documents. Windows NT™ uses standard IP for internetworking. Therefore 
all personal computers in the MAGTF that access the tactical internet will require IP 
addresses. [Gaunter,96] 
C. INTERNETWORKING REQUIREMENTS 
This section examines some of the salient communications requirements placed on 
the tactical internet infrastructure by the end systems which were described in the 
previous section. It is difficult to know exactly what these requirements will be for two 
reasons: 
• Most of these systems are still under development. 
• Users often employ a fielded system differently than was anticipated by the 
system's designers. 
Using what is known about these systems, in conjunction with the requirements stated in 
the TDN Operational Requirements Document (ORD) [MCCDC,95a], five broad areas 
of internetworking requirements were selected for analysis: addressing, multicast 
communication, mobility, quality of service (QoS), and security. 
Much has already been written in the public domain about protocol requirements 
for the global Internet. Many of those requirements parallel those of the Marine Corps' 
tactical internet. There remain some areas (such as scalability) where the two 
requirements sets are not necessarily in consonance. 
1. Addressing Requirements 
Section B discussed only the major tactical data systems that will be deployed in 
the MEF. There will surely be many more workstations and PCs in the tactical 
environment as the Corps becomes a more information-intensive force. In order to have 
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a fully seamless and robust information grid, all of these systems will have to be 
interconnected and internetworked. Every end system must be capable of 
communicating with every other system in the internet. This requires that the network 
provide a unique means of identifying each end system. In an IP internet, this unique 
identifier is the IP address. Assigning IP addresses is a major task. Not only must the 
number of end systems be considered, but also the arrangement and employment of those 
systems. For example, systems such as AF ATDS may require that all workstations at 
the same command center share the same local-area network (LAN) segment. Likewise, 
command elements are often organized into multiple command groups which operate 
separately (Forward and Main Command Posts). This kind of physical and logical 
separation must be accounted for when assigning IP addresses. 
Assigning, reconfiguring, and tracking IP addresses can be a significant burden on 
network managers. This can be a serious problem in smaller units which may lack the 
manpower and expertise to do the job correctly. For this reason there is a requirement to 
keep IP address assignment and configuration as simple as possible. Ideally either 
configuration might be done automatically by the networking software, or address 
assignment would not change regardless of circumstance. 
2. Multicast Requirements 
The TDN ORD states that TDN must support multicasting [MCCDC,95a]. 
Multicasting is the transmission of a single copy of the same information to a selected 
group of stations on a network at the same time. Multicasting is really the general case 
of all communications. Broadcasting is a special case of multicasting in which the 
multicast group includes all stations on the network. Unicast communications involves 
transmission to only one station. 
Multicasting is already used extensively in military communications. A 
SINCGARS radio net is an example of a multicast topology. Although the radio 
transmission is physically broadcast by the sender, only a select group of radios are 
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configured to receive the transmission. In an internet the difference is that not all of the 
stations who need to receive the information are connected by the same physical 
communications medium. The key advantages of multicast over unicast or broadcast are 
that it conserves bandwidth and requires less computer processing. Bandwidth is 
conserved because no data packet traverses a communications link more than once. 
Further, multicast data transmission does not even cross a communication link unless 
there is a station on the other side of the link that is a subscriber to the multicast group. 
By contrast, unicast requires a separate transmission for each receiving station while 
broadcasting sends packets everywhere regardless of actual receiving station locations. 
Conserving bandwidth is especially crucial in the tactical internet, where radio is often 
the primary means of communication and link capacities can be less than 9.6 kbps. 
Multicast also consumes less computational resources at the receiving stations than 
broadcast. A packet with a broadcast destination address must be examined by every 
end-system computer that receives it. Most computer network interface hardware can be 
configured to only accept data packets destined for particular multicast addresses. By 
stopping unwanted data packets at the network interface card, the end system CPU is not 
burdened by examining and rejecting those data packets. In a shared data network like 
TDN this can be a significant advantage. 
There are many examples of tactical data exchange that must be multicast. One is 
position update information that maintains the common operational picture for TCO, 
GCCS and other terminals. Another example is electronic mail that must be delivered to 
multiple recipients who all reside on the same destination network. Yet a third example is 
a distributed collaborative planning (DCP) session involving participants at several 
command posts, all of whom must be able to see the same data at the same time. DCP 
traffic can involve simultaneous audio, video, and data multicasts. 
Global Broadcast Service (GBS) is another emerging technology that may require 
multicast. GBS is a high-power high-bandwidth system that permits ground stations to 
use small antennas to passively receive television and data. The unique aspect of data 
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transfer on GBS is that the receiving station does not have a full-duplex communication 
path with the data source via the GBS satellite. The receiving station must either 
establish a return path via other means (such as a modem and serial-line connection), or 
just receive the broadcast data one way. The networking protocols used must 
accommodate this asymmetric topology. [Morales,96] 
A major issue in defining a multicast requirement is whether or not the 
communication must be reliable. Reliable in this sense means that the sender has a way 
of knowing that all intended destinations received the transmitted data, and receivers can 
account for all intended traffic. Position reporting may not need guaranteed reliability if 
the positions are changing slowly and the updates are being sent frequently. Audio and 
video streams rarely require reliability since a few missed "sound bytes" or picture frames 
do not significantly disrupt the overall impact of the communication. On the other hand, 
the sender of an e-mail message containing an intelligence image, operations order, or 
overlay must be assured that all intended recipients got it without error. Therefore, there 
are requirements in the tactical internet for both unreliable and reliable multicast. 
Multicast does not just happen automatically. The internetwork infrastructure must 
support multicast, and the end-system applications must be configured to take advantage 
of the network's multicast capability. As the force moves toward a distributed, 
decentralized structure, the need for rapid, simultaneous information sharing will 
increase. The Marine Corps has stated that in future warfare "information will be 
originated once and shared by all" [WarLab,96]. Therefore many-to-many (multicast) 
communications will continue to increase in usage and importance relative to one-to-one 
(unicast) communications in the tactical internet. 
3. Mobility Requirements 
Greater mobility of land forces is expected to be a tenet of 21st century warfare. 
The Army has expressed this in its Force XXI concept [U.S. Army,96]. Likewise the 
Marine Corps stresses mobility in its current doctrine of Operational Maneuver from the 
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Sea and in a new concept for expeditionary warfare called Sea Dragon [WarLab,96]. 
This is stated clearly in the Sea Dragon concept paper: 
A significant increase in force mobility is required. Forces will have to be 
highly mobile in conducting the mission, and able to be rapidly extracted 
or relocated as the mission is completed. [W arLab,96] 
The Tactical Data Network (TDN) will have to support several kinds of end system 
mobility. Individual computers will be moved around within each command center 
changing their physical network connections. Users must be able to relocate or replace 
their workstations in order to adapt to physical constraints, adaptive C2 structures, and 
equipment failures. Entire units and their networks will also be mobile. A unit may 
simply physically relocate but remain part of the larger network, as in the case of a 
command post displacement. If displacement involves temporary loss of a networking 
node (router), the rest of the internet must dynamically adapt. The same unit may, 
however, move and become part of an entirely new network. A MAGTF headquarters 
moving from ship to shore is an example of this latter type of mobility. While afloat the 
MAGTF connects to the Joint Task Force (JTF) via the Navy's network. Once ashore the 
MAGTF sets up its own satellite or microwave internetwork connectivity to the JTF. 
While shifting locations, partial connectivity via wireless links may be needed. Unit 
mobility of this type can require substantial addressing and routing changes to the 
internet infrastructure. 
Some individual end-user terminals will be nomadic, dynamically moving from 
network to network while maintaining continuous access to internet services. Users who 
are "roaming" will connect to the tactical internet via SINCGARS radio, wireless LAN, 
cellular phone, or a combination of these. Other mobile users will disconnect from the 
internet, move, and reestablish an internet connection in a new place. 
Which users are mobile and which are not needs to be transparent to other network 
users. Keeping track of mobile users is a requirement for the network infrastructure 
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itself. Further, the mobile user should not have to take extraordinary measures to get 
connected and remain connected to the internet while roaming. The TDN ORD 
explicitly states a requirement to "provide the means for a mobile host to enter and leave 
the network with minimal user-performed system configuration changes" [MCCDC,95a]. 
Ideally, all adjustments will be dynamically and autonomously handled by the network, 
as they are in commercial cellular telephone networks. 
4. Quality of Service Requirements 
Some types of applications and end-user systems must have access to a certain 
amount of a network's resources in order to function properly. That is, they require a 
certain quality of service (QoS) from the network. By negotiating a quality of service 
guarantee, an end-user system can gain some control over an otherwise-shared network 
infrastructure. 
Dimensions of network quality of service are usually discussed in terms of 
bandwidth guarantees, controls on the amount and variability of network-induced delay, 
and reliability provisions for ensuring error-free and in-order data delivery [Jeffries, 96]. 
All applications do not require the same QoS. Several emerging classes of applications 
that are being embraced by the military will require some QoS guarantees if they are to 
work in the tactical internet. 
Recently, multimedia applications that involve transmission of audio and video 
across the network in real time have become popular in both the commercial and military 
sectors. The trend toward multimedia will continue and the tactical internet must 
therefore support multimedia and real-time applications. Multimedia applications place a 
high demand on the network infrastructure because they are intolerant of out-of-order 
data or long and/or inconsistent delay. In order to support such an application, a network 
must provide special handling of the data packets transmitted between the two ends of the 
connection, guaranteeing some minimum thresholds of bandwidth and latency to the 
application so that it can operate properly on a shared link. 
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Distributed collaborative planning (DCP) is an application area that is enjoying 
much interest and research. DCP can be facilitated by commercial groupware products 
such as Lotus Notes™ [Lotus,96] as well as by military-specific products such as the 
Theater-level Analysis, Replanning, and Graphical Execution Toolbox (TARGET), 
which will become part ofGCCS [DISA,96]. Today's concepts ofDCP range from two 
users remotely sharing a document on an electronic "whiteboard" to full-blown 
multipoint desktop videoteleconferences. Similar applications have been used to conduct 
seminars and meetings across the global Internet utilizing a virtual network known as the 
Multicast Backbone(MBone) [Jacobson,94]. (MBone will be discussed in the next 
chapter.) Intense interest in this technology suggests that it will continue to flourish in 
the future and will find applications in tactical C4I. For example, the command and 
coordination concept for Sea Dragon refers several times to the need to enable "dynamic 
collaboration among all elements" [WarLab,96] .. 
Distributed interactive simulation (DIS) is another application that may also require 
quality of service guarantees. It is not yet clear how prevalent simulation will be in 
tactical units. If simulations prove to add value at the tactical level, however, they will 
certainly be intemetworked. Simulation architectures used for exercises can be used 
identically for actual engagements. Data transmission for DIS must be real-time, 
many-to-many multicast and reasonably reliable. [Bradner,96a] 
All quality of service does not have to be provided in the network infrastructure. 
Reliability is often considered an end-system function [Comer,95]. Real-time multimedia 
applications have been developed that can adapt to some degree of packet delivery delay 
as well as to out-of-order packet delivery. However, there is a limit to what these 
applications can do, and thus delay caused by the network must be bounded. 
Beyond the technical requirements of bandwidth and delay there is the issue of 
priority. Priority determines which traffic gets network resources regardless of the traffic 
type. Priority is a policy that needs a technical enforcement mechanism in the network. 
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In recent years tactical communication has consisted predominately of voice traffic 
transmitted over user-controlled, single-purpose radio and wire links. All users on those 
links shared a common purpose and enforced their own priorities through net control 
stations. With the fielding of TDN, much of the information that used to flow over those 
dedicated links will shift onto a shared data internet. Users will lose some control over 
their communications path. Consider an example from the Sea Dragon concept paper: 
Target information emanating from a dispersed small team might be 
injected by a FOF AC into a personal handheld computer for immediate 
transmission into the network, whereupon all agencies simultaneously 
receive that information for processing. [WarLab,96] 
There is an implicit assumption in this scenario that such traffic will not become 
delayed or discarded by some network device whose queue is full of 
administrative traffic. There must be some means in TDN to ensure that the 
command's priority policies can be enforced in the network infrastructure. 
5. Security Requirements 
In this age of Information Warfare (IW) network security has become a heightened 
concern. There is consensus that information dominance holds the key to victory in next 
generation warfare. However, there is a dichotomy in our ambitions. On one hand, we 
want more information sharing as well as easier and faster access to information. At the 
same time we want greater security protection for that same information. Simultaneously 
fulfilling these two goals is a significant challenge. 
Users have four general network security requirements: confidentiality, 
authenticity, integrity, and availability [Russel1,91]. Users need their sensitive and 
classified data to remain confidential. Access to the data's content must be denied to 
unauthorized users. Users need assurance of data's authenticity, or proof of its time and 
place of origin. Data must retain its integrity and not become corrupted during 
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transmission or while in storage. Finally, data and network resources must be available to 
the user when he needs them. 
Confidentiality is the facet of security that has always been stressed most strongly by 
the military. As attention has focused on IW, the military has better understood the 
relative importance of authenticity, integrity, and availability. The question in this study is 
whether there is a requirement for the network infrastructure itself to fulfill or support any 
of these security requirements. The vulnerability of the network's devices and controls is a 
key concern. Protection must be afforded to TDN routers and servers to ensure that the 
tactical internet remains available for use when critically needed. 
There are a myriad of other specific security requirements in the tactical internet. 
There will be force-readiness databases, directories, and geoposition data that must all be 
protected. The data must retain its integrity, confidentiality and availability. User queries 
to these databases must be authenticated. Much of that security can be provided by the 
applications themselves. Lotus Notes™, Windows NT™ and most ofthe tactical data 
systems have built-in security measures [Lotus, 96]. Multilevel security (MLS) features 
will be integral to the objective Defense Messaging System (DMS) [JIE0,95a]. Link 
encryption devices (KY gear) will continue to be employed at the physical 
communications level to scramble the data stream and prevent traffic analysis [JIE0,95a]. 
TDN must have an integrated security architecture that incorporates security technology 
where it is needed, but avoids proprietary methods and duplicative security overhead 
among layers. 
D. SUMMARY 
A great many end user systems will eventually connect up to the Tactical Data 
Network. Each will place different demands on the network infrastructure. These 
requirements are summarized in Figure 4.2. While the exact nature of future applications 
in the tactical environment cannot be known for certain, a clear pattern is developing. 
Technologies which appear in the commercial world and on the global Internet quickly 
develop advocates and applications within the military. Just one example of this is the 
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development of INTEiJNK, a classified information space identical in form to the 
enormously popular World Wide Web. There is no reason to doubt that this trend of 
technology transfer will continue in the future. Sea Dragon's focus on smaller, more 
mobile and fully networked forces, coupled with the shift toward information warfare also 
create unique network requirements. The tactical internet infrastructure of the next 




QUALITY OF SERVICE 
NETWORK SECURITY 
-Need IP addresses for the myriad of communicating 
devices in the tactical internet 
- Simple and dynamic method of assigning IP addresses 
- Common Operational Picture to everyone 
- Distributed Collaborative Planning (DCP) 
- Both reliable and unreliable multicast delivery 
- Conserve bandwidth on tactical links 
- Accommodate "roaming" of mobile users 
- Handle intermittent communications links 
- Mobile routers as well as mobile terminals 
- Support real-time multimedia like DCP 
- Support prioritization by data type as well as data 
source 
Guarantee bandwidth available for · critical 
applications 
-Ensure confidentiality, integrity, authenticity of data 
- Protect network infrastructure from attack 
Figure 4.2 Summary of the intemetworking requirements of tactical data systems. 
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V. INTERNET PROTOCOL VERSION 4 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines aspects of the current Internet Protocol (1Pv4) that are 
relevant to the Tactical Data Network (TDN) requirements discussed in Chapter III. The 
objective of this chapter is to identify which requirements of TDN that can be met by 
1Pv4 and which cannot. The analysis focuses on the concepts and capabilities of the 
Internet Protocol, rather than on the specific protocol details. 
Complete details of1Pv4 and the entire TCP/IP protocol suite are contained in 
original documents known as the Request for Comments (RFCs) series. All RFCsare 
available online atftp://ds.internic.net/rfc/. The Department of Defense (DoD) has 
established profiles for several TCPIIP protocols that assign specific values to the 
protocols' options and/or parameters. These profiles are published as military standards 
(MIL-STDs) in the MIL-STD-2045-xxxxx series [MCCDC,95b]. All MIL-STDs are 
available online from the DISA Center for Standards at http://www.itsi.disa.mil. 
B. OVERVIEW OF IP VERSION 4 
1. The Need for an Internet Protocol 
A protocol is a rule that two or more computer systems must agree upon and adhere 
to in order to exchange data unambiguously [Comer,95]. For example, in data 
communications there must be a protocol that defines how a computer system interfaces 
with the physical communication medium to which it attaches. Such data link (or 
network interface) protocols are often limited by the details of the particular networking 
hardware used. In an internet, however, end-user computing systems must communicate 
across heterogeneous intermediate networks that may incorporate widely disparate 
hardware technologies, such as Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM), single channel 
radio, Fiber Distributed Data Interface (FDDI) and Ethernet. In a truly open system 
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architecture, end-user host machines and user-level applications cannot be required to 
deal with the complexity and heterogeneity of the underlying internetwork. A protocol is 
needed that transcends the details of the various technologies and vendor 
implementations of physical networks, thus presenting the end user with a common 
abstraction of the network. This is the purpose of the Internet Protocol. 
2. IP's Placement in the Protocol Stack 
Communicating data across a network is too varied and complex a task to be 
accomplished through use of a single protocol. Protocol layering partitions the 
communications problem into bounded, manageable tasks. Although not widespread in 
implementation, the Open System Interconnect (OSI) 7-Layer Reference Model (Figure 
5.1) developed by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) is the most 

















Figure 5.1 The Open System Interconnect (OSI) 7-Layer reference model. After [Comer,95]. 
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The original purpose of this model was to guide ISO protocol development 
committees in bounding the scope of their protocols [Buddenberg, 95]. The protocol at 
each layer only needs to define the interface with the next higher and next lower protocol 
layers. This permits network hardware implementation details to be hidden from the 
applications software and end users. 
However, the OSI model does not accurately describe the layering of the TCPIIP 
protocol suite. The TCPIIP protocols do not map neatly into seven layers because the 
Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) developed TCPIIP independently 
of the OSI model. The TCPIIP protocol stack is conceptually divided into four layers: 
Applications or Processes, Transport, Internet, and Network Interface or Data Link. 

























Figure 5.2 Correspondence between OSI and IP protocol layer models, and information objects 
passed between corresponding host layers. After [Brutzman,96] 
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Because the OSI model was intended to describe communications in a single 
network, it contains no specific internet layer (IP) [Comer,95]. Furthermore, the TCP/IP 
layers are not as strictly constrained as those in the OSI stack. OSI protocols can only 
communicate with protocols in adjacent layers. By contrast, any TCP/IP layer can 
interface directly with any other layer. Implementing this feature can greatly reduce 
overhead in certain situations and makes TCP/IP more flexible than OSI [Brotzman, 96]. 
IP's mapping into the ISO model is not as important as IP's relationship to the 
other protocols that will be employed in the tactical internet. Figure 5.3 shows the 
dependency of all projected tactical applications upon IP for network communications. 
TEL- 8GPV4 XAOOI MIL-
NET HTTP X.500 DNS BOOTP DHCP SNMP STD-FTP RFC- OSPF OMS RFC- RFC- STD-15 2045-STD-9 STD-8 1654 STD-13 STD-35 951 1541 47001 V2 
RFC-




(DTE) LLC AAL1, 
PPP, CCITT IEEE 802.2 AAL5 
LAPS X.25 MIL.STD- (DCE) ISO 7776 IEEE 802.3, 188-220A (DTE) EthernetV2 
FDDI ATM RS-232, 449,530, 4W COP, ISO 9314 
MIL.STD-188-114A, or 
ISDN (1.430, 1.431) 
Figure 5.3 Protocol layering in the tactical internet. These layers map directly to the four-layer IP 
stack in Figure 5.2. From [Dept. of the Army,95] 
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The figure also illustrates the broad range of network hardware interface (data link layer) 
protocols with which IP can intemperate. Only a few of the protocols shown in 
Figure 5.3 will be discussed in this thesis. A list of acronyms is provided in 
Appendix B. 
3. The Internet Protocol as a Bearer Service 
A bearer service is a protocol abstraction of the underlying data communication 
network. The main characteristic of the bearer service is that it decouples the higher level 
applications from the lower level hardware technology. Described in "Realizing the 
Information Future: the Internet and Beyond" [NRC,94], the concept of the bearer service 
is illustrated in Figure 5.4. The importance of the bearer service is obvious from its place 
at the neck of the "hourglass" figure. This centrality is a powerful feature. It allows 
higher and lower technologies to evolve independently as long as they can all 
interconnect via the bearer service. However, since the bearer service must be agreed 
upon by everything above and below it, the bearer service must be sparse and simple. 
[NRC,94] 
The authors of "Realizing the Information Future" admit that they used the Internet 
Protocol (IP) as their model for the bearer service [NRC,94]. IP is the bearer service.for 
the global Internet, and was specifically defined independently of any particular 
technology. IP datagrams are typically processed in software, so ~eir format and 
content are not constrained by the details of any hardware. This has enabled IP to 
accommodate the introduction of various new hardware and software technologies. The 
Internet Protocol per se is also quite simple. It really only defines two things: the 
datagram structure (hence IP address) and the connectionless packet delivery service. 
4. IP's Connectionless Data Packet Delivery Service 
The IP layer supports connectionless (as opposed to connection-oriented) data 
transfer. Conceptually, an IP internet operates like a more familiar connectionless 
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Figure 5.4 "Hourglass" figure illustrating the centrality of the open data 
networking (ODN) bearer service. From [NRC,94] 
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system, the postal service. The postal system's elemental unit of transfer is the letter, or 
parcel. In an IP network the elemental unit of transfer is the datagram. Each datagram 
contains both a header (information on the outside of the envelope) and a data payload 
(the information inside the envelope). The header includes the datagram's destination and 
source (return) addresses, which makes each datagram self-describing. This allows each 
datagram to be handled by the network independently of all other datagrams. 
Transferring a datagram across an internet is analogous to mailing a single letter through 
the postal system. A transmitting host "drops" a datagram into the network, and the 
network's routers forward the datagram according to its destination address. The actual 
route taken by each datagram is typically not known by the sender ahead of time. 
Intermediate routers are free to decide dynamically which route is best. If a sequence of 
datagrams is sent to the same recipient, each datagram may or may not traverse the same 
route through the network. This can cause unpredictable delay and/or out-of-order 
delivery. Although the network does not capriciously discard datagrams, at the internet 
layer there is no guarantee that any particular datagram will be delivered at all. 
This connectionless method of communication contrasts sharply wi!h that of 
connection-oriented services such as the public telephone network, Asynchronous 
Transfer Mode (ATM), and X.25 packet switching. Prior to transferring data across one 
of these connection-oriented networks, signaling must be used to establish a connection 
and negotiate a route with all intermediate switches between the end points. Once the 
connection is set up, all data flows over the same route. This ensures that data packets 
are delivered in order and with typically consistent delay. Furthermore, all of the 
intermediate switches in the route must be kept aware of the status of the connection 
between the endpoints. If a failure occurs at any point along the route, the connection is 
closed. 
Despite some of the benefits of connection-oriented technologies, IP is more 
appropriate for the tactical internet. Being connectionless, IP is more robust in the 
presence of hostile and uncertain network conditions. If a communications link fails or 
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becomes heavily congested, IP routers are free to dynamically forward datagrams via 
better paths. Further, since IP does not use signaling to establish connections, it creates 
less overhead data traffic on the already bandwidth-constrained tactical communications 
circuits. 
There are many requirements for network communications that were never intended 
to be met by IP alone. The internet layer protocol (IP) accomplishes host-to-host 
connectionless unreliable communication across disparate networks. Other important 
functions in data communications (such as error checking and correction) are performed 
by other protocols in the TCP/ IP suite. The next section describes how other protocols 
. work together with IP to provide a greater range of services in the combined TCPIIP 
suite. 
5. Connection-Oriented Services in a TCP/IP Internet 
The Internet Protocol (IP) was designed to provide a simple network service for 
more complex end-system communications. Put another way most of the "intelligence" 
in a TCPIIP networkis in the end-systems rather than in the network infrastructure 
[Comer,95]. The TCPIIP protocol suite has two transport layer protocols that manage 
end-to-end communications: UDP and TCP. User Datagram Protocol (UDP) simply 
extends IP's connectionless datagram delivery service up to the applications layer. UDP 
adds no reliability, but does add the capability to deliver to a datagram directly to a 
specific application or process on the end-system (host). IP can only deliver datagrams 
to a destination host. [Comer,95] 
The Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) provides reliable connection-oriented 
communications between two (and only two) applications. TCP also performs flow 
control to alleviate congestion in the network. TCP is a complex protocol, and a 
complete discussion of TCP is beyond the scope of this thesis. What follows is an 
overview of the features that TCP adds to IP's basic service. 
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An application invokes TCP to establish a communications connection with an 
application on another host. The application sends TCP a stream of data and TCP uses 
IP's delivery service to exchange packets with the TCP layer software on the destination 
host. TCP sequences packets so they can be put back in order after receipt. On the 
receiving end TCP performs error checking and sends positive packet acknowledgements 
(ACKs) back to the transmitter to confirm error free delivery. Unacknowledged packets 
are retransmitted after a timeout period. [Comer,95] 
A form of flow control is also provided by TCP [Jacobson,94]. Flow control is 
necessary in a shared data network to avoid overloading switching nodes (routers) and 
disrupting service for all users. When TCP detects delays in receiving packet 
acknowledgements, it assumes that the cause is network congestion. To avoid causing 
further congestion TCP quickly "backs off' its sending rate and allows more time before 
retransmitting unacknowledged packets. Once congestion subsides TCP slowly increases 
its sending rate back to a normal level. This exponential back off and slow start 
procedure is effective in controlling congestion, but wreaks havoc on delay-sensitive data 
traffic such as audio and video streams. Workarounds for TCP are often necessary on 
wireless and satellite communications links where intermittent communications and 
propagation delay, rather than congestion, are the major causes of unacknowledged 
packets. [Comer,95] 
C. IPV 4 ADDRESSING 
1. Overview of 1Pv4 Addressing Architecture 
Addressing plays a vital role in the architecture of an IP-based internet. To permit 
any host to communicate with any other host in the internet, the architecture must define 
a common method of identifying each host. IP defines this identifier as the IP address. 
A datagram is routed through the network solely on the basis of its destination IP 
address. Without a proper and valid IP address, a datagram cannot be delivered to its 
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intended recipient. A host's IP address, therefore, indicates not only the host's identity, 
but also the host's topological location in the network. 
Like a postal address or a telephone number, an IP address must be "globally" 
· unique. In this context "global" is relative; it encompasses all computers and networks 
that are reachable by that IP internet. Address uniqueness ensures unambiguous handling 
of datagrams. Sharing of the same IP address by different locations in the network 
otherwise confuses routers as to where to deliver datagrams destined for that address. 
(Multicast addresses are the exception to this rule. IP Multicast is discussed in Section D 
of this chapter.) Technically, global address uniqueness is not always required. For 
example, a MEU might establish a TCPIIP network in support of a training exercise. If 
the MEU's tactical internet has no connection to any other IP network, then the MEU can 
assign arbitrary IP addresses that are at least unique within the MEU network. However, 
if the MEU's network connects to the NIPRNET, SIPRNET or the global Internet at any 
point, the MEU's addresses must be truly "globally" unique. 
Uniqueness of addresses in the global Internet is ensured by having a single body, 
the Internet Network Information Center (InterNIC), vested with address assignment 
authority [InterNIC,96]. Any organization that wants to connect its network to that are to 
the global Internet must obtain IP network addresses from the InterNIC. Military 
networks numbers are obtained from InterNIC by the DoD Network Information Center 
[DISA,96b]. The DoD NIC in turn assigns IP addresses to the military services as 
necessary. 
Many commercial businesses have installed private enterprise-wide TCPIIP 
networks called "intranets" [Cortese,96]. (Although the Marine Corps tactical internet 
fits the corporate definition of intranet, the military uses intranet in a data link layer 
context [MCCDC,95b]. To avoid confusion the term intranet is not used in this study.) 
Since many of the hosts in these private internets may never be connected to the global 
Internet, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) recommended that private internets 
use non-globally unique IP addresses in order to help extend the life of IPv4 address 
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space [Rekhter,96a]. In conjunction with the IETF plan the Internet Assigned Numbers 
Authority (lANA) reserved several large blocks ofiPv4 addresses for use by private 
internets. These addresses can be used by many organizations simultaneously so long as 
their networks are not connected to the Internet. An advantage of using the private IP 
address space is that it offers an organization many more addresses can be obtained from 
the globally unique address space. The main disadvantage is that any host or network 
that is subsequently connected to the Internet must be renumbered. [Rekhter,96b] 
The Tactical Data Network will be connected to the SIPRNET and NIPRNET. It 
must be assumed that all hosts in the tactical internet will have access to these global 
DoD networks, as well as to the Internet. Therefore it is imperative that globally unique 
IP addresses be used within the Tactical Data Network (TDN). 
2. 1Pv4 Address Format 
IPv4 addresses are 32-bit binary numbers. As mentioned above, both identity and 
location is embedded in the address in order to facilitate more efficient network routing. 
Each IP address is actually a pair (network!D, host!D), where the network!D identifies a 
network and the host!D identifies a host attached to that network. Internet routers use 
only the network!D portion of the address to forward datagrams to the destination 
network. The router on the destination network uses the host!D portion of the address to 
forward the datagram to the destination host. [Comer,95] 
a. 1Pv4 Address Classes 
In order to support different sizes of networks, the total IPv4 address space (232 
addresses) was partitioned into five address classes (Figure 5.5). The first five bits of an 
address indicate its class. Class A, B, and C addresses differ in the number of the 32 bits 
that correspond to the network/D. For example, class B addresses allocate 14 bits 
to the network!D portion, and 16 bits to the host!D portion. This yields a total of214 
(i.e., 16,382) possible class B networks, each of which can include up to 216 (i.e., 65,534) 
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bit number: 0 1 8 16 24 31 
Class A L-1 o ...... l_ne_t_lo _ __._ ____ ho_s_tl_o ______ ____. 
Class B ~...11 ...... 1o...~l ___ ne_tl_o _____ -...~ ____ ho_s_tl_o __ _____. 
Class C ~...11 ...... 11 ....... 10__.1 ___ ne_tl_o ____ __.___h_o_st_lo _ ___. 
Class D ~...11~...11-L.I __.11 ...... 0-'-l __ m_u_lt_ic_a_st_a_dd_re_s_s _____ -----J 
reserved for future use 
Figure 5.5 The five forms of1Pv4 addresses. The numbers across the top (0-31) indicate 
the order of the bits. After [Comer,95] 
hosts. Thus there are more than 2 million possible class C network numbers, each of 
which can support as many as 254 hosts (host#s 0 and 255 are reserved). [Comer,95] 
The problem with this three-level class breakdown is that it does not efficiently 
support the intermediate size network panitions that are expected in the Marine Corps' 
tactical internet. The step sizes (256 and 65,534) between network classes is too great. 




Subnetting is simply the further partitioning of the hostiD portion of a standard 
class A, B, or C address into a subnetwork!D and a hostiD, as depicted in Figure 5.6. 
Subnetting permits several physical networks to share a single IP network number. 
Although it reduces the available address space slightly and can be tricky to set up 







Figure 5.6 (a) Conceptual representation of 32-bit IP address in original 
class structure, and (b) using subnet scheme. After [Comer,95]. 
A simple example can illustrate subnetting in the tactical internet. In Figure 5.7 
a unit has been assigned the class C network number 19 2.187.179. 0. There are actually 
four physical local-area network (LAN) segments connected to this unit's router. 
Consider what happens when a datagram containing the destination address 
192.187.179.34 arrives at the router from somewhere in the internet. If subnetting is not 
used, the router has no way ofknowing that the host identified by 192.187.179.34 is 
attached to LAN segment # 1. The router must then broadcast the datagram on all four 
LAN segments. If instead each LAN segment is assigned a subnet number, the local 
router can directly determine the physical LAN segment to which a given destination 
51 











Figure 5.7 Example of a TDN subnet scheme within a regiment. 
host is attached. For the example in Figure 5.7, the first three bits of the host!D portion 
of the class C address 192.187.179.0 were used as the subnetwork/D. The resulting 
subnet numbering scheme breakdown is shown in Table 5.1. A datagram destined for 
host 192.187.179.66 (binary address: 11000000.10111011.10110011.01000010), for 
example, would be transmitted by the router only on LAN segment 2. 
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LAN Subnet Number Binary Subnet Number Router Subnet Range of 
seg Port Number host IDs 
unused 192.187.179.0 11000000.10111011.10110011.00000000 192.187.179.1 2-30 
1 192.187.179.32 11000000.10111011.10110011.00100000 192.187.179.33 34-62 
2 192.187.179.64 11000000.10111011.10110011.01000000 192.187.179.65 66-94 
3 192.187.179.96 11000000.10111011.10110011.01100000 192.187.179.97 98-126 
4 192.187.179.128 11000000.10111011.10110011.10000000 192.187.179.129 130-158 
unused 192.187.179.160 11000000.10111011.10110011.10100000 192.187.179.161 162-190 
unused 192.187.179.192 11000000.10111011.10110011.11000000 192.187.179.193 194-222 
unused 192.187.179.224 11000000.10111011.10110011.11100000 192.187.179.225 226-254 
Table 5.1 Subnetting the Class C IP Address 192.187.179.0 
In order to perform routing in the presence of subnetting, network routers must 
be able to distinguish which portion of the address corresponds to the subnetwork/D. 
This is done by including a subnet bit mask in the routing table along with the IP address. 
All of the bits that are set to "1" indicate the network!D portion of the IP address, to 
which the sub net bit mask corresponds. An example of the bit mask is shown in 
Figure 5.8. 
Subnetting is supported by most current routing protocols, including Open 
Shortest Path First version 2 (OSPFv2), Interior Gateway Routing Protocol (IGRP), and 
Border Gateway Protocol4 (BGP-4). However, there are several drawbacks to 
subnetting. Subnet bit masks add to the information that routers must store in their 
routing tables. This may not be a major concern in the Marine Corps since TDN routing 
tables will probably be small anyway. 
Subnetting also reduces the original address space by using address bits to 
indicate subnet hierarchy [WRQ,95]. Subnetting can reduce aggregate bandwidth 
requirements if traffic can be kept within each subnet. However, maintaining proper 
subnets is a challenging network administration task. In practice, subnetting is generally 
not advised. A further example demonstrating subnetting can be found in [Bigelow,95]. 
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Subnet Address 
Binary Subnet Address 
Binary Bit Mask 
Bit Mask 
192.187.179.64 
11 000000.1 0 Ill 011.1 0 11 00 11.0 1 00000 
11111111.11111111.11111111.111 00000 
255.255.255.224 
Figure 5.8 Example ofSubnet Bit Mask. 
c. Supernetting 
Intermediate-size networks that do not have enough hosts to fully utilize a class 
B address, but do have more than enough for a class C address, have another addressing 
option: supernetting. Supemetting (also called summarization) is approximately the 
opposite of subnetting. Whereas subnetting takes bits from the host!D portion of the 
address and adds them to the network!D portion, supemetting takes bits from the 
network!D portion and adds them to the local host!D portion [NCCOSC,95]. The effect 
is to aggregate a number of class C network addresses into one larger network address. 
Only that one aggregated network number needs to be advertised throughout the internet 
routing system. 
The tactical internet configuration depicted in Figure 5.9 can be used to 
illustrate how supemetting might benefit the Tactical Data Network. Suppose that there 
is a router at each battalion of the 6th Regiment, and that each of these routers can only 
access the rest of the tactical internet via the regiment's router. Notice that all ofthe 
battalions' class C addresses begin with JJOOOOOO.JOJJJOJJ.JOJJOxxx.O (binary 
format), which corresponds to 192.187.176.0 in dotted decimal format. Therefore, the 
only network number that needs to be advertised to the rest of the internet by the 
regiment's router is 192.187.176.0 (the supemet network address for these five 
networks). Routers 192.187.179.0 through 192.187.183.0 are handled uniquely by the 
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Figure 5.9 Notional regimental Tactical Data Network configuration. 
between routers greatly reduces both the routing computation required the amount of 
bandwidth consumed for network overhead. 
Notionally, all of the networks summarized by a supemet address must be 
reachable via a common gateway, or border router, that interfaces with the rest of the 
internet. In practice, if one of the battalion networks within the supemet splits off from 
the rest of the regiment, that battalion network advertises itself independently.. In routing 
tables these addresses appear as shown in Figure 5.10. Since the networkiD portion of 
the separate network's address, identified by the bit mask, is longer than the networklD 
portion of the supemet address, routers will use the longest match to perform the routing 
function [Comer,95]. This allows both the efficiency of sparse routing overhead and the 
flexibility to relocate subnetworks according to mission requirements. 
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Supemet address: 192.187.176.0 
Supemet bit mask: 
Separate network addr: 192.187.179.0 
Separate network bit mask: 
II 000000.10 Ill 011.10 II 0000.00000000 
11111111.11111111.11111000.00000000 
II 000000.10 Ill 011.10110011.00000000 
11111111.11111111.11111111.00000000 
Figure 5.10 Example routing table entries for the network in Figure 5.9 with 
1st Bn advertised as a separate entry. 
3. Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) 
Subnetting and supemetting can be combined in an addressing and routing scheme 
called Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) [Fuller,93]. CIDR allows any portion of 
the 32-bit IP address to be allocated to the networkiD. This scheme is classless because 
routers do not need to determine whether an address is class A, B, or C. Instead, the 
routers use the bit mask that accompanies the IP address to determine the networkiD 
portion ofthe address. [Fuller,93] 
CIDR has many advantages for tactical IP addressing. By breaking the subnet 
size restrictions of the original address class hierarchy, CIDR allows network managers 
greater flexibility and autonomy in defining an addressing and routing structure. CIDR 
may also enhance the interoperability of TDN. All of the routing protocols planned for 
use in NIPRNET and SIPRNET support CIDR, and the Navy is using CIDR as the basis 
for developing its own tactical IP addressing plan [NCCOSC,95]. 
4. Configuring an IP Address 
Each host computer attached to a TCP/IP network must know its own IP address 
before it can send and receive datagrams. The host must also know the IP address of its 
local router, the correct subnet bit mask to use, and the IP address of a domain name 
server (name servers are discussed in the next section). A host obtains this information 
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from either its own disk memory or an address server on the network. In either case, the 
binding between the IP address and the host's network interface is normally 
preconfigured manually. When the host moves to another subnet or gets a new network 
interface card, its IP address must also be reconfigured manually. The same procedures 
are required for adding any new host to a subnet. These requirements are problematic. In 
a dynamically changing network environment, such as in a field command center, 
frequent renumbering is an unsatisfactory and failure-prone burden on both the network 
administrator and the end user. 
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) developed the Dynamic Host 
Configuration Protocol (DHCP) to help alleviate this problem. The concept ofDHCP is 
simple. A DHCP server(s) is placed on the network and entrusted with a set ofiP 
addresses. When a host on the network boots up, it sends a configuration request out to 
the network. The DHCP server either picks up the request directly, or the host's local 
router relays the request to the nearest DHCP server. The DHCP server then issues the 
host an IP address for a specified lease period. The host must periodically renew the 
lease, or the DHCP reclaims the address. In practice, DHCP can support dynamic or 
static IP address configuration. [Wobus,96] 
There are several problems with DHCP. The most obvious is that address 
configuration, which is necessary before a host can communicate over the network, is 
dependent upon the DHCP server. A host cannot work autonomously without the DHCP 
server, and the system (as currently defined) is not fault tolerant. If the DHCP server 
fails, hosts can neither obtain IP addresses nor renew leases on previously issued IP 
addresses [Murai,95]. This failure might bring down an entire portion of the network. It 
must also be noted that DHCP is not yet a mature protocol. DHCP is currently defined as 
a Proposed Internet Standard (the Internet standards process is described in Chapter VII), 
and solutions to many of these problems are currently being pursued by the IETF 
[Wobus,96]. 
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5. Domain Name System (DNS) 
IP addresses are not user friendly. They are designed to be used by machines, not 
people. Further, IP addresses are not necessarily permanent since computer network 
topologies can change. Thus it may be difficult to find out the current IP address of a 
destination host. Domain names are abstractions ofiP addresses that were created to give 
users and application programs a more intuitive, durable method of referring to hosts and 
host network interfaces. Domain names such as www.usmc.mil (the name of the Marine 
Corps' World Wide Web site) have no implicit meaning to the network infrastructure. 
To be useful in networking, domain names must be mapped to an IP address.[Comer,95] 
The domain name system (DNS) is a set of distributed databases called name 
servers that work together to map (or resolve) domain names to IP addresses [Comer,95]. 
For example, an application passes the domain name of the destination host with which it 
wants to communicate to the DNS client software running on the local host. The DNS 
client coordinates with the system of DNS name servers to obtain the corresponding IP 
address of the destination host. The IP address is then used by the host machines for all 
communications. Thus establishment of a proper and robust DNS is a crucial 
requirement of the tactical internet. The actual implementation ofDNS in the Tactical 
Data Network is not a focus of this study. DNS is mentioned here for completeness, and 
to illustrate how IP addresses are used by end user systems. DNS will be discussed 
briefly again in Section D, which deals with 1Pv4 support for mobile computing. 
6. Summary of 1Pv4 Addressing 
The complexities and pitfalls of IP addressing are legion. This stresses the need for 
a sound tactical IP addressing architecture. Tactical IP addressing plans must 
accommodate a wide variety of command post network topologies that may be constantly 
changing. Since topology is embedded in the IP address, adapting to these types of 
changes is too daunting a task for manual network management methods: Dynamic 
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addressing protocols are necessary to ensure that end users have transparent and error-free 
interface to the internet. 
A full case study of building IP-based local-area networks (LANs) to create a 
wide-area network (WAN) is available online in [Bigelow,95]. A detailed analysis of 




Multicasting is required in tactical internetworking. This section is a brief overview 
of the multicast capabilities of the current Internet Protocol (IPv4) and how multicasting 
is used in the global Internet. The following section considers issues related to 
multicasting with IPv4 in the tactical environment. 
a. Unicast!Broadcast!Multicast 
There are three fundamental types of IPv4 address: unicast, broadcast, and 
multicast. A unicast address is designed to transmit a datagram to a single destination. A 
broadcast address is designed to deliver a datagram to every host on the destination local-
area network. A multicast address enables the delivery of a datagram to a specific set of 
hosts, called a multicast group, each of which may be physically located anywhere within 
an internet. 1Pv4 support for handling multicast datagrams is called IP Multicast. 
[Comer,95] 
IP multicast group membership is dynamic. Any host with appropriate 
multicast -capable software can establish a multicast group, also called a session, by 
obtaining a multicast address and then announcing the group address and lifetime to the 
internet. Hosts are free to join or leave multicast sessions at any time, and a single host 
can be a member of many multicast groups simultaneously. A host does not have to be a 
member of a particular group to send traffic to that group (although membership is 
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recommended). When the number of members in a multicast group drops to zero, the 
group is effectively disbanded and the multicast address is freed for reuse. 
[Macedonia!Brutzman, 94] 
b. Multicast in the Global Internet 
The preponderance of data traffic on the global Internet is unicast. Browsing the 
Web is an example ofunicast communication. A single client host running a Web 
browser typically establishes a communications connection with a single host running 
Web server software. Individual queries from Web browsers communicate with only one 
Web server at a time. In general, any application that employs TCP as a transport layer 
protocol is unicast. TCP is connection-oriented, and does not support multicast. 
Because unicast traffic has predominated Internet usage, unicast Internet 
protocols are more mature than multicast protocols. However, interest in multicast is 
steadily developing. Multicast support for transmission of audio and video is now one of 
the most active areas of research in the Internet community. The Multicast Backbone 
(MBone) is one of the most successful applications of multicast technology in the global 
Internet and an example of dramatic results that can be produced by group research 
efforts. 
MBone is a virtual IP Multicast network testbed that is layered on top of the 
existing physical topology of the Internet. Since many of the routers in the global 
Internet do not support IP Multicast, MBone is fragmented into islands of IP 
multicast-capable networks. Isolated multicast routers (mrouters) communicate with each 
other using a communications technique is known as "tunneling." The mrouters 
encapsulate the IP Multicast datagrams within regular unicast IP datagrams, then forward 
them through the portion of the Internet that does not support native multicast. Modem 
mrouters can comniunicate via native distribution of multicast traffic, without 
encapsulation or tunneling. [Macedonia!Brutzman,94] 
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MBone has existed since 1992. Thus far is has been used primarily to transmit 
audio and video from research conferences, IETF meetings, and special events such as 
space shuttle launches. The MBone can also be used for distance learning [Emswiler,95]. 
The MBone community has developed multicast protocols, as well as freely available 
multimedia applications compatible with nearly every computing platform on the market 
today [Kumar,96a]. 
Development of multicast protocols and applications continues to progress at a 
rapid rate. One recent proposal that may have direct application in the tactical internet is 
the use of Global Positioning System (GPS) data to determine IP addressing and routing 
[Imielinski,96]. GPS coordinates can be used to define a multicast group such that only 
tactical nodes within the geographical area bounded by the coordinates receive the 
multicast messages. The geographic region targeted for the multicast can be described 
numerically or by a line traced on an electronic map display. Mobile users can use GPS 
data to determine the correct multicast group to join for the area in which they are 
currently operating. This type of GPS-determined addressing and routing might greatly 
enhance the ease-of-use, security and scope control of tactical multicast. The proposed 
GPS-based protocols are in the early stage of definition. Nonetheless, the Marine Corps 
must track this development effort and determine what the role ofGPS in the tactical 
internet can be. 
2. Multicast in the Tactical Environment 
As mentioned in Chapter III, multicast has significant advantages over unicast for 
use in tactical communications. Multicast takes advantage of the inherent 
multicast/broadcast nature of physical media used in tactical communications, such as 
single channel radio, wireless LAN and Ethernet LAN. Compared to unicast, multicast 
uses less bandwidth and incurs less transmission delay. Although broadcasting also 
delivers data to multiple recipients at once, it wastes bandwidth and end-system 
computational power doing so. Furthermore, broadcast is not supportable past the 
61 
boundaries of individual LANs. Unlike broadcast, multicast allows the recipient to select 
which traffic is received. The selection is performed at the physical (hardware) network 
interface level. The network interface only listens to certain subscribed multicast 
addresses and passes only those data packets to the higher layer software. This keeps the 
CPU from being consumed by constantly sorting out which data to keep. By contrast, 
broadcast consumes excess CPU time because broadcast packets must be inspected by the 
higher layer software. [Macedonia!Brutzman,94] 
Multicast fits closely with the "warrior pull" concept which is integral to the C41 
for the Warrior (C4IFTW) vision. Under C4IFTW, the warrior decides which 
information is relevant to his mission and his battlespace, and chooses to pull (or receive) 
only that information. [Joint Staff,93] 
In fact there are so many advantages to the use of multicast one researcher has 
described unicast as merely a special case of multicast in which the group consists of two 
end users [Symington,96]. Given the importance of multicast, there are six potential 
problems with using IP Multicast in the Tactical Data Network (TDN) that must be 
considered: 
• Multicast address assignment/allocation 
• Prompt termination of multicast sessions 
• Determination of the appropriate scope of multicast sessions 
• The optional nature of multicast support in commercial router implementations 
• Dissemination of Direct Broadcast System (DBS) traffic 
• Reliability of data transfer 
a. Multicast Address Allocation 
IP Multicast has no built-in address allocation mechanism. Multicast (Class D) 
IP addresses are dynamically obtained through protocol mechanisms within the multicast 
application programs themselves [Braudes,93]. Thus far, address duplication has not 
been a problem in the global Internet. There are few applications that manage multicast 
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sessions, and the multicast address space is huge (228 possible addresses). As the Marine 
Corps and the other military services develop new multicast applications for tactical use, 
however, they must adopt some consistent means of obtaining and managing multicast 
addresses. Current applications and protocols appear adequate for this task [Handley,95]. 
If Class D addresses are dynamically assigned, there is no way to know a 
multicast group's address before the first group member announces it electronically to the 
network. All other hosts must wait passively until they receive the announcement, then 
those that want to join the group do so by notifying their local multicast routers. 
Depending on the topological scope of the multicast session, excessively distant users 
may not even receive the announcement of the group. This current method of joining an 
IP Multicast group is analogous to using a radio frequency scanner to locate the tactical 
C2 radio net that you want to join. Passive procedures such as this do not fit with the 
changing nature of tactical network topology and the users' needs to rapidly exchange 
and distribute information. In order to make IP Multicast work in the tactical internet, it 
may be necessary to assign well-known, semi-permanent multicast addresses to high 
priority groups, and also to multicast groups that develop naturally from doctrinal 
command structure. Such an approach is gaining acceptance [Handley,95]. A detailed 
analysis of multicast address allocation and partitioning schemes appears in 
[Macedonia,95]. 
b. Termination of Multicast Sessions 
Termination of host and subnetwork participation in a multicast group is also 
done passively. The local multicast routers (mrouters) are responsible for determining 
whether any local hosts are still members of any active multicast groups. The mrouters 
do so by periodically polling their multicast "constituents." If at least one local host 
claims membership in a multicast group, an mrouter must continue to forward traffic for 
that group. If after several.polls no host claims membership in a particular multicast 
group, the local mrouter will notify all other mrouters to stop sending it traffic for that 
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multicast group. In the meantime, multicast data may be needlessly transmitted across 
tactical communications links. IPv4 Multicast currently lacks a globally employed 
protocol that allows hosts and mrouters to actively prune uninterested hosts and subnets 
from the multicast "tree." However, this is an active area of research and numerous 
developmental implementations exist [Voigt,96]. 
c. Scoping a Multicast Session 
To preclude inundating the entire internet with multicast traffic that are only of 
local interest, IP Multicast provides a method for limiting the scope of multicast 
datagrams. The scope is a rough measure for the portion of the internet through which a 
multicast datagram is allowed to propagate. The scope of IP multicast is controlled by 
setting the Time-to-Live (TTL) field in each multicast IP datagram. Each time the 
datagram passes through a router, its TTL field is decremented (either by one, or by a 
preset bounding value such as 16 or 32). The router may also decrement the TTL by the 
number of seconds the datagram remain in the router's queue. When the TTL reaches 
zero, the datagram is discarded by the network. 
Determining the proper TTL for tactical multicast may be difficult. It may be 
possible to guess the number of routers a datagram must pass through, but the delay in the 
tactical internet is likely to be unpredictable. TTL scoping is inherently crude and more 
precise mechanisms such as pruning, grafting, and fast leave/join are needed. 
d. Universal Support for Multicast 
In the global Internet, multicast has not been universally supported by routers or 
host operating systems. The result has been scattered islands of multicast networks 
(MBone) separated by unicast-only routers. A similarly awkward topology will emerge 
in the joint tactical internet architecture if multicast protocol support is not uniformly and 
universally adopted by all services. The Navy, for one, has ensured that all of its 
shipboard IP router implementations support multicast [NCCOSC,95]. In order to take 
full advantage of multicast capabilities, however, support must go beyond the network 
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infrastructure and the internet protocol layer. End-user applications, transport layer 
protocols, and internet protocols must implement multicast in an integrated fashion. 
Network interface cards must support multicast in hardware to prevent computational 
overload. Finally, software applications being developed for tactical data systems must 
extend their sole reliance on TCP, a unicast-only transport protocol, by incorporating 
multicast approaches. 
e. Multicast Over the Global Broadcast Service (GBS) 
GBS has become a high priority developmental program. GBS will have the 
capability to downlink high bandwidth (currently 23 Mbps) data streams to small earth 
stations receivers with 18-inch antennas. It is envisioned that GBS will transport the 
bulk of high-bandwidth data traffic being transmitted into a joint tactical area of 
operations. However, GBS is a one-way communications system with no direct return 
channel, and it remains to be seen whether IP can be used effectively with such a system. 
Most of the IP routing and multicast protocols require periodic router-router 
communications. There is research being done in this area by both military and 
commercial organizations [Starburst,96]. 
f. Reliable Multicast 
Current implementations of IP Multicast are inherently unreliable. The Internet 
Protocol itself provides connectionless, unreliable datagram delivery. To get reliable 
(i.e. error-free and in-order) data transfer across an IP network, most applications use 
TCP. TCP does not support multicast. Multicast applications using the Internet employ 
the connectionless User Datagram Protocol (UDP) at the transport layer, and settle for 
unreliable delivery service from the network. This has worked for MBone applications 
because the nature of the audio and video traffic does not demand reliability. Transfer of 
essential high-volume data, such as Defense Messaging System (DMS) electronic mail, 
however, must be both reliable and multicast. IP must be capable of supporting both 
reliable and unreliable (best effort) data transfer. Rather than changing IP to make it 
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reliable, the Internet community is pursuing solutions to provide reliable multicast at the 
transport protocol layer. 
The essential problem with both TCP and UDP is an ali-or-nothing approach. 
TCP is completely reliable. UDP is completely unguaranteed. The level of reliability is 
currently driven by the protocol and network contention, not the user's requirement 
[Weaver,94]. Several reliable multicast transport layer protocols are in developmental or 
experimental stages. Much of the research in this area has centered on the scalability 
problems of reliable multicast in the global Internet. The basic problem with reliability 
is that lost data packets can cause a cascade of negative acknowledgement (NAK) 
messages, which in tum may reduce throughput further. This difficulty is referred to as 
the "NAK implosion" problem. Example application-based reliable multicast solutions 
that exist today include white board (wb ), in which updates are reliably transmitted from 
host to host, and the reliable audio tool (rat) which incorporates redundancy (i.e. forward 
error correction) to minimize the impact of lost audio packets [Floyd,95]. An alternative 
transport-layer protocol that provides selectable-reliability multicast is the Xpress 
Transport Protocol (XTP) [Weaver,94]. The basic challenge in all these approaches is to 
find appropriate tradeoffs between reliability and scalable throughput. It is likely that one 
or more of these protocols, once they are fully developed, will surely meet the reliable 
multicast needs of the Marine Corps tactical internet. 
3. Multicast Summary 
The multicast capability of 1Pv4 is adequate to meet the needs of the Marine Corps 
Tactical Data Network. However, there are several key aspects of IP Multicast that must 
be properly administered when implementing it in TDN. An appropriate multicast 
address allocation mechanism must be employed, and multicast sessions must be properly 
scoped and promptly terminated. Multicast support must be implemented throughout the 
TDN. Finally, appropriate balances between reliability and throughput must be achieved 
for multicast applications. 
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E. MOBILITY 
1. Mobility Introduction 
IPv4 currently provides no explicit support for mobility. The Internet Protocol was 
designed under the assumptions that each end system (host computer) and router has only 
one point of attachment to the network, and that each point of attachment changes 
infrequently or not at all [Perkins,96b]. To facilitate efficient routing in such a static 
network configuration, the IPv4 address represents both the destination node's identity 
and location (point of attachment). By hardwiring topological significance into IP 
addresses, the original Internet architecture severely restricted IP's ability to cope with 
mobile users and networks. 
In the context ofthis study, mobility is really mobile computing. Mobile 
computing can be defined as using a computing device with a wired or wireless interface 
at different locations that cannot be accurately predicted by the network ahead of time 
[Ghosh,93]. It was noted in the previous chapter that the Tactical Data Network (TDN) 
will be required to support both mobile and non-mobile users. There is a significant trend 
toward mobile computing in commercial community as well. This has caused the IETF 
to accelerate its effort to develop mobility support within the TCPIIP protocol suite 
[Hinden, 95]. 
2. The Mobility Problem 
The mobility challenge in the tactical internet is to allow end users, wherever they 
are in the battlespace, to access network services. Examples of mobile computing in the 
tactical internet were given in the previous chapter. Mobile nodes may maintain 
communication with the network while actually on the move (roaming), or they may 
disconnect from the internet in one place and reconnect in another. The mobile node can 
be an individual foot-mobile Marine carrying a single computing device or an entire 
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command center LAN being displaced. The network must have a means of forwarding 
datagrams to the relocated mobile user no matter where he is located or connected. 
It is important to distinguish between intra-network and inter-network mobility. 
Intra-network mobility includes users who move about but remain physically connected 
to their home network either by radio, dial-up telephone or wireless LAN. Mobility of 
this type is usually handled by data link (network interface) layer protocols, such as 
MIL-STD-188-220A (tactical radio) and IEEE 802.11 (wireless LAN) [MCCDC,95b]. 
Inter-network mobility entails a user changing the physical network through which he 
accesses the internet. Inter-network mobility must be accommodated by the Internet 
Protocol suite. 
There are several approaches to solving the inter-network mobility problem. These 
can be simply summarized as: 
1. Broadcast packets for all mobile users to every subnetwork within the tactical 
internet. 
2. Send all packets for all mobile users to a "mobile node" multicast group. 
3. Have the mobile user change his IP address each time he moves to a new 
network. 
4. Have the mobile user retain the same IP address no matter where he is in the 
network. 
5. Have the mobile user maintain an up-to-date "care-of' address and have his 
home network forward his data traffic. 
The broadcast approach can be ruled out for the same reasons stated in the multicast 
section: wasted bandwidth and processing time. The advantage of the multicast option 
is its simplicity of concept. When a node "goes mobile" it joins the multicast group and 
will receive its traffic regardless of its point of network attachment. A drawback to this 
approach is that reliability and bandwidth may not scale well. A mobile multicast group 
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with a large number of members is essentially a broadcast group from the individual 
mobile node's perspective. Thus a multicast approach can overwhelm the low-bandwidth 
wireless communications links typically used by mobile nodes. 
Another drawback to the mobile multicast approach is that the network must keep 
track of which specific nodes are members of the multicast group. This is fundamentally 
different from the way IP multicast works. IP multicast routers only keep track of 
whether any members of a multicast group reside on a destination LAN, not which 
specific hosts are members [Deering,89]. This problem can be rectified by assigning 
each mobile node a unique multicast address, but such an approach complicates multicast 
routing and does not scale well for point-to-point communications. Finally, mobile 
nodes may be limited in their use of applications because IP multicast does not support 
reliable data transfer. 
The third approach of having mobile nodes.change IP addresses requires two things 
of the network: a method of assigning a temporary address to each mobile user for each 
network to which he attaches, and a method of dynamically updating the domain name 
System (DNS) to ensure correct binding of the end user's domain name to the current 
temporary IP address. A temporary address assignment method already exists: the 
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) discussed in the IP Addressing section 
above. However, a open systems standard for DHCP-to-DNS communications has not 
been established. Nor does a standard method exist within DNS to dynamically update IP 
address-to-domain name bindings. The Army uses the dynamic address-to-domain name 
approach to connect mobile data users to its Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) 
network. The Army Tactical Name Server (TNS) solves the dynamic DNS binding 
problem by employing a proprietary protocol [Spector,96]. Open systems solutions to the 
issue are being actively pursued by the IETF, and several protocol specifications are 
currently in draft form [Droms,96]. 
The strength of the DHCP approach is that the mobile end user maintains only one 
logical point of attachment to the internet. Thus DHCP routing can be kept optimal. One 
69 
of the weaknesses of this method is that it relies on both the DHCP server and the DNS 
name server to make the system work. A second weakness is that this approach requires 
every affected portion of the internet to implement mobility support protocols. 
The fourth approach whereby the mobile node retains a "permanent" IP address 
places the entire burden of maintaining mobile user connectivity on the internet's routers. 
If a mobile node is identified by an unchanging IP address regardless of where it is 
physically connected to the network, the network!D (location) portion of the node's IP 
address is of no use in routing. To compensate for this loss of functionality, the routers 
must maintain a host-specific route for every mobile node in their routing tables. 
Unfortunately, large numbers of dynamically changing host-specific routes can lead to 
routing instability, and can limit the expandability of the network. The strengths of 
host-specific routes are that DNS bindings remain stable and that no reconfiguration or 
readdressing is necessary at the end-user level. The IETF rejected this solution because 
it cannot efficiently scale to the global Internet. Therefore, the feasibility of permanent 
addressing for TDN is unlikely. 
The care-of address approach is a hybrid of the previous two. The Mobile IP 
Working Group of the IETF has proposed a mobility support extension for IP that 
essentially implements the "mail forwarding" concept. This protocol extension (called 
Mobile IP) is discussed in detail in the next section. 
3. The IETF Solution: Mobile IP 
The Mobile IP proposal was released as an Internet Draft in February 1996 
[Perkins,96b]. It is still immature and has not been field tested. Nonetheless, this 
proposal indicates the direction in which the Internet community is moving to provide 
support for mobile computing. 
Mobile IP has several basic design principles: 
•A mobile node must not have to change its IP address. 
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•A mobile node must be able to communicate with other nodes that do not 
implement Mobile IP. 
•Mobile IP must work without requiring implementation of mobility support 
throughout the entire network infrastructure. 
•All messages regarding the location of a mobile node must be authenticated. 
Mobile IP assumes that every mobile node has a home network. The home network 
is the node's usual point of attachment to the internet. For example, a battalion 
commander's C2 vehicle might be considered a mobile node whose home network is the 
battalion's Tactical Data Network. Any other network to which a mobile node is currently 
attached is called a visited or foreign network. Each mobile node is issued a "permanent" 
IP address on its home network. The fundamental concept of Mobile IP is illustrated in 
Figure 5 .11. When a mobile node is away from its home network, the mobile node uses a 
care-of address. The mobile node uses its home IP address when sending datagrams. 
Replies and incoming datagrams are also sent to that home IP address. The incoming 
traffic is intercepted by a mobility-capabable router, called the home agent, on the mobile 
node's home network. The traffice is then forwarded to the mobile node's current care-of 
address. 
This description of Mobile IP is greatly simplified, and due to a variety of other 
considerations the actual protocol remains quite complex. A mobile node may or may 
not make use of a foreign agent. A foreign agent is a router on a visited network that acts 
as a surrogate for the mobile node. Once the mobile node registers its presence with the 
foreign agent, the foreign agent performs all coordination with the appropriate home 
agent. The home agent tunnels the mobile node's incoming datagrams to the foreign 
agent's IP address. The foreign agent then delivers those datagrams to the mobile node 
via a local physical network connection. 
A network's foreign agent can support many mobile nodes. Therefore employing 









Figure 5. I I The Concept of Mobile IP. (I) A mobile node attached to a visited network sends a 
datagram to the destination host using the mobile node's home network IP address as the source address 
of the datagram. (2) The datagram is routed through the network as usual. (3) The destination host 
receives the datagram, and (4) sends a reply to the source IP address. (5) The reply is routed by the 
internet to the source IP address, i.e. the mobile node's home network. (6) The home agent intercepts 
the reply and forwards it to the mobile node's current care-of address (7) on the current visited network. 
Mobile node routing and home-agent router updates are handled separately. [Perkins, 96b] 
nodes. This is the major benefit of foreign agents. The major advantage of not using 
the foreign agent approach is that communications are not dependent on the presence of a 
foreign agent on every visited network. Mobile IP allows both methods to be used 
together in the same network. [Perkins,96b] 
Mobile IP provides an elegant solution for the type of mobility that is emerging in 
the commercial world. It also appears to meet many ofthe Marine Corps' end user 
mobility needs as well. However it falls short in one respect: the necessity ofthe home 
agent. The type of mobile node envisioned by Mobile IP is a laptop/palmtop computer 
that is moved from office to office, or office to hotel room, reconnecting to the Internet 
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at each location:· There is an implicit assumption that the node's home network (and 
home agent) remains on-line at all times. In the expeditionary tactical environment of the 
Marine Corps' TDN, continuous home-agent availability is not a valid assumption. 
Tactical command centers displace frequently. The command center's data network is 
normally unavailable during these displacements. Under the Mobile IP plan, a mobile 
node that was away from its home network during a displacement would be unable to 
communicate with the rest of the internet. Thus extensions to this approach in terms of 
procedures and protocols will likely be needed to support TDN requirements. 
4. Mobility Summary 
Overall, Mobile IP appears to be a well-thought-out protocol. It remains to be seen 
how it will mature and be implemented in real-world systems. All of the proposed 
solutions for mobility mentioned here are bound to have problems. They are attempts to 
stretch the limits of IP to support a networking environment for which it was not 
originally intended. All these proposals, and new ones that may yet be developed, will 
need to be tested to determine which best meets the mobility needs of the Marine Corps. 
F. IPV4 SUPPORT FOR QUALITY OF SERVICE (QOS) 
1. QoS Introduction 
The basic quality of service delivered by IPv4 at the internet layer is classified as 
"best effort." Any datagram handled by the IP layer will be delivered to its destination as 
soon as possible, but with no specific commitment as to bandwidth, delay or absolute 
reliability [Bradner,96a]. Using TCP over IPv4 guarantees end-to-end reliability (a part 
of QoS) but without other guarantees. Therefore, IPv4 does not offer true quality of 
service guarantees. This can be a problem for applications that need to communicate in 
real time. 
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2. Real-Time Data 
Real-time data traffic (such as audio and video) has a time-sequence structure that 
must be maintained during transmission or restored after transmission. When real-time 
data is transmitted over a shared network infrastructure like an IP internet, the time 
structure of the data can become distorted by the delays induced by intermediate 
switching nodes (routers) [Jacobson,94]. Competition among data traffic from different 
sources creates variable length queues at intermediate internet routers. These router 
R_ueuing delays can get translated into variable delays in end-to-end delivery of the 
real-time data [Braden,94]. To some extent applications can compensate for variable 
delay by buffering incoming real-time data, recovering the time sequence of the data 
packets, and then playing out the data with reconstructed timing [Jacobson,94]. Forward 
error correction can also ameliorate loss problems [Brutzman,95]. Nonetheless, the 
amount of delay that can be buffered by end-system applications is limited by memory 
size and user latencies. Thus the network must be able to bound the delay [Braden,94]. 
3. QoS Guarantees 
In order to offer quality of service guarantees the network infrastructure must have 
at least three features: 
• a means to identify the bits that require special handling. 
• a means to reserve resources across the network in order to make good on the 
guarantee. 
• a means for applications to negotiate QoS guarantees across the network. 
None of these capabilities are built into 1Pv4. TCP does have a type-ofservice field, 
which is a primitive quality of service, but it is inadequate for real-time applications. 
TCP is strictly an end-to-end protocol that cannot control the intermediate network 
infrastructure devices. 
The Internet community has made a number of proposals to create QoS features as 
add-ons to IPv4. The Reservation Setup Protocol (RSVP) and Stream Protocol 2 (ST -II) 
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are two experimental resource reservation protocols that have been in use for several 
years [Braden,94]. There are other protocols being worked on that will allow different 
qualities of service for different recipients of the same multicast data. Yet another 
working group is developing QoS negotiation methods that apply across wide-area 
networks (WANs) comprised of a mix of IP and ATM infrastructure [Borden,95]. 
Nevertheless these efforts are still experimental and commercial implementations might 
not occur until IP version 6 is ready for deployment. 
G. SECURITY 
1. Security Overview 
Security is not a strong point ofiPv4. Many of the global Internet's security 
vulnerabilities are inherent in the original protocol design. There are no security features 
built into IPv4 itself, and the few security features that do exist in other TCP/IP protocols 
are weak. Devices have been developed, however, that add security to TCP/IP networks. 
The most popular Internet security mechanism is commonly referred to as a 
firewall. Firewalls are designed to keep unwanted and unauthorized traffic from the 
global Internet out of a private network, yet still allow the private network's users to 
access Internet services. Most firewalls are merely routers that filter incoming datagrams 
based upon the datagrams source address, destination address, higher level protocol, or 
other criteria specified by the private network's security manager. More sophisticated 
firewalls employ a proxy server, also called a bastion host. The bastion host prevents 
direct access to Internet services by the private network's users (it acts as their proxy) 
while filtering out unauthorized incoming Internet traffic. [Bruno, 96] 
2. Authentication 
As mentioned in Chapter IV there are three prime security concerns for 
internetworked applications: authentication, confidentiality and integrity. Most security 
features that do exist in the TCP/IP protocols are authentication mechanisms. 
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Unfortunately the form of authentication most often used is based on insecure IP 
addresses or (worse yet) domain names. These authentication techniques are easy to 
defeat [Bradner,96a]. A common method of attack called spoofing involves imitating the 
IP address of a "trusted" host or router in order to gain access to protected information 
resources. One avenue for a spoofing attack is to exploit a feature in IPv4 known as 
source routing. 1Pv4 will allow the originator of a datagram to specify certain (or all) 
intermediate routers that the datagram must pass through on its way to the destination 
address. The destination router must send reply datagrams back through the same 
intermediate routers. By carefully constructing the source route, an attacker can imitate 
any combination of hosts or routers in the network, thus defeating an address-based or 
domain-name-based authentication scheme. Authentication security was a prime 
consideration in the development of the Internet Protocol Security Architecture (IPSEC) 
discussed in Section 5 [ Atkinson,95]. 
3. Confidentiality 
There is some support for confidentiality at the IP layer. For example, the 
Motorola Network Encryption System (NES)™ provides datagram encryption but it does 
so in a manner that seals off the protected network from the rest of the internet 
[NCCOSC,95]. All of the military services plan to use NES (or some similar device) in 
the near term to provide IP network security for the different levels of classified data 
[JIE0,95a]. Unacceptable current drawbacks toNES are an elaborate configuration 
scheme, low bandwidth, and lack of support for IP Multicast. Additionally, security for 
the TDN must not be tied to one commercial vendor. Open systems security solutions are 
needed to ensure an evolutionary upgrade path for TDN security features. 
4. Integrity 
Some measure of data integrity is provided by the TCP/IP transport layer 
protocols (TCP and UDP) which can perform error detection using checksums 
[NCCOSC,95]. In a sophisticated information warfare environment, simple checksums 
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are inadequate. True integrity assurance is obtained through the use of electronically 
signed message digests, which are not currently part of the IPv4 protocol suite 
[Russell,91]. Prototype integrity mechanisms are among the security features for IPv4 
(and also incorporated into IPv6) that have been produced by the IETF IPSEC Working 
Group [Atkinson,95]. 
5. Internet Protocol Security Architecture (IPSEC) 
Recognizing the need for greater security support within the Internet Protocol, the 
Security Working Group of the IETF published a proposed standard IP security 
architecture in 1995. The IPSEC is intended to be implemented as an option with IPv4 
and as an extension header in IPv6 (IPv6 security is discussed in the next chapter). 
[ Atkinson,95] 
The Internet Protocol Security Architecture (IPSEC) supports authentication, 
integrity and confidentiality at the datagram level. Authentication and integrity are 
provided by appending an authentication header option to the datagram. The 
authentication header makes use of public-key cryptography methods and openly 
available algorithms. Confidentiality is provided by the IP encapsulating security 
payload (ESP). ESP encrypts the datagram payload and header and attaches another 
cleartext header to the encrypted datagram. ESP can be used to set up private virtual 
networks within the Internet. Conceptually, ESP performs the same function as the 
Motorola NES. The strengths ofNES are that it works, and that it is certified by the 
National Security Agency (NSA) to carry classified information. It remains to be seen 
whether implementations of ESP will be less expensive than NES, will be certified by 
NSA, and will work better than NES in a multicast environment. 
6. Internet Protocol Security Option (IPSO). 
The IP Security Option (IPSO) is a set of security features for IP that were 
proposed in 1991 by the Department of Defense. IPSO consists of labeling datagrams 
with their level of sensitivity in much the same way that classified documents are labeled 
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and controlled. IPSO did not include encryption, just flags that routers and hosts could 
use to facilitate special handling. IPSO is not an Internet Standard, and is not included in 
all IP implementations. [ Atkinson,95] 
7. Network Management Security 
One element of IP security that has been somewhat neglected is protection of the 
network devices themselves. The Simple Network Management Protocol version 2 
(SNMPv2) was designed to strengthen authentication measures for management of 
network devices, such as routers [Comer,95]. Many of the original proposed security 
aspects of SNMPv2 [Galvin,93] were made optional or removed from the Internet 
Standards track SNMPv2 specification in March 1996 [Postel,96]. A new experimental 
security protocol for SNMPv2 has been proposed [Waters,96]. Past controversies 
indicate that successful incorporation of strong security features will not be quickly 
forthcoming. 
8. Other Security Considerations 
Because of the inherent insecurity of the Internet infrastructure, many applications 
have developed their own security features. Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) employs 
sound public-key cryptographic methods to provide security for electronic mail 
[Bruno,96]. Work is also continuing on a secure hypertext transfer protocol (S-HTTP) 
for use in Web applications [Rescoria,96]. The IETF is developing a secure protocol for 
the Domain Name System (DNS) as well.[Eastlake,96]. Massive pressure to implement 
secure commercial electronic transactions on the Internet has produced a variety of 
simultaneous efforts in this area. 
End-to-end security features will play a major role in the Defense Messaging 
System (DMS). DMS will provide user level authentication and access control, 
electronic mail authenticity, integrity, confidentiality and non-repudiation, as well as 
X.500 directory database security controls [Henderson,96]. Thus some security 
considerations can be handled by applications, independent of the network infrastructure. 
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At the physical communications layer, key-generated (KG) link encryption devices 
will continue to be employed throughout the tactical internet to protect against data 
compromise and traffic analysis [MARCORSYSCOM,95a]. 
H. SUMMARY 
The Internet Protocol is the de facto open systems internetworking standard that 
offers almost universal interoperability. It is independent of the complexities and 
vagaries that plague various proprietary and hardware-based network protocols. IP's 
simplicity and robustness have made it enormously popular, not only in the global 
Internet but also in many large private "intranets." Since IP's development in the 1970s, 
however, technology has advanced immensely and 1Pv4 is beginning to show signs of 
age. The explosive increase in the number of hosts connected to the global Internet 
coupled with the revolution taking place in mobile computing is beginning to strain the 
limits ofiP's address structure. The demands of real-time, multicast multimedia 
applications push the bounds ofiP's delivery service. The emergence of information 
warfare as a national priority is further exposing IP's security vulnerabilities. Through it 
all, however, IP continues to be the networking protocol of choice throughout the world. 
The IETF and the Internet research community are dedicated to solving the technical 
problems of the TCPIIP protocol suite. These are good reasons to believe that 1Pv4 is a 
sound protocol for the Tactical Data Network. Indeed no suitable alternative exists. 
Nevertheless 1Pv4's limitations must be recognized. It is unwise to expect that 1Pv4 will 
meet military internetworking needs beyond the current decade. 
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VI. INTERNET PROTOCOL (IP) VERSION 6 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Next Generation Internet Protocol (IPng), now formally called IP version 6 
(IPv6), is an evolutionary enhancement ofiPv4. IPv6 is designed to redress IPv4's 
shortfalls, retain IPv4's strong points, and accommodate the expected future growth and 
diversity of the global Internet. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has defined 
the formal structure of IPv6 and this new protocol is on track to become an Internet 
Standard. IPv6 will eventually replace IPv4 throughout the global Internet and in most 
private TCPIIP networks around the world. However, the Internet community does not 
intend for this transition to take place precipitously. Rather, it is expected that IPv6 and 
IPv4 will coexist for years with transition rates driven by user requirements. 
The treatment of IPv6 in this chapter parallels the discussion of IPv4 presented in 
Chapter V. Following a review of the origin ofiPv6 and the progress of its development, 
the discussion focuses on the same five salient aspects: addressing, multicast support, 
mobility support, quality of service (QoS) support, and security. The technical 
mechanisms that have been defined to facilitate smooth transition from IPv4 to IPv6 are 
also reviewed. Discussion ofthe implications ofiPv6 on the Tactical Data Network 
(TDN) architecture completes this chapter. 
B. NEED FOR A NEXT GENERATION INTERNET PROTOCOL 
The communications field is constantly changing. New technologies are introduced 
so frequently that older ones must either adapt or become obsolete. Since the original 
version of IP was developed, computing power has increased by orders of magnitude and 
the number of machines connected to the global Internet has grown from a few dozen to 
more than 4 million [Comer,95]. The fact that IPv4 accommodated these changes and 
continued to grow in popularity is a testament to the soundness of its original design. 
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However, 1Pv4 was not originally designed to support a network of universal scale or 
the interactive multimedia applications being envisioned for the future. 1Pv4 needs to be 
upgraded if the Internet Protocol suite is to survive and thrive in the 21st century. 
The astonishing growth of the global Internet provided the initial impetus to 
develop a Next Generation Internet Protocol (IPng) [Hinden,95a]. In 1991 several 
members of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) concluded that the exponential 
growth of the Internet threatened to exhaust the 1Pv4 address space by the end of 1994. 
Further, the growth in the number of separate networks connecting to the global Internet 
was causing the Internet's routing tables to fill up, thereby straining the technical capacity 
of state-of-the-art routing hardware [Bradner, 96a]. 
The IETF responded to this perceived impending crisis by recommending the 
adoption of Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) throughout the Internet in order to 
delay the exhaustion of addresses [Bradner,96a]. (As discussed in chapter V, CIDR is 
designed to better utilize the IP address space by allowing flexibility in designing 
addressing and routing hierarchy.) Initial implementation of CIDR did slow the growth 
of Internet routing tables temporarily. It is now projected that with widespread 
implementation ofCIDR in the Internet, 1Pv4 addresses might last unti12020 
[Tallerico,95]. 
Many in the IETF acknowledged that CIDR was as a short-term solution that was 
merely delaying the inevitable exhaustion of IP addresses. In addition to the growth 
issue, the nature of the Internet's use was also changing. New technology trends like 
nomadic computing, interactive multimedia and electronic commerce are emerging. 
Users want access to all network services via a single network connection, ostensibly the 
_Internet. Convinced that a long-term solution to these challenges required changes to the 
Internet Protocol itself, in 1992 the IETF solicited proposals from the Internet community 
for a next generation Internet Protocol to replace 1Pv4. [Bradner,96a] 
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C. DEVELOPMENT OF IP VERSION 6 
1. Key Players in the Process 
The development of the next generation Internet Protocol combines Internet 
architecture strategy, technical protocol design, and actual protocol software 
implementation. This subsection identifies the key organizations and participants 
involved in this development process. 
a. The Internet Society (/SOC) 
The Internet Society is an international organization concerned with the growth 
and evolution of the global Internet, as well as with the social, political and technical 
issues that arise from the use of the Internet. ISOC is composed ofboth organizational 
and individual members. The ISOC Board of Trustees oversees the Internet Standards 
process and ratifies standardization procedures. [Hovey ,96] 
b. The Internet Architecture Board (JAB) 
The Internet Architecture Board is chartered by the ISOC to provide oversight of 
the architecture and the protocols of the global Internet. The lAB advises the ISOC and 
the IETF regarding technical, architectural, policy and procedural matters pertaining the 
technologies of the Internet. The lAB performs strategic planning and identifies long 
range problems and opportunities. [Hovey,96] 
c. Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) 
The Internet Engineering Task Force is a loosely organized group of technical 
professionals who make contributions to the technological evolution of the global 
Internet. It is the principal body involved in development of specifications for protocols 
used on the Internet. The IETF is composed of numerous (currently 76) Working Groups 
that are grouped into nine Technical Areas. IETF Working Groups are intentionally 
short-term entities focusing on solving specific problems or developing specific 
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protocols. Participation in the Working Groups is open to anyone who has enough time 
and interest. Much of each group's collaboration is done via e-mail. Participants 
contribute as individuals, not as representatives of organizations. [Hovey,96] 
The open and egalitarian nature of the IETF's procedures contrasts with those of 
other standards developing bodies. For example, the International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU) and the International Organization for Standards (ISO) both tend to be 
dominated by the interests of telecommunications corporations and public 
communications utilities [Baker,94]. The open nature of the Internet standards process 
has been a major factor in the widespread acceptance and use ofTCPIIP protocols. 
d. IPng Working Group 
A special IETF working group was created to direct the development of1Pv6. 
The IPng Working Group (IPngWG) has cognizance over the development of the initial 
specifications for IPv6. Responsibility for the various aspects of1Pv6 will eventually 
shift to the cognizant functional Technical Areas, and the IPngWG will be (successfully) 
dissolved. As of this writing, the IPng Working Group is still refining specifications for 
IPv6. Information about the current progress of IPv6 is available at 
http:/ /playground. sun. com/pub/ipng/html/ipng-main. html 
and http:/ lwww. ietf cnri. reston. va. us/html. charters/ipngwg-charter. html 
e. Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG) 
The Internet Engineering Steering Group manages the technical activities of the 
IETF. Composed of the IETF Chairperson and the Directors of the IETF Technical 
Areas, the IESG administers the Internet standards process and is the deciding authority 
as to whether a protocol specification is advanced along the "standards track." [Hovey,96] 
f. Research Laboratories and Commercial Protocol Software Vendors 
Research laboratories and commercial vendors play a vital role in the Internet 
standards process. Although the IETF defines protocol specifications, it is up to software 
programmers at research laboratories and commercial vendors to produce working 
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protocol implementations. Working implementations are key because a protocol must be 
successfully and independently implemented twice in an operational environment before 
it can become an Internet Draft St(lndard. Software implementations usually follow 
shortly after Internet protocol specifications are defined because many of the working 
groups' participants are associated with commercial protocol software/hardware vendors 
and research labs. 
2. Selecting an IPng Proposal 
In 1993 the IESG chartered the IPng Working Group (IPngWG) to develop a 
recommendation for the Next Generation Internet Protocol. The IPngWG evaluated three 
candidate protocol proposals and selected the Simple Internet Protocol Plus (SIPP) as the 
best of the three. SIPP was the proposal that differed least from IPv4, had the most 
details defined and (most importantly) had the best-thought-out transition plan. 
[Bradner,96a] 
The finalized IPng recommendation presented to the IETF by IPng Working Group 
in 1994 was actually a synthesis of the three candidate proposals, combining the best 
aspects of each one. The IPngWG recommendation was approved by the IETF in 
November 1994 as the basis for IPv6. [Bradner,96a] 
3. Moving Forward: The Internet Standards Process 
To erisure that IPv6 will be widely accepted and implemented throughout the 
Internet, the IETF plans to make IPv6 an Internet Standard. An Internet Standard is a 
protocol specification that is well understood, technically sound, rind has multiple 
interoperable implementations that have worked successfully in operational networking 
environments [Bradner,96b]. IPv4 (also referred to as STD-5) is an example of an 
Internet Standard. This section briefly explains the Internet comm~ity's standards 
process to help the reader to understand IPv6's current stage of maturity. 
The Internet standards process focuses on practicality, simplicity and timeliness. 
Before becoming an Internet Standard a protocol must be proven to work. Protocol 
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documentation must be clear, concise and easy to understand. Finally a protocol must 
achieve success and acceptance within two years or it will normally be removed from the 
"standards track." [Bradner,96b] 
The IETF has defined a "standards track" to provide order to the standards 
development and approval process. A protocol that is expected to become a standard 
must evolve through the three stages of maturity in the track: Proposed Standard, Draft 
Standard and Internet Standard. [Bradner,96b] 
a. Proposed Standard 
A protocol advanced to the status of Proposed Standard is officially on the 
standards track. At the time of this writing most of the core IPv6 specifications have 
become Proposed Standards [Postel,96]. A proposed standard has the following 
characteristics: 
• well-known design choices have been resolved 
• is well understood 
• has received significant review by the Internet community 
• appears to enjoy interest and support 
• has not yet been implemented operationally 
• may be changed or even retracted if experience is not positive 
Protocol specifications are declared proposed standards only by decision of the 
IESG. Before an official IESG decision is made, the cognizant IETF working group 
usually releases its working draft of the protocol specification to the Internet community. 
These Internet Drafts invite informal comments regarding refinement of the 
specification. Once the IESG approves the specification as a Proposed Standard, the 
specification is published as a Request for Comments (RFC). Each RFC is given a 
unique number, and the protocol specification is always identified with that RFC number 
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throughout its lifetime. A protocol must remain in Proposed Standard status for a 
minimum of six months before it can be considered for advancement to Draft Standard. 
[Bradner,96b] 
b. Draft Standard 
A protocol specification advanced to Draft Standard is almost certain to become 
an Internet Standard. Draft standards usually have at least tw<:> interoperable real-world 
implementations with substantial operational experience. Specifications must remain in 
Draft Standard status for at least four months before being considered for advancement to 
Internet Standard. Vendors can safely begin commercial implementations of a protocol 
in this stage of maturity because it is unlikely to change before becoming a standard 
[Bradner,96b]. At the time of this writing none ofthe 1Pv6 specifications have yet 
become Draft Standards [Postel,96]. 
c. Internet Standard 
Internet Standards are highly mature protocol specifications with successful and 
stable operational implementations. A standard can be classified as required, 
recommended or elective. A required standard must be implemented by any system 
claiming to be TCP/IP compliant. As an example, 1Pv4 is a required standard. TCP, on 
the other hand, is a recommended standard. If another transport layer protocol better 
satisfies a vendor's needs, the vendor does not have to implement TCP in his "TCPIIP 
stack." However the IETF strongly encourages vendors to include recommended 
standards in all implementations. Finally, implementation of elective standards by 
vendors is optional. [Bradner,96b] 
The current status of all Internet protocol specifications is contained in Internet 
Official Protocol Standards (STD-1) which is updated and published quarterly as an RFC 
[Postel,96]. Every Internet Standard is documented in an RFC, but not every RFC is an 
Internet Standard. [Bradner,96b] 
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4. Current State of Progress in 1Pv6 Development 
a. IETF Protocol Work 
Much of the technical protocol specification work for IPv6 has already been 
completed. The details of the IPv6 packet structure, addressing architecture and security 
architecture have been approved as Proposed Standards [Postel,96]. Some of the 
peripheral protocols that will interact with IPv6 are not yet fully specified, and work 
continues on several IPv6 packet extension headers. The specification for IPv6 mobility 
support [Perkins,96a] is still in draft stage at the time of this writing. Likewise quality of 
service (QoS) functionality has not been completely defined. IPv6 support for mobility 
and QoS are subjects of continued research and are discussed later in this chapter. 
b. Host Implementations 
The basic structure of IPv6 has stabilized and vendors and laboratories have 
begun development of IPv6 software that can be implemented on host computers (end 
systems). Commercial IPv6 prototype software is being developed by Sun Microsystems 
Inc. and Hewlett-Packard Inc. among others. Product versions ofiPv6 software are 
expected to be available by the end of 1997 [Medlin,96]. Further, the Institut National de 
Recherche en Infromatique et en Automatique (INRIA) and the Naval Research 
Laboratory (NRL) have each developed an experimental IPv6 host implementation based 
on the Berkeley Software Design (BSD) version of UNIX [Tallerico,95]. Current 
information regarding host implementations of IPv6 software is tracked by the IPng 
Working Group of the IETF and is posted on the IPng Web page [Hinden,96] at 
http:/ /playground. sun. comlpublipnglhtml/ipng-main. html 
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c. Router Implementations 
Development of IPv6 router implementations has been slower than development 
of host implementations. The main reason for this problem is that key aspects of1Pv6 
routing have not been fully defined. Nonetheless, several commercial router vendors are 
developing preliminary versions of1Pv6 routing software anyway. Cisco Systems Inc., 
Bay Networks Inc. (Wellfleet routers) and Ipsilon Networks Inc. all have prototype IPv6 
routing implementations, but none of these companies has made source code publicly 
available [Reitzel,96]. Progress on router implementations is also maintained on the 
IPng Web page [Hinden,96]. 
d. /Pv6 Implementation Testing 
Preliminary third-party testing of the INRIA prototype IPv6 host implementation 
was conducted by Mitre Corporation in 1995. The test results are promising. Mitre 
successfully used IPv6 to establish TELNET and FTP sessions between two hosts on the 
same physical network. Further, Mitre was able to "tunnel" IPv6 packets between two 
IPv6 hosts using an IPv4-only network backbone. This tunneling capability is a key IPv6 
transition mechanism, and is described in more detail later in this chapter. [Tallerico,95] 
Thus far the only public testing of IPv6 router implementations was conducted 
at the University ofNew Hampshire (UNH) Interoperability Laboratory in February 
1996. Most ofthe U.S. vendors and laboratories who had any type of prototype IPv6 
software (host or router) demonstrated it at the UNH event. Initial reports from 
participants [Grehan,96] suggested that most implementations were highly successful, but 
no documentation of the test results has been released. The testing plan for the UNH 
event is available at 
http:llwww.iol.unh.edu/general!IOL-News Items!IP-l-22-96.html 
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5. Future Developments to Watch 
Progress in the development of routing implementations will be a barometer for 
gauging the maturity of1Pv6. In order for a network to fully benefit from IPv6's 
increased address space, reduced packet processing overhead, quality of service controls, 
native multicast capability and embedded security, IPv6 software must be implemented 
in the network's routers. Large-scale transition from IPv4 to IPv6 will not be feasible 
until stable IPv6 routing implementations are available. The IPng Working Group has 
recognized this fact and is endeavoring to establish an IPv6 "backbone" within the 
Internet to study and test IPv6 implementations similar to the way MBone is employed 
now to study multicast [Reitzel,96]. Thus far the "6-Bone" plan has been stymied 
because no IPv6 routing software code is publicly available [Reitzel,96]. It is wise for 
the Marine Corps, DISA and the other military services to track this IETF project closely 
because it is likely to tinearth problems that tactical and strategic networks might 
encounter when making the transition from IPv4 to IPv6. 
D. OVERVIEW OF THE IPV6 SPECIFICATIONS 
IPv6 does not represent a revolutionary replacement of the Internet Protocol. 
Rather, it is an evolutionary step forward from IPv4. IPv6 retains the fundamental 
connectionless packet delivery service of IPv4 but also adds new functionality to improve 
scalability and to support a broader range of applications. The major improvements of 
IPv6 over IPv4 include [Tallerico,95]: 
• Expansion of the address space and a more versatile address hierarchy. 
• A new type of addressing called anycast that is conceptually a cross between 
unicast and multicast. 
• Allowable use of non-globally unique (link-local and site-local) addresses on 
networks that are connected to the global Internet. 
• IP address autoconfiguration that enables "plug and play" connection to the 
network. 
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• A simplified IP packet header to reduce the per-packet computational load on 
network routers. 
• Provision for future addition of protocol features through use of extension 
headers. 
• Native multicast capability (IP Multicast) and an improved mechanism for 
controlling the scope of multicast sessions. 
• A new flow label field in the 1Pv6 packet header that provides a mechanism for 
controlling quality of service (QoS). 
• Elimination of 1Pv4 requirements that were determined to be redundant during 
1Pv4 operational experience. 
• Native support for security at the IP (internet) layer. 
The IPng Working Group has also developed a number of protocol mechanisms that 
allow 1Pv4 and 1Pv6 to coexist within a network in order to facilitate a smooth transition 
to 1Pv6. Each of the capabilities listed above and the corresponding transition 
mechanisms are discussed in further detail in the following sections. 
E. IPV6 ADDRESSING 
1. Overview of 1Pv6 Addressing 
The original impetus for the 1Pv6 development was the need for more IP address 
space. Therefore many of the differences between 1Pv4 and 1Pv6 relate to addressing. 
This section discusses the IP address format and hierarchical structure, the new address 
type called anycast, 1Pv6 address autoconfiguration, and 1Pv6 routing considerations. 
2. 1Pv6 Address Format 
a. Address Notation in 1Pv6 
1Pv6's most visible and well known feature is its 128-bit address. The current 
32-bit 1Pv4 address is composed of four 8-bit octets, and is usually written in a dotted 
decimal form (e.g. 131.120.50.202). The 128-bit IPv6 address is composed of eight 
16-bit double octets. This makes the IPv6 address awkward to represent in decimal form. 
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Instead, IPv6 addresses are 'expressed as hexadecimal (base 16) numbers (one hex number 
for each double octet) separated by colons. An example IPv6 address in this colon-hex 
notation is 153F:102A:1224:67A4:903F:65EA:7898:78A4. In practice it is expected that 
many IPv6 addresses will contain several zero-valued double-octets. For brevity a string 
of zero valued double-octets is represented by a double colon. For example, the address 
10A4:0:0:0:0:3A23:1178:2345 can be written more compactly as 
10A4::3A23:1178:2345. IPv4 addresses in dotted decimal notation can be easily 
converted to colon-hex notation by adding the double colon to the left of the first octet as 
in this example: ::131.120.50.202. The latter notation maps IPv4 addresses into the 
IPv6 address space, and is one of the transition mechanisms discussed in Section J of this 
chapter [Carl-Mitchell,95]. 
The 128-bit IPv6 address length was a compromise between the IETF members 
who wanted to accommodate immense growth of Internet address requirements and those 
IETF members who wanted to constrain IP overhead in order to accommodate mobile 
Internet users (who presumably access the network over low bandwidth communications 
links using less powerful computers). The IPv6 address space is indeed immense. 
Theoretically, more that 100 million unique IPv6 addresses could be assigned to every 
person alive in the world today and there would still be millions of addresses left over. 
In fact only 15 percent of the IPv6 address space has been allocated for use. The 
remaining 85 percent is reserved for future requirements [Hinden,95b]. 
b. Addressing Hierarchy in 1Pv6 
The increased length of IPv6 addresses permits greater flexibility in defining the 
addressing hierarchy. The original IPv4 address space had only one level of hierarchy 
and three classes (network sizes). Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) expanded the 
IPv4 address hierarchy somewhat by allowing a 32-bit IPv4 address to be partitioned 
arbitrarily between network!D and host!D. The method of indicating address hierarchy in 
IPv6 is essentially the same as the method used for CIDR. However, IPv4's 32-bit 
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address length severely limits the levels of hierarchy that CIDR can define. The fact that 
a substantial portion of the total IPv4 address space has already been allocated using the 
less efficient three-class structure further restricts the effectiveness of CIDR. 
The IPv6 address allocation architecture [Rekhter,95] seeks to support 
decentralized administration of address assignment and to reduce the amount of 
computation, memory and bandwidth consumed by routing. Both of these goals are 
attainable through hierarchical addressing and routing. By partitioning the IPv6 address 
into several hierarchical tiers, large blocks of addresses can be allocated to international 
or regional address assignment authorities. Those address blocks can be further 
partitioned and the control of assignment within blocks can be passed down the hierarchy. 
Below each level of the hierarchy every host and router shares a common address prefix. 
This greatly reduces the amount of routing information that must be exchanged among 
routers (particularly routers on the backbone). Currently all IPv4 address assignments 
are made by a central authority (InterN! C) and there need not be any correlation between 
two network number assignments, regardless of physical or logical proximity. For 
example, the Marine Corps can be assigned two unrelated IP network address blocks for 
two networks that are on the same Marine Corps base. [Rekhter,95] 
A hierarchical IPv6 address allocation plan called the Provider-Based Unicast 
Address Format is currently in draft stage [Rekhter,96b ]. This plan defines a three-tiered 
hierarchy consisting of registries, providers, and subscribers. Addresses are partitioned as 
depicted in Figure 6.1 below. 
5 bits n bits 56-n bits 64 bits 
010 Registry ID Provide riD Subscriber ID Intra-Subscriber 
Figure 6.1 Proposed IPv6 Unicast Address Format. After [Rekhter,96b]. 
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The leftmost three bits indicate that this a unicast address. The Registry ID 
identifies the IPv6 address assignment authority that assigned the address. Registries are 
expected to encompass broad geographic areas, and currently only four IPv6 address 
registries have been identified. The Internet Assigned Number Authority (lANA) will 
serve as the principal global IPv6 address registry and will assign large blocks of 
addresses to three other regional registries. The registries can then allocate blocks of 
addresses to providers (operators of transit IP networks). The Provider ID identifies the 
Internet provider from which the address is obtained. The Subscriber ID identifies the 
major organization (e.g. corporation, campus, military base) to which the address 
belongs, and the Intrasubscriber portion can be allocated as the subscriber sees fit. There 
is no prescribed length for the Provider ID or the Subscriber ID but both together must 
total 56 bits. Each of the fields in this proposed address format can be further subdivided 
using a procedure much like the subnetting described in Chapter V. [Rekhter ,96b] 
It is not clear where the military services will fit into this address hierarchy. A 
separate military registry will probably not be necessary. It is more likely that the 
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) will be considered the Internet provider, 
since it provides NIPRNET and SIPRNET connectivity for the military, and each service 
will be issued subscriber blocks of addresses. 
3. 1Pv6 Address Types 
In precise terms, Internet Protocol (IP) addresses refer to specific network 
interfaces rather than specific network nodes [Comer,95]. The distinction is subtle but 
important. The term node implies a single machine that is physically connected to the 
internet. A network interface is a more specific identity than either host or node, because 
a host or node can have multiple physical and logical network interfaces. For example, a 
router (node) has at least two ports, each of which physically connects to a different 
network. Therefore a router has at least two network interfaces. A network interface can 
also be logical. For example, a domain name server and Web server that reside on the 
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same host computer may have different logical network names and interfaces, even 
though their host may have only one physical network interface [Bradner,96a]. The 
distinction between interfaces and nodes is helpful in understanding IPv6 address types. 
The 1Pv6 addressing architecture [Hinden,95b] defines three types of addresses: 
unicast, multicast, and anycast. Of significant note is that 1Pv4-style broadcasting is no 
longer used because it wastes bandwidth and processing time. A unicast address 
identifies a single network interface such that a packet sent to a unicast address is 
delivered to only that one interface. A multicast address identifies a set of interfaces such 
that a packet sent to a multicast address is delivered to every interface in the set. 
Conceptually, unicast and multicast are identical in both 1Pv6 and 1Pv4. The anycast 
address (also referred to as a cluster address) is a new concept introduced by 1Pv6. 
Any casting is discussed in the next section. [Hinden,95b] 
4. Anycasting 
Functionally, anycast is a cross between unicast and multicast. An any cast address 
identifies a set of interfaces (any cast group) such that a packet sent to an any cast address 
is delivered to only one of the interfaces in the set. The interface to which the packet is 
delivered is the one determined by the routing algorithm to be the "closest." There is no 
way to distinguish an anycast address from a unicast address syntactically, i.e. by 
inspection. Anycast and unicast addresses are both assigned from the unicast address 
space. Nodes must be specifically configured to recognize a particular 1Pv6 address as 
belonging to an anycast group. The IETF has not specified a method for managing 
anycasting. One proposed method [Partridge,93] employs the same techniques and 
protocols that are used in managing IP Multicast groups. [Hinden,95b] 
Anycasting is immature and its application is not well understood. The Internet 
community envisions using anycasting to support policy-based routing. Policy-based 
routing is the exerting of control over the geographical and topological flow of data 
packets through the internet (much like source routing in IPv4). The Internet community 
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believes that organizations and individuals who are paying for Internet services from 
specific providers need a means of assuring that their chosen provider transports their 
data traffic. To provide such assurance each Internet provider might be assigned his own 
anycast address that identifies all of that provider's routers. Inserting the provider's 
anycast address in an IPv6 packet header is intended to ensure that the packet will transit 
the provider's network. [Bradner,96a] 
It is less clear how the military might apply anycasting to enforce policy-based 
routing. Secure routing is one possible application. The military's widespread use of link 
encryption makes its data networks more secure than commercial and public networks. 
Furthermore, the military has little control over the bandwidth/switching capacity and 
allocation schemes of outside networks. Therefore it makes sense to transport military 
data traffic over military networks as much as possible. The suggestion has also been 
made to use policy-based routing to segment different data types onto specific 
subnetworks within the tactical internet [ Adamson,96]. It is not clear whether using 
anycast addresses can support this segmentation. 
There are many other potential uses for anycasting besides policy-based routing. 
Morales [96] proposes employing anycast addresses to deliver Defense Messaging 
System (DMS) data traffic to Navy ships at sea. Anycasting can also be applied in the 
tactical internet to make it easier for end users to locate well-known network services. 
(This process is often called resource location.) In order to ensure a high degree of 
availability the tactical internet must have distributed and mirrored databases and servers, 
i.e. multiple sites containing identical information. Users who access geoposition 
databases, Web servers and DNS name servers do not really care which specific computer 
supplies the information as long as the information is accurate, timely and complete. 
Therefore, a single any cast address might be assigned to a group of mirrored databases or 
Web serv~rs to make them easier to find. When a user sends a packet to that anycast 
address, the server that is nearest the user will respond. Similarly a single anycast 
address might also be consistently assigned to all of the Domain Name System (DNS) 
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-- - -- ---- -- --- ----------------------------------, 
servers within the Marine Corps Tactical Data Network. This eliminates the need to 
configure each host with the address of its local name server because any casting reaches 
the nearest server by default. In each of the examples given above the actual location of 
the server is initially transparent to the user. This is an advantage in a network as mobile 
and rapidly changing as the Marine Corps tactical internet. 
Some protocol interface details will have to be worked out in practice to make IPv6 
any cast addresses usable by current higher layers. The use of anycasting (a 
connectionless process). for resource location might confuse a connection-oriented 
protocol like TCP. A TCP connection is only established between two end points. 
However any casting cannot guarantee that the same end point (server or database in this 
example) will receive all of the any cast packets because the network's routers have no 
way to keep track of where previous any cast packets were delivered. Depending on 
network topology changes and the routing algorithms in use, the first packet of a TCP 
connection might go to one server and the second packet to a different server. This is a 
situation that TCP cannot handle. One solution to this problem is to use anycasting to 
make the initial contact with the server and then have the server reply with its own 
unicast address (i.e. locate the resource). A unicast TCP connection might then be 
established using unicast addresses. [Partridge,93] 
It is useful to compare anycasting and multicasting for locating resources. The 
most important advantages of using anycasting for this purpose in the tactical internet are 
bandwidth conservation and routing simplicity. Resource location with multicasting 
often involves sending multiple datagrams over multiple paths. Using anycast, only one 
packet is sent (assuming no packet loss) over one path to the nearest server. Further, 
multicast routing is more complex than the unicast routing needed for anycast. 
[Partridge,93] 
Anycasting also raises several security concerns. Anycasting promotes network 
security in that the actual IP addresses of well-known network services do not need to be 
published to end users. Only after authenticating a client will the server reply with its 
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own IP address (in the case ofTCP connections). Thus an anycast IP address can shield a 
server or database from attack to some degree. However anycasting also introduces 
security vulnerabilities. A malicious host or software program might "volunteer" to be a 
server in an anycast address group and feed false information to clients [Partridge,93]. 
Malicious software might also conduct a denial-of-service attack by joining the anycast 
group and simply accepting (but not replying) all data traffic sent to the anycast address. 
Thus far the IPng Working Group has tried to reduce the security risks of anycasting by 
specifying in the IPv6 addressing architecture "an anycast address MUST NOT be 
assigned to an IPv6 host, that is, it may be assigned to an IPv6 router only" 
[Hinden,95b]. This rule severely restricts the applications of any cast in the tactical 
internet. All in all, anycast addressing has promising potential but a more suitable 
security solution for anycast vulnerabilities must be found. 
5. Address Autoconfiguration in 1Pv6 
Autoconfiguration enables "plug-and-play" connection to the network. Address 
autoconfiguration is a feature that allows a host to legitimately acquire one or more IP 
addresses for itself and to associate those addresses with the host's network interface. A 
host's IP addresses need to be configured each time a network interface is initialized, 
which normally occurs when the computer boots up [Bradner,96a]. A interface must be 
reconfigured whenever its IP address changes, such as when the host is moved to a 
different subnetwork. As described in Chapter V, configuration/reconfiguration is 
typically done manually by systems administrators. With the advent of multiple 
addresses per host and widespread mobility of end-user computing devices, manual 
address configuration will no longer be feasible. Further, it is likely that portions of the 
Internet will have to be renumbered after the introduction of IPv6. This process must be 
made as "painless" as possible to facilitate the IPv4 to IP.v6 transition. Therefore, another 
goal of the IPv6 specification is to allow plug-and-play connection (and reconnection) to 
the Internet. Although autoconfiguration has been employed for a number of years in 
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local-area networking (data link layer) technologies such as Novell Net Ware and 
AppleTalk, there has been much less experience with IP layer 
autoconfiguration. [Bradner ,96a] 
1Pv6 has two methods of autoconfiguration: stateful and stateless. Stateful 
autoconfiguration will be accomplished by an updated version of the Dynamic Host 
Configuration Protocol (DHCP) that was described in Chapter V. The stateful method 
requires the DHCP server to have prior knowledge of the state (e.g. how many hosts) of 
the link on which it is assigning addresses. The stateless method requires no manual 
configuration of hosts and does not depend upon the presence of servers. Hosts are 
permitted to form their own addresses by combining a unique "network interface token" 
(probably the unique 48-bit Ethernet hardware address) with the subnet prefix that is 
periodically advertised by the local router. The stateless method of autoconfiguration is 
meant to be used in networks where the specific address used by an interface is not really 
important as long as the address is unique and routable. Such a system may not work 
locally if the network managers want to predefine addresses down to the host level. 
[Thomson,95] 
Another feature of 1Pv6 that facilitates plug-and-play operation is the addition of 
site-local and link-local addressing. Every host will have a link-local address that can be 
used for IP communications on the physical link to which the host is attached. Routers 
will not forward packets containing link-local addresses, so link-local addresses are 
limited to use local LAN segments. Site-local addresses use a reserved portion of the 
global 1Pv6 address space, but do not need to be assigned by a global addressing 
authority. Site-local addresses are intended to be used on networks that are not currently 
connected to the global Internet but may establish an Internet connection in the future. If 
the network eventually is connected to the Internet, its site-local addresses can be retained 
and used with the addition of a globally-unique subscriber ID address prefix. Link-local 
and site-local addresses greatly expand the number of addresses that can be used by an 
organization. However, it does not appear wise to use link-local and site-local addresses 
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in the tactical internet. The 1Pv6 address space is so huge that sufficient globally unique 
addresses can be obtained to accommodate both current requirements and future growth 
of the Tactical Data Network (TDN). [Hinden,95b] 
6. 1Pv6 Routing Considerations 
Routing and addressing are inextricably linked in TCPIIP intemetworking. One of 
the key design goals of 1Pv6 was to simplify routing by introducing global addressing 
hierarchy and streamlining the 1Pv6 packet header [Bradner,96a]. Although the 1Pv6 
address is four times larger than the 1Pv4 address, the 1Pv6 header is only twice as large 
as the 1Pv4 header [Deering,95]. Furthermore, routing option information was moved out 
of the basic 1Pv6 packet header and into new packet extension headers. The significance 
of this design is that (unlike 1Pv4) intermediate routers using 1Pv6 need not inspect the 
optional extension information, so routing is simpler [Carl-Mitchell,95]. It remains to be 
seen in practice whether the per-packet costs of routing 1Pv6 will be less than those of 
1Pv4. 
Another routing simplification feature of 1Pv6 is the elimination of packet 
fragmentation by intermediate nodes. If an 1Pv4 datagram is too large for a data link 
layer protocol to handle, any 1Pv4 router can break the datagram into smaller pieces 
(fragment it) for transmission over that link. The datagram is reassembled 
(de-fragmented) by the next 1Pv4 router in the path. Because fragmentation is 
computationally expensive, only the source and destination nodes are alloweq to fragment 
an 1Pv6 packet. This requires the 1Pv6 end nodes to discover the largest packet size 
(called MTU) that can traverse the entire path (route) without having to be fragmented. 
Indeed, a protocol for MTU discovery in 1Pv6 is now in draft stage [McCann,96]. 
However, end nodes can also choose to forego MTU discovery by restricting the size of 




Routers using IPv4-only routing software will not be able to route native IPv6 
packets. Nor will IPv6-only routing software handle native IPv4 packets. The packet 
sizes and structures of the two protocols are different and the address hierarchies are 
dissimilar. (Section J of this chapter discusses protocol mechanisms that allow IPv4-IPv6 
interoperability.) However, conceptually IPv6 routing will be much like IPv4 routing 
[Bradner,96a]. The standard IPv4 routing protocols now being used in most TCP/IP 
networks, namely Open Shortest Path First version 2 (OSPFv2) and Border Gateway 
Protocol4 (BGP-4), will be upgraded to handle IPv6's longer addresses and new packet 
format [Tallerico,95]. It is likely that deployed IPv6 routing software will still retain 
backwards compatibility with IPv4 packets. 
7. 1Pv6 Addressing Summary 
The Tactical Data Network (TDN) architecture must include provisions for 
transitioning to IPv6 addressing. The hierarchical structure of IPv6 addresses will 
significantly impact the TDN tactical IP address plan and the routing of datagrams 
through the tactical internet. Autoconfiguration is needed to simplify network 
administration, allow plug-and-play TDN connectivity and facilitate mobility. Finally, 
anycasting will provide a powerful tool for making the network infrastructure more 
transparent to end systems. 
F. IPV6 MULTICAST SUPPORT 
Multicast support in IPv6 is not substantially different from IPv4 (IP Multicast). 
The most significant change is that all IPv6 implementations must have native multicast 
capability. This will eliminate the need to tunnel multicast packets across unicast-only 
routers in the way that MBone does today. This universal multicast capability must be 
exploited by both the tactical internet architects and the developers of tactical applications 
software. Multicast capability inherent in lower-level networking technology is only part 
of the solution. Higher-layer applications must also be configured to take advantage of 
the multicast support provided by the lower protocol layers. 
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1Pv6 does not address the reliable multicast requirement specifically, since reliable 
multicast is a transport layer function and not an internet layer function. 1Pv6 must fulfill 
the requirements of a bearer service and support a broad range of higher-layer 
applications. Thus quality of service features such as reliability cannot be "hard coded" 
into the baseline Internet Protocol. 
The Marine Corps C41 development community needs to track multicast research 
efforts such as the :MBone [Kumar,96b ], and also follow the muiticast development efforts 
of commercial firms such as Starburst Communications [Starburst,96]. Transport layer 
protocols must be devised that support reliable multicast in ways that are implementable 
and scaleable [Knight,96]. Finally, multicast capability must be made a requirement for 
new and re-engineered software applications. 
G. IPV6 MOBILITY SUPPORT 
Support for mobile hosts, networks and subnetworks is a primary design 
requirement for 1Pv6 .[Bradner,96a]. The protocol specification for mobility support in 
1Pv6 is in draft form and is similar to the Mobile IP protocol described in Chapter V. 1Pv6 
improves upon Mobile IP by reducing the importance of the home agent, allowing direct 
communication between mobile nodes and other nodes in the internet. Using 1Pv6 a 
mobile node can make its current IP address known to the other nodes (mobile or 
stationary) with which the mobile node is communicating. These other "correspondent" 
nodes can then communicate directly with the mobile node without going through the 
mobile node's home agent. For security reasons the mobile node need not reveal its 
current IP address to any node except its own home agent. Therefore, 1Pv6 can employ 
either direct or indirect (tunneling) routing to support mobile nodes. Another significant 
change in the 1Pv6 mobility plan is that it requires all routers in the network to be capable 
of acting as home agents. Thus mobility support is assured in all portions of the internet 
that are employing 1Pv6. [Perkins,96a] 
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IPv6 does not address how a mobile node is to maintain TCP connections while 
changing IP addresses. (TCP uses the IP addresses and port numbers of the end points to 
identify a connection.) This points to the need for an integrated mobility solution that 
encompasses the transport and internet protocol layers. However, the draft IPv6 mobility 
plan does mention a potential security problem that might result from mobile nodes 
trying to access networks which are protected by firewalls [Perkins,96a]. Firewalls that 
filter packets on the basis of the packet's source address might deny access to a mobile 
node that has moved to an "untrusted" network. The IPv6 plan does not propose a 
solution to this problem but stresses the need for one [Perkins,96a]. This further 
illuminates the inadequacy of address-based and name-based authentication methods (as 
discussed in Chapter V) and reinforces the requirement for integral, robust packet security 
features in IPv6. 
Seamless access to network services is a required objective capability of the 
tactical internet [MCCDC,95a]. Although neither Mobile IP nor IPv6 offer complete 
solutions to mobile computing, the Internet community is continuing active research in 
this area. Mobile IP is too immature at this point for the Marine Corps to make a final 
decision as to whether to implement it in TDN. The preferred solution is an open system 
standard that will be widely implemented and available in commercial software. 
Nonetheless, other internet mobility solutions such as the Army's proprietary Tactical 
Name Server (TNS) must be evaluated for potential incorporation into TDN in case the 
open systems protocol does not develop fast enough. Market forces and similar design 
requirements make it likely that Mobile IP will become robust enough to meet Marine 
Corps needs in a timely manner. 
H. IPV6 QUALITY OF SERVICE (QOS) SUPPORT 
Besides the need to increase address space, quality of service (QoS) support was the 
most important feature that needed to be designed into IPv6 [Bradner,96a]. IPv6 will 
offer a choice of QoS levels beyond the single "best effort" delivery service offered by 
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1Pv4. With these added QoS capabilities 1Pv6 will provide a better range of support to 
real-time data traffic. Although 1Pv6's QoS features are anxiously anticipated by the 
Internet community,- these features are still in the experimental stage of development 
[Deering,95]. 
The primary QoS mechanisms provided by 1Pv6 are the flow label and priority 
fields of the 1Pv6 data packet header. A flow is a sequence of data packets sent from a 
particular source (usually a single host) to a destination for which the source (or sender) 
desires special handling by the network [Deering,95]. A flow is analogous to a virtual 
circuit or a connection. Figure 6.2 lists some data traffic types that can be classified as 
flow-oriented, contrasted with non-flow-oriented data traffic which typically consists of 
only a few packets. A flow is uniquely identified by the combination of the packet's 
source address and non-zero value in the packet's flow label field. An 1Pv6 packets that 
is not part of a flow has a flow label value of zero and receives the internet's default 
best-effort delivery service. [Deering,95] 
1Pv6 does not specify exactly how the flow label is to be used. Of course the type 
of special handling required or desired for a particular flow must be communicated to the 
network's routers (QoS negotiation) by some means. The emerging standard for QoS 
negotiation over IP is the Resource Reservation Protocol (RSVP~ [Braden,96]. Hosts 
and routers use RSVP to deliver QoS requests to all nodes along the path of the data 
stream, typically resulting in a reservation of bandwidth for that particular data flow. 
FLOW-ORIENTED TRAFFIC SHORT -LIVED TRAFFIC 
file transfer protocol (FTP) data Domain Name System (DNS) query 
TELNET session Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) data 
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) data Network timing protocol (NTP) 
Web image download Point-of-presence (POP) 
Multimedia audio/video SNMP network management queries 
Distribute Interactive Simulation (DIS) streams 
Figure 6.2 Flow-oriented data versus non-flow-oriented data. [Ipsilon,96] 
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Since RSVP is designed for use over both IPv4 and IPv6, it does not make use of the .flow 
label field in the IPv6 packet header [Braden,96]. The details of RSVP are currently 
being worked out experimentally, while the major router vendors have expressed plans to 
support RSVP in the near future [Rogers,96]. 
The priority field label specifies the delivery priority of data packets relative to the 
other data packets from the same source [Deering,95]. All packets belonging to a 
particular flow must have the same priority, so prioritization can also be done by flow 
label. It is expected that the priority field will be used to identify interactive and 
control-oriented data traffic as having higher priority than electronic mail and other 
non-interactive applications [Bradner,96a]. This prioritization by data type falls short of 
the tactical internet's requirement for prioritization among sources noted in Chapter IV. 
Therefore a priority mechanism must be employed within TDN in addition to the IPv6 
priority field This may require explicit reservations of bandwidth on intermediate 
routers for the highest priority users or end systems. 
As in the cases of multicast, mobility and security-, IPv6 is not the complete 
solution to TDN's quality of service requirements. Ensuring end-to-end QoS requires a 
cooperative effort between the end-user applications, the transport and internet layer 
protocols, intermediate routers and the underlying physical network. This is an 
immensely complex problem involving QoS negotiation methods, appropriate routing 
metrics, and authentication mechanisms [Borden,95]. Of particular concern to the Marine 
Corps and the other military services is how IPv6 and Asynchronous Transfer Mode 
(ATM) might coexist and complement one another. DISA plans to migrate to an 
ATM -based joint tactical communications architecture in the near term, but has not 
specified the extent of ATM deployment within the joint network [JIE0,95a]. The likely 
architecture will be a mixture of IP routers and ATM switches in the internetwork and a 
few pockets of ATM LANs. Although unicast IPv4-over-ATM has been feasible for 
several years, it is not at all clear how IPv6 can mesh its QoS capability with that of 
ATM. For example, there are fundamental differences between RSVP's QoS negotiation 
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method and ATM signaling. (An extensive treatment of issues regarding integration of 
IP and ATM quality of service controls can be found in [Borden,95]). Further 
complicating the issue are both the inherent complexity of ATM, lack of many-to-many 
multicast in ATM, and the fact that no single and stable A TM standards process has yet 
emerged. 
A proprietary solution to IPv4-ATM integration called IP Switching has been 
developed by Ipsilon Networks [Ipsilon,96]. IP switches dynamically choose between IP 
routing (in software) and ATM switching (in hardware) depending on the nature of the 
data traffic. This technology sounds promising but it relies on proprietary protocols 
which may restrict its availability and multi-source competition. An open systems 
solution is being pursued collaboratively by the IP-over-A TM and Integrated Services 
Working Groups of the IETF. Several draft proposals for IPv6 over A TM are being 
evaluated [Armitrage,96], but it may be several years before any widely acceptable and 
implementable solution is found. Current information regarding the progress of these 
efforts can be found at the working groups Web pages [Hinden,96] at 
http://www. ietf cnri. reston. va. us/htmlcharters/ipatm-charter. html and 
http://www. ietf cnri. reston. va. us/htmlcharters/intserv-charter. html 
IPv6 will be a quantum leap forward from IPv4 in terms of providing QoS support. 
Although massive bandwidth can eliminate many QoS bottlenecks [Brutzman,96], such 
bandwidth is unlikely to be available within the tactical internet. Therefore it is expected 
that tactical applications will develop more detailed and more demanding ryquirements 
for delivery control. Furthermore a requirement will emerge to integrate quality of 
service guarantees across the disparate networking technologies of the tactical internet. 
The Internet community and commercial vendors are actively pursuing methods of 
making varied internetworking technologies like IP and ATM intemperate seamlessly. 
The prudent course of action over the next one-to-two years is to remain patient and 
allow these solutions to materialize. 
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I. IPV6 SECURITY 
Security in the Internet is such a critical problem that solutions must be developed 
and implemented without waiting for IPv6. The IPv4 security architecture outlined in 
Chapter IV extends to IPv6 as well. Differences are confined to the method of 
implementation in the packet headers. The Security Architecture for the Internet 
Protocol [Atkinson,95] is on the standards track as a Proposed Standard [Postel,96]. 
When IPv6 is deployed, network infrastructure security will become even more 
important than it is now. IPv6 mobility support requires that mobile nodes are 
authenticated before joining the network, and meanwhile the mobile node's own location 
must be protected from those in the network who don't have a "need to know." 
Autoconfiguration mechanisms (DHCP and DNS) might be exploited by network 
intruders if proper authentication procedures are not enforced at the network level. 
Unprotected quality of service options in IPv6 might increase the vulnerability of the 
tactical internet to both intentional and unintentional denial-of-service attacks. Finally as 
the military becomes more network-centric in its approach to C4I, control and disruption 
of the network infrastructure devices themselves becomes a more likely avenue of attack 
for information warfare. The IETF recognizes these issues and has done substantial work 
in integrating security features into these emerging protocols. Overall, the TCPIIP 
protocol suite will be significantly less vulnerable by the time IPv6 is fielded. 
The IPv6 protocol suite will be technically secure, but there is a nontechnical aspect 
of Internet security that must be considered in relation to the tactical internet. Once the 
security features of IPv6 are fully defined, they will be well understood and open to 
inspection by the entire Internet community. On one hand it is desirable to have core 
security features that can be tested, validated and implemented by all designers, devices 
and applications. On the other hand it is dangerous to.rely on security features that can be 
easily examined in detail by the enemy. Fortunately the Internet security architecture 
[Atkinson,95] does not mandate the use of a specific encryption algorithm. The security 
architecture does require that all IPv6 implementations support the MD5 hash algorithm, 
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which is widely used in computer security products to compute message digests for 
authentication and integrity checks. In choosing the IP layer security features to 
implement in its tactical internet, the Marine Corps must balance the need for 
compatibility with commercially available equipment and software against the need to 
protect tactical communications from hostile sources who may be experts in Internet 
technology. On balance, this open approach to specification and validation leads to 
stronger protocols, strong encryption configuration options and a more secure 
infrastructure. 
J. TRANSITION MECHANISMS FOR IPV6 
1. Transition Overview 
The IETF IPng Working Group began development of IPv6 with transition 
planning at the top of their agenda [Bradner,96a]. The working group realized that for 
IPv6 to succeed, smooth and incremental transition for the huge installed base of IPv4 
equipment and software must be accommodated. Previous attempts to make large-scale 
protocol transitions had failed due to poor transition planning. A case in point was the 
U.S. Government's plan to force all of its networks to Open System Interconnect (OSI) 
protocols [Hinden,95a]. Therefore the IETF planned for a lengthy but deliberate 
migration from IPv4 to IPv6. 
The IETF defined three technical mechanisms to facilitate coexistence ofiPv4 and 
IPv6 in the same internet. These can be summarized as: 
• Dual-Stack operation: routers and hosts implementing support for both IPv4 
and IPv6 simultaneously. 
• IPv6 over IPv4 tunneling: hosts and routers encapsulating complete IPv6 
packets as data inside IPv4 packets for transmission over IPv4-only portions of 
the network. 
• IPv4 addresses mapped into IPv6 address space: the IPv4 address can be 
represented in the rightmost portion of an IPv6 address format (as discussed in 
Section E above) to facilitateiPv4-IPv6 gateway translations. 
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2. Dual-Stack Transition Approach 
Running both protocols on each node is the most straightforward method of 
transition and ensure complete interoperability with all other IP nodes. IPv6 nodes 
running dual protocol stacks can be added to the network without disrupting the in-place 
IPv4 infrastructure. A disadvantage of this approach is that dual-stack protocol software 
requires nearly twice the computing resources required for single-protocol operation. 
Furthermore routers must support both IPv6 and IPv4 to preclude the use of inefficient 
"tunneling." 
Dual-stack nodes have both IPv6 and IPv4 addresses. The IPv6 address can be 
formed by placing the IPv4 address in rightmost portion of the IPv6 address. (This 
convention is convenient, but not required). The protocol stack used for a particular 
communication is determined by the capabilities of the destination host. IPv4 hosts talk 
to IPv4 hosts; IPv6 hosts talk to other IPv6 hosts. The protocol version being used by the 
destination host is obtained from the domain name system (DNS) (which itself must be 
upgraded to handle IPv6 addresses). Routers with both IPv4 and IPv6 protocol stacks 
will function just like mixed protocol routers do today. If the networks routers do not 
support both IPv4 and IPv6, packets must be tunneled as described in the next section. 
[Bradner,96a] 
Regardless of the migration strategy employed by the Marine Corps, some 
dual-stack nodes will be required. Just as electronic mail gateways are required to 
translate among the myriad types of e-mail, protocol gateways will be needed to translate 
between IPv4-only and IPv6-only portions of the network. 
3. 1Pv6 over 1Pv4 Tunneling 
IPv4-only routers cannot route IPv6-only packets. Tunneling provides a way for 
IPv6 hosts to comrriunicate with each other using a predominantly IPv4 infrastructure. 
The IPv6 hosts must also have IPv4 addresses in order to use this method of 
communication. Tunneling is accomplished by encapsulating a complete IPv6 packet as 
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the data payload inside an 1Pv4 datagram. The network treats the datagram like a normal 
1Pv4 datagram until it reaches an 1Pv6-capable node where the 1Pv6 packet is extracted 
and examined. In practice, tunneling of1Pv6 can be host-to-host, router-to-router, 
host-to-router or router-to-host. 
Tunneling 1Pv6 over a predominantly 1Pv4 infrastructure negates much of the value 
added by 1Pv6. Until intermediate routers support 1Pv6, the quality of service, mobility 
and security features of 1Pv6 are not available to the network's end users. Tunneling must 
be viewed as an expedient mechanism to be employed in situations where no other 
solution is possible. 
4. IPv4 Addresses Encoded in IPv6 
1Pv4 addresses can be mapped directly into the 1Pv6 address space. This powerful 
transition mechanism allows an 1Pv6 host to communicate in a limited way with an 
1Pv4-only host using a protocol-translating gateway. The 1Pv6 host forms an 1Pv6 
address directly from the 1Pv4 address of the destination. An 1Pv6-to-1Pv4 gateway can 
interpret the address directly and simply forward the data in an 1Pv4 datagram. The same 
process is used in reverse when an 1Pv4 host needs to communicate with an 1Pv6 host. 
This mechanism also makes it simple to change addresses for an 1Pv4 host that is 
upgraded to 1Pv6. 
K. IMPLICATIONS OF IPV6 FOR THE TDN ARCHITECTURE 
1Pv6 makes significant improvements over 1Pv4 in addressing, multicast, mobility, 
quality of service and security. These enhanced features are needed for tactical 
intemetworking in the next century and must be included in the long-term tactical internet 
architecture. However, basing the design ofTDN entirely on 1Pv6 is not prudent because 
significant deployment and testing of 1Pv6 implementations remains to be accomplished. 
Therefore it is recommended that the TDN design proceed based on the proven 
capabilities of 1Pv4 and be influenced by expected 1Pv6 improvements. 
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Several aspects of the tactical internet architecture require special consideration for 
the effects of IPv6. The tactical IP addressing plan must incorporate features that will 
facilitate the eventual integration of IPv6 autoconfiguration and hierarchical routing. 
This might involve explicit support for the current versions of Dynamic Host 
Configuration Protocol (DHCP) [Droms,93] and Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) 
[Fuller,93]. Of course, utilization ofiP Multicast [Deering,89] can be incorporated not 
only in TDN but also in tactical end-system software applications. A preliminary 
strategy for employing IPv6's mobility (and IPv4's Mobile IP) and QoS features within 
the tactical internet must be developed to ensure that TDN's design does not preclude 
incorporation of these features as they become available. Finally, the IP security 
architecture [Atkinson,95] options are available now and can be implemented in TDN 
[Bruno,96]. An integrated TDN security architecture is needed to define the role of 
IP-layer security features in the tactical internet. 
L. SUMMARY 
IPv6 is a necessary and natural step in the evolution of the Internet Protocol as an 
open system network bearer service. IPv6 retains the simplicity and robustness that 
makes IPv4 so appropriate for tactical networking. The quality of service, multicast and 
security features added to IPv6 are also necessary to support the emerging technology 
trends that will affect the Marine Corps tactical internet. Although some aspects of IPv6 
are still in the formative stages, IPv6 is on track to become an Internet Stand~d and 
commercial software products based on IPv6 will be available by the time the Tactical 
Data Network (TDN) is fielded. Nonetheless, basing the design of TDN solely on IPv6 is 
not prudent due to the significant IPv6 deployment and testing that remains. IPv4 is here 
now and it works. Therefore the design of TDN must proceed based on IPv4 and must 
include provisions for incorporating the improvements of1Pv6. The Marine Corps and 
the other services must also formulate migration strategies now to ensure a smooth and 
properly timed transition from IPv4 to IPv6. 
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VII. AN IP ADDRESS ALLOCATION PLAN FOR THE 
TACTICAL DATA NETWORK 
A. INTRODUCTION 
1. Purpose of This Address Plan 
The tactical IP addressing plan presented in this study is intended to serve as a 
baseline 1Pv4 address allocation architecture for the Tactical Data Network (TDN). 
Tactical Data Network equipment will be employed by every Fleet Marine Force (FMF) 
unit battalion-level and above [MCCDC,95a]. Many communications personnel across 
all echelons will be involved in establishing and maintaining the tactical internet for field 
exercises and operations. A common frame of reference for allocating and assigning IP 
addressing is needed to preclude a free-for-all of disparate, inefficient and complex 
addressing schemes. Communications personnel.who are not expert in IP network 
planning can use this plan to set up basic addressing structures for their units. Finally, 
this plan identifies the number of 1Pv4 addresses that must be obtained by the Marine 
Corps in order to ensure that TDN can be employed to the fullest of its capabilities. 
2. Guiding Principles 
The TDN addressing plan recommended in this study is based on operational 
requirements. Addresses were allocated on the basis of both the current need for IP 
addresses and the projected future growth of IP address requirements. Several 
overarching precepts guided the development of the plan. In particular the TDN 
addressing plan must: 
• Be simple to understand and implement by people who are not experts in TCPIIP 
addressing/routing. 
• Accommodate future growth of TDN IP address requirements. 
• Be usable regardless of the specific IP networking equipment utilized in TDN. 
• Keep unclassified addresses separate from classified addresses. 
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3. Assumptions 
TDN will not be fielded until the 1999-2000 timeframe and many questions 
regarding its concept of operations remain unanswered. Therefore, several assumptions 
were made in order to include a useful degree of detail in the tactical IP addressing plan. 
These design assumptions can be summarized as follows: 
• That the Marine Corps will not radically alter its tactical organizational structure 
(MAGTF) between now and 2000. 
• That Marine Corps doctrine for MAGTF command and control structure and 
communications connectivity will remain consistent for the near term. 
• That potential future growth of the number of nodes connected to TDN is 
accounted for. 
• That the tactical internet will operate in a SECRET -high security mode, and data 
traffic of other classification levels will be tunneled across the SECRET network 
as needed. 
•That the TDN program will receive full funding and will be fielded in accordance 
with the current distribution plan [MARCORSYSCOM,95a]. 
Future variations in these design assumptions are not likely to invalidate the 
addressing plan, but may require some plan modifications. 
4.Limitations 
The TDN IP addressing plan presented in this study is notional and not doctrinal. 
The plan is intended to serve as a foundation upon which a standard Tri-MEF tactical 
internet addressing plan can be built. Such a Marine Corps-wide standard operating 
procedure (SOP) requires substantial review and comment from the entire Fleet Marine 
Force. Although some communications officers and data systems officers from the FMF 
contributed their ideas to this plan, the FMF as a whole has not yet been afforded the 
opportunity to officially review it. The staffing of the TDN IP addressing plan by the 
TDN Project Office is recommended future work. 
The IP addresses allocated in the TDN IP addressing plan proposed in this thesis 
have not yet been obtained from the military Internet Protocol addressing authority (DoD 
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NIC). Therefore, substantial changes to the plan may be necessary if sufficient numbers 
of class C addresses cannot be obtained for TDN. Nonetheless, the goal of the study was 
to identify the IP addresses required for TDN, not to fit an IP address assignment plan to 
an already existing group ofiP addresses. Finally, many details are still unknown about 
what the Marine Corps' tactical internet will look like when it is fielded. In particular, the 
physical topology of the network is nearly impossible to determine. For this reason 
address assignments for most units were left in a generic form that is open to change as 
greater detail becomes available. Given that the TDN architecture will be diverse and 
evolve over time, these limitations on future knowledge can optimistically be considered 
strengths when designing an adaptable tactical network. 
B. OVERVIEW OF THE TDN IP ADDRESS ALLOCATION PLAN 
The IP addressing plan proposed here is designed to meet currently projected needs 
of the tactical internet as well as future requirements. This section describes the plan and 
discusses the technical issues considered in the plan's development. 
1. Number of IPv4 Addresses Required 
The IPv4 addresses required for a notional Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) are 
shown in Table 7.1. A fully deployed MEF requires 128 class C addresses for use on the 
SECRET tactical internet (connected to SIPRNET) and 64 class C addresses for use on 
the UNCLASSIFIED tactical internet (connected to NIPRNET). All (or at least most) of 
these addresses will need to be contiguous for maximum routing efficiency. The number 
of addresses under the "MEF" heading in Table 7.1 include IP addresses allocated to the 
Marine Force Component Commander (MARFOR) and the Marine Expeditionary Units 
(MEUs) within the MEF's area of responsibility. The total numbers ofiP addresses 
required for TDN employment throughout the Marine Corps are listed in Table 7.2. 
These tables are summaries, with design details and future growth considerations detailed 
in this chapter. Appendix A contains the detailed TDN tactical IP address allocation plan. 
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Address Type MEF Division Air Wing FSSG Total 
SECRET Class C 32 32 48 16 128 
UNCLAS Class C 16 16 16 16 64 
Table 7.1 IP address requirements for a notional Marine Expeditionary Force. 
UNIT Class C Class C 
SECRET UNCLASSIFIED 
IMEF 112 57 
including 3 MEUs 12 3 
IIMEF 112 57 
including 3 MEUs 12 3 
III MEF .112 57 
including I MEU 4 1 
MARFORLANT 4 4 
including contingency JTF cell 
MARFORPAC 4 4 
including contingency JTF cell 
Marine Corps Reserve Forces 112 57 
FMFTotals 484 243 
Total Class C Addresses for TDN 727 
Table 7.2 Total 1Pv4 class C address requirements for the Fleet Marine Force using current 
projections. Additional growth projections appear in Table 7 .4. 
2. Global Uniqueness ofTDN IP Addresses 
All of the 1Pv4 addresses used in the Tactical Data Network must be obtained from 
and registered with the Department of Defense Network Information Center (DoD NIC) 
[DISA,96b]. The DoD NIC will ensure that all IP addresses allocated to TDN are globally 
unique (i.e. not registered to any other user in the global Internet, NIPRNET, or 
SIPRNET). The importance of obtaining globally unique addresses for the tactical 
internet cannot be overstated. In the previous chapter it was explained that every host 
in an internetwork must have an IP address that is unique within that internet. It is 
unwise to assume that any network will never be connected to some universal 
internetwork like the global Internet. Unclassified tactical networks will certainly be 
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connected to the Internet in some way. However, classified networks may also connect to 
global classified internets such as the SIPRNET. The global "infosphere" described in 
C41for the Warrior [Joint Staff,93] will be reachable by every warfighter at every level 
of command using whatever computing terminal he happens to have. Similarly as 
multilevel security (MLS) products make their way into the tactical networking 
environment both classified and unclassified platforms will share the same network 
infrastructure. Adhering to IETF addressing standards and recommendations will also 
simplify eventual migration to 1Pv6. Therefore TDN must have globally unique 
addresses to ensure a clear migration path into the next century. 
3. Technical Considerations in Developing the Address Plan 
a. Routing Considerations 
The TDN tactical IP addressing plan is designed to make use of the Classless 
Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) address aggregation scheme that was introduced in 
Chapter V. CIDR makes it possible to represent a block of consecutive class C 1Pv4 
addresses as a single network number. Therefore, instead of advertising individual routes 
for each network, routers only need to advertise one route for the entire group of 
networks. This aggregation of information greatly reduces both the computational load 
on routers and the amount of network bandwidth consumed by routing overhead. 
Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) [Fuller,93] is fully supported by the 
Open Shortest Path First version 2 (OSPFv2) [Moy,94] routing protocol which is the 
Marine Corps' standard interior gateway routing protocol [MCCDC,95b]. OSPF is called 
an "interior gateway" protocol because it performs routing within an autonomous system, 
i.e. a group of routers using the same protocol and under the control of a single network 
authority [Comer,95]. Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) between autonomous 
systems is performed using "exterior gateway" protocols such as the Border Gateway 
Protocol version 4 (BGP4), which is also a Marine Corps standard [Rekhter,94]. In the 
context of the tactical internet, each Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) is an 
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autonomous system. Therefore OSPF can be used as the basis for constructing the 
addressing architecture of the MEF. 
Besides the IP addressing structure used, the key network architectural issue that 
needs to be defined when using OSPF is the definition of routing areas [Cisco,95b]. 
Routers belonging to an OSPF area maintain detailed knowledge about that area's 
network topology and must recalculate routes whenever the topology changes. Routers 
outside the area are given only summary information (CIDR) about the area topology on 
a periodic basis (about every 30 minutes). In order to use the computationally intensive 
OSPF in the rapidly changing network topology like the tactical internet, routing areas 
need to be kept small. Experts in the field recommend that no more than 50 routers be 
assigned to a single area [Cisco,95b]. The areas must be connected by a backbone that is 
stable and has redundant communications. Using these criteria the Marine Division, 
Marine Air Wing, Force Service Support Group and MEF Command Element were 
chosen as routing areas for TDN. The logical OSPF routing topology is depicted in 
Figure 7.1. 
Figure 7 .I Logical OSPF routing topology in the Marine Corps tactical internet. 
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Each major command (MEF Command Element, Division, Wing, FSSG) is 
designated an OSPF routing area. Additionally, the Marine Forces Component 
Command (MARFOR) is designated an OSPF area. The TDN Gateways (GW) in the 
MEF are interconnected via the tactical communications architecture and form the OSPF 
backbone area. The routers in the TDN Gateways exchange summary information about 
the OSPF areas they serve. The MEF TDN Gateway connects to the joint tactical internet 
using the BGP-4 protocol. The TDN tactical IP addressing plan is constructed such that 
network addresses within each OSPF area can be summarized by each TDN Gateway as a 
single network route. 
b. Subnetting Use Minimized 
Although OSPF supports variable length subnetting, subnetting was avoided 
wherever possible in the recommended TDN address plan. Subnetting is administratively 
intensive and inherently prone to error. Further, specifying subnet numbering in a 
standardized plan greatly restricts the flexibility afforded to local network managers in 
adapting solutions to their particular situations. However there are instances in which 
subnetting was the only reasonable alternative to wasting address space. In those cases 
where subnets are needed, variable-length subnets have been employed to avoid overly 
fragmenting the total address space. It is permissible in OSPF and CIDR to define a 
subnet/D of any length because every network address carries with it a 32-bit subnet bit 
mask which explicitly informs the router of the subnet/D. 
The fact that subnetting was not used extensively in the development of this plan 
does not mean it cannot be done. Class C addresses are used in the recommended TDN 
addressing plan because they are easier to obtain froni the NIC than class B addresses. 
Indeed detailed justifications are now required to obtain any ofthe remaining class B 
addresses. Furthermore, class C addresses will function in any network running any type 
ofiP routing protocol, even if subnetting is not supported. Since Classless Inter-Domain 
Routing was used as the basis for this plan, a class B address might be substituted for the 
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group of class C addresses that were recommended. Since an address's class is ignored 
when using CIDR, this kind of substitution has no effect on the routing in the network. 
c. Network Hardware Considerations 
Every effort was made to avoid linking the addressing allocation plan too closely 
with networking hardware. The Tactical Data Network (TDN) is still an evolving 
system. Details of the actual hardware that will be integrated into TDN are not currently 
specified. In any case such details are not critical inputs to the address plan. TDN is a 
modular system and any of its components can be replaced using equivalent items 
without greatly affecting the rest of the system. For example, the current TDN 
specification states that each TDN Server will have four 12-port LAN hubs 
[MARCORSYSCOM,95c]. This specification was not used as an addressing criterion 
because larger hubs might easily be substituted by the time TDN is fielded. Instead 
address allocation was based on anticipated requirements of the FMF. Thus the address 
plan is grounded in reality. The proposed TDN fielding plan was used to determine 
which units will actually have networks as well as to gauge the general size and topology 
of those networks. 
The tactical internet of the future will be populated with communication devices 
that are not specifically part of the Tactical Data Network (TDN) system or the tactical 
data systems discussed in Chapter IV. Handheld computing devices (such as the Marine 
Corps Digital Automated Communications Terminal or DACT ) and remote sensors are 
just two examples of the types of equipment that might be connected to the tactical 
internet. Every such device must be uniquely identified by the network, therefore every 
such device must have an IP address. There is also a trend toward integrating network 
management capability (i.e. support for the Simple Network Management Protocol or 
SNMP) in all kinds of electronic devices. Within several years this trend will extend to 
radios and many other types of communications equipment. In the tactical internet of the 
21st century it is possible that SNMP-manageable devices will outnumber tactical users. 
This trend was carefully considered in the development of the TDN address plan. Units 
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with large numbers of electronic devices were allocated enough addresses to 
accommodate this type of IP address requirement. 
C. BASIC IP ADDRESS ALLOCATION/ASSIGNMENT SCHEME 
One of the TDN Project Office aims in sponsoring this study is to develop a 
standard tactical IP addressing scheme for TDN. Therefore a basic template (Table 7.3) 
was developed for the TDN server, which is intended primarily to connect end users to 
the tactical internet [MARCORSYSCOM,95c]. The TDN tactical addressing plan 
allocates at least one class C network number to each FMF unit which has a TDN server. 
Thus, the generic address assignment template shown in Table 7.3 is a breakdown of a 
single class C address. The goal of the template approach is to assign standard IP 
addresses to network services and devices that are common to most TDN LANs. For 
example, every Web server is assigned IP address number NNN 12 (where "N.N.N" 
represents the class C network address). Although several well-known network services 
(i.e. DNS, e-mail server) might be hosted on the same workstation, such a configuration 
is not required and was not assumed to be the norm. Therefore, a separate IP address was 
assigned to each well-known network service in order to allow local network 
administrators greater predictability when configuring those services. 
The convention of assigning hostJD # 1 to the network router was maintained. 
Several other addresses were also allocated to the router to allow some flexibility in 
assigning the router such services as the Mobile IP home agent. HostJD #6 is reserved for 
a personal computer (PC) network file server that might reside on the LAN. HostJD #7 is 
reserved for the local Defense Messaging System (DMS) Message Transfer Agent 
(MTA). Host/D #8 is reserved for multilevel security devices that might be incorporated 
into TDN, such as the Secure Network Server (SNS) and the Motorola Network 
Encryption System (NES). Addresses NNN 9-12 are reserved for well-known Internet 
services, and addresses N.NN13-30 are allocated to TDN ancillary hardware 
components. 
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UNIT/ORG NETWORK# SUBNET# HOST RANGE COMMENTS 
FMF Unit N.N.16.0 N.N.16.0 N.N.16.1-5 TON router 
N.N.16.6 LAN file server 
N.N.16.7 DMSMTA 
N.N.16.8 SNS/NES/INE 
N.N.16.9 DNS server 
N.N.16.10 DHCP server 
N.N.16.11 SMTP mail server 
N.N.16.12 Web server 
N.N.16.13 TON management 
workstation 
N.N.16.14-16 UPSs 
N.N.16.17-20 External drives/RAID 
N.N.16.21-24 TCIMs 
N.N.16.25-30 TON repeaters 
N.N.16.31-33 reserved 
N.N.16.34 main TCO workstation 
N.N.16.35-254 LAN users (220 total) 
N.N.16.255 network broadcast 
Table 7.3 Example of the basic TDN IP address assignment within an FMF unit. 
Addresses NNN31-33 are reserved for future subnetting (if necessary). It is 
expected that subnets in the tactical internet will not be smaller than 30 host!Ds (except 
for point-to-point link subnets). Thirty-user subnets are created by using the first three 
bits of the host!D portion of the class C IP address to indicate the subnetwork/D. This 
creates subnets that are numbered: 0,32,64,96,128,160,192, and 224. The first host!D in 
each subnet is assigned to the router, and the last host!D is the subnet's broadcast address. 
For example, in 3-bit subnetting NNN31 is the broadcast address for subnet number 
NNNO. The network number ofthe next subnet isNNN32 and address NNN33 
identifies the router port that is connected to subnet NNN32. Therefore, these three 
numbers are reserved in the standard template. 
In most units the remainder of the host!Ds are reserved for end users. IP address 
NNN34 is reserved for the unit's primary Tactical Combat Operations (TCO) 
workstation. This was made a standard address because every FMF unit that will have 
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TDN will also have at least one TCO terminal [MCTSSA,95]. Further partitioning of the 
host!D portion of the IP address space is assumed to be unit/network dependent. Further, 
many of the tactical data systems that will connect to TDN have not published equipment 
fielding plans. It is also likely that dynamic IP address assignment will become the norm 
for individual host addressing. The actual IP addresses of end systems will be less 
important than the binding between user-understandable directory services (X.500) and 
naming systems (DNS). 
D. FUTURE GROWTH AND ADDRESS SPACE ALLOCATION 
A consistent trend in intemetworking is that growth exceeds expectations. 
Price/performance improvements in computer hardware are 10 percent per month, 
doubling each year. Global growth of the Internet averages approximately 15 percent per 
month, which equates to a doubling in size every five to six months. A prudent network 
design considers these long-term sustained exponential growth rates, and the 
accompanying technological improvements which .drive them, in addition to predicted 
operational requirements. Significant allowances for growth are already incorporated in 
- the address plan assignment templates contained in Appendix A. Nevertheless, other 
future growth possibilities must be considered. 
The address plan proposed in this study assumes that TDN will extend down to 
company level. Specific 30-user subnet addresses are assigned to companies and 
batteries in the armored vehicle, artillery, and light anti-air defense battalions: In other 
units of the MEF, sufficient IP addresses are also provided so that networked devices at 
the company level can be assigned at the discretion of the battalion/squadron-level 
commander. If more than 30 communications devices within a company are 
intemetworked with TDN, the addressing space requirements specified in this plan must 
be increased. For example, extending TDN to every individual Marine in the MEF might 
require that the TDN IP address space be increased by a factor of four. 
Significant routing benefits accrue in IPv4 when using a contiguous address space. 
For that reason, and for sustained exponential growth reasons, a larger address space must 
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be reserved for TDN than is needed to meet currently projected requirements. A larger 
1Pv4 address space also provides for a longer transition period if 1Pv6 deployment is 
delayed. Table 7.4 extends the totals provided in Table 7.2 to provide for unforeseen 
growth in the size of the tactical internet. Minimum recommended and recommended 
address spaces are listed. 
Class C Address Requirements Current Growth Factor Total Projected 
(SECRET plus UNCLASSIFIED) 
Current TDN Requirements 727 1 727 
Minimum Recommended 727 2 1,454 
Minimum Recommended with TDN 
extended to individual Marine level 727 4 2908 
Recommended 1Pv4 Address Space 
to be Reserved for TDN 2908 
Table 7.4 Total 1Pv4 Class C address requirements for the Fleet Marine Force Tactical Data 
Network, accounting for unforeseen growth. 
The Marine Corps Tactical Data Network (TDN) Project Office needs to ensure 
that the military IP addressing authority (DoD NIC) reserves adequate contiguous 1Pv4 
address space to meet approved recommendations. The cost of reserving too many 
addresses ( inefficient address assignment) is trivial. The cost of reserving too few 
addresses is potentially devastating. An address shortfall may require massive 
renumbering of the tactical internet, or in the worst case may result in some end systems 
not being able to communicate across the network at all. 
E. SUMMARY 
The Tactical Data Network IP address allocation plan presented in this study is 
consistent with current best practices in the IP intemetworking field. It provides enough 
address space for current tactical IP address requirements and also provides room for 
future growth. With the advent of Internet Protocol version 6, address space will become 
less of a concern, but address hierarchy will continue to be critical to routing efficiency. 
CIDR is the prototype for next generation hierarchical routing, and OSPFv2 is currently 
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being upgraded to work with IPv6. By employing Classless Inter-Domain Routing 
(CIDR) and OSPFv2 in TDN, the Marine Corps positions itself to make a smooth 
transition into the next generation intemetworking environment. Implementation of this 




VIII. MIGRATION TO INTERNET PROTOCOL VERSION 6 
A. INTRODUCTION 
When the Tactical Data Network (TDN) is fielded, portions of the global Internet 
may already be transitioning from IPv4 to IPv6. Integrating transition planning into the 
TDN architecture will ensure that TDN is a viable internetworking backbone for the 
Marine Corps tactical internet in the next century. This chapter discusses some of the 
issues the Marine Corps must consider when formulating its IPv6 migration strategy. 
B. FACTORS FORCING THE MIGRATION TO IPV6 
Exhaustion of 1Pv4 address space is the primary factor is forcing the move toward 
IPv6 in the global Internet [Hinden,95a]. The tactical internet's need for IPv6 is 
somewhat different. Address space will not be a problem for the Tactical Data Network 
(TDN) if the Marine Corps implements the tactical IP addressing plan proposed in this 
study. IPv6's added functionality in supporting multicast, mobility and security are 
certainly needed by TDN, but many of those capabilities will be available as extensions 
to IPv4. Rather, the tactical internet's migration to IPv6 will be qriven by the quality of 
service (QoS) requirements of next generation applications software. Multimedia, 
collaborative planning and distributed simulation applications will require QoS 
guarantees in order to operate in the low-bandwidth intermittent communications 
environment of the tactical internet. These QoS requirements cannot be met consistently 
by IPv4. 1Pv6 is the only potential successor to IPv4 that is an open systems standard, is 
independent of hardware, and also enjoys widespread support among network research 
communities and commercial vendors. IPv6 is hand-crafted by the global Internet 
community itself and it is unlikely to falter.· Therefore the Marine Corps must adopt the 
position that eventual migration to IPv6 is a necessary step in the evolution of the tactical 
internet. 
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C. IPV6 DEPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS 
1. Introduction 
This section addresses the "how" of upgrading to IPv6. It is unreasonable to expect 
that IPv6 will be implemented everywhere at once. IPv4-only nodes and networks will 
coexist with dual-protocol (IPv4 and IPv6) and IPv6-only nodes and networks for years. 
This will be true of both the global Internet and the tactical internet. Therefore the 
deployment of IPv6 in the tactical internet must be carefully planned to ensure minimal 
disruption of the existing IPv4 infrastructure as well as backward compatibility with 
networks and nodes that do not upgrade to IPv6. 
__ 2. P_hysical Actions Required to Upgrade to IPv6 
Introduction of IPv6 into the existing IPv4-based tactical internet requires only 
software changes. No TDN or end-system (host) hardware will have to be modified to 
accept IPv6. Routers are upgraded to IPv6 by adding new IP layer software, 
IPv6-capable routing software, and IPv6-capable network management software to the 
routers' protocol stacks [Bound,96]. Even so, overdue unsupported router replacements 
may be occasionally necessary. 
Host upgrades are somewhat more complex. In addition to IP layer software, hosts 
have transport layer and application layer software that must be upgraded to work with 
IPv6. IfTCP/IP protocol software is built into a host's operating system (as is the case 
for hosts running UNIX and WindowsNT), upgrading to IPv6 may necessitate the 
replacement or recompiling of the host's operating system [Trinity,95]. For example, a 
typical tactical internet host running the GCCS common operating environment (COE) 
might have all of the following protocol software: Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), 
User Datagram Protocol (UDP), File Transfer Protocol (FTP), Domain Name System 
(DNS), Simple Mail Transport Protocol (SMTP), and TELNET 
[MARCORSYSCOM,94]. All of these protocols and applications must be modified in 
some way to accommodate IPv6 [Bound,96]. In general any protocol or application that 
embeds IP addresses must be modified to recognize and utilize IPv6's 128-bit address. 
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Applications that will utiliz~ the multicast, mobility, quality of service and security 
features of1Pv6 will require more extensive modification [Bound,96]. However 
applications that are designed now to use the IP Multicast [Deering,89], Mobile IP 
[Perkins,96b] and IP security [Atkinson,95] extensions to IPv4 are expected to require 
less modification than those applications that have no support for these protocols. 
Finally, of course every node that is upgraded to IPv6 must be assigned at least one IPv6 
address. [Bound,96] 
Nodes that run dual-protocol stacks (IPv4 and IPv6) require transition software. 
For example, dual-stack nodes must have a protocol selection mechanism that enables 
higher-layer software to choose the appropriate IP layer protocol (IPv4 or IPv6). In 
practice vendors will probably bundle IPv4 and IPv6 in an integrated dual-stack software 
package, thus making IPv6 upgrade much simpler. [Bound,96] 
Upgrading the tactical internet to IPv6 will not be a trivial undertaking. Steps can 
be taken now to reduce the burden of the transition. Application layer software 
modification and re-engineering will be minimized if IPv6 is considered in the original 
design. For example, tactical applications must not make assumptions about the IP 
address format. Further, tactical applications must be designed to utilize the enhanced 
multicast, mobility and security features of1Pv4. These actions will result in significant 
savings in complexity and cost when the transition to IPv6 commences. 
3. Recommended Method ~f 1Pv6 Deployment 
It is recommended that IPv6 be deployed in the tactical internet incrementally, 
beginning with TDN routers and then extending to end systems as needed. 
Interoperability and continuity of service must be maintained throughout the introduction 
of1Pv6, thus ruling out an "all-at-once" transition. Similarly the Marine Corps tactical 
internet cannot remain an IPv4-only "island." It is technically possible to retain IPv4 
internally and connect to IPv6 networks using IPv4-to-IPv6 translation gateways. 
However such an approach denies Marine Corps users the needed features of IPv6 and 
will not support the future TDN internetworking requirements. Incremental deployment 
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of IPv6 will ensure the stability of existing IPv4 infrastructure and provide the flexibility 
to transition to IPv6 on a user-driven schedule. 
TDN routers must be the first elements of the tactical internet to be upgraded to 
IPv6. Routers are crucial to the delivery of IPv6's QoS, multicast, and mobility services. 
Once TDN's routers are running IPv6, hosts that are upgraded will have access to IPv6 
services regardless of the hosts' location in the network. Further, to ensure that the IPv4 
infrastructure is not disrupted by the transition to IPv6, all TDN routers must be 
configured as dual-stack nodes. 
Concurrent with the upgrade of routers, IPv6 support must be added to DHCP and 
DNS servers. These services are important for IPv6 host configuration and 
communication. With the basic IPv6 infrastructure support in place, end systems can 
upgraded to IPv6 as needed. Initially, most end systems will also have to be configured 
as dual-stack nodes to facilitate interoperability. As IPv6-only hosts become more 
common, IPv4-to-IPv6 translating gateways will be required. 
The minimalist view of1Pv6 transition is that only those hosts which absolutely 
need IPv6 should be upgraded. Any cost savings that might result from this approach 
will be negated by the added complexity of a hybrid networking environment. Isolated 
IPv6 nodes make network management more difficult and reduce the network's 
transparency and flexibility for end users. For example, IPv6-only applications must not 
be restricted to only one or two hosts in a command center. The whole idea behind the 
common operating environment (COE) is that end users are able to execute tactical 
applications on any COE platform. Therefore when upgrading a local-area network 
(LAN) to IPv6, every node on the LAN segment must be upgraded to a dual-stack 
configuration. 
4. 1Pv6 Deployment Summary 
An incremental approach must be taken to the deployment of IPv6 in the tactical 
internet in order to ensure interoperability and backward compatibility. Upgrading the IP 
software in the TDN routers first will ensure that critical IPv6 capabilities are available 
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throughout the network to IPv6 hosts that need them. Maintaining dual protocol (IPv4 
and IPv6) stacks on all TDN routers is necessary to allow IPv4 hosts to be upgraded 
incrementally as needed. 
D. ISSUES IMPACTING TDN MIGRATION TO IPV6 
1. Introduction 
Many aspects of both IPv6 and the Tactical Data Network (TDN) are still evolving. 
This section discusses several issues that will have a significant impact on both the timing 
ofiPv6 migration and the viability of the TDN tactical IP addressing architecture 
proposed in this study. 
2. Employment of IPv6 Address Autoconfiguration 
The tactical IP address plan proposed in this study is designed to facilitate an 
orderly transition to IPv6. For example, changing TDN IPv4 addresses into IPv6 
addresses might be as simple as adding a six double-octet prefix as shown in Figure 8.1. 
96 bits 32 bits 
1Pv6 Prefix 1Pv4 Address 
Figure 8.1 Forming a 128-bit 1Pv6 address by attaching an 1Pv6 prefix to an 1Pv4 address. 
This procedure preserves the topological and hierarchical structure of the TDN tactical IP 
addressing plan. However the way in which IPv6 address autoconfiguration is employed 
may lead to the renumbering of TDN. 
Two methods ofiPv6 autoconfiguration were discussed in Chapter VI: stateful and 
stateless. Stateful autoconfiguration uses the same Dynamic Host Configuration 
Protocol (DHCP) [Droms,93] that will be used in the TDN to assign IPv4 addresses to 
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hosts ... Therefore employment of stateful 1Pv6 autoconfiguration will provoke few 
changes to the TDN addressing plan. A host employing stateless 1Pv6 autoconfiguration 
combines information provided by a local router with information the host itself already 
knows (such as its Ethernet hardware address) to form an 1Pv6 address [Thomson,95]. 
Since hardware addresses have no topological significance, 1Pv6 addresses created in this 
manner are only related to addresses of other hosts on the same subnet by the 1Pv6 prefix. 
In such a case the original 1Pv4 address structure of the network pertaining to host 
assignment conventions will be of no use in routing. 
One approach to this issue is to use only the stateful method of 1Pv6 address 
autoconfiguration in TDN, but this policy is too restrictive to satisfy the dynamic needs of 
tactical internet end users. A better approach is to align 1Pv6 address prefixes with the 
structure of the TDN tactical 1Pv4 addressing plan, permitting effective stateful and 
stateless autoconfigura:tion. The latter option requires that an assignment allocation be 
thought out well in advance of 1Pv6 deployment. This will ensure that the correct 1Pv6 
address blocks can be obtained from the 1Pv6 address assignment authority. 
3. Mobile IP Development 
The eventual solution for 1Pv6 mobility support will have a significant impact on 
the viability of the TDN tactical IP addressing architecture. The draft proposals for 
Mobile IP [Perkins,96b] and 1Pv6 mobility support [Perkins,96a] each require mobile 
nodes to retain a topologically significant home address. Mobile hosts and mobile 
subnetworks do not require renumbering just because they change their point of 
attachment to the network. This stabilizes the assignment of IP addresses and simplifies 
routing, but requires special mobility support in the network. Alternatives to Mobile IP 
involve dynamic address reconfiguration and dynamic bindings of domain names to IP 
addresses. Protocols that facilitate dynamic IP addressing [Droms,93] [Rekhter,96a] 
[Vixie,96] are immature. Therefore it is unclear what the most viable IP layer mobility 
solution will be. The interconnection between mobility support and the TDN addressing 
plan is a key issue that must be addressed in the 1Pv6 migration strategy. 
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4. Maturity of1Pv6 Quality of Service (QoS) Features 
Quality of service issues will greatly affect the overall migration of TDN to IPv6. 
The most important aspects of IPv6 QoS support that impact the IPv6 migration strategy 
are: 
• How applications and higher layer protocols will negotiate QoS with the network. 
• How IPv6 will technically enforce QoS guarantees across the intermediate networks. 
• How network managers will control/enforce tactical internet QoS and priorities across 
networks that are "owned" by different military organizations/services. 
The QoS negotiation methods supported by IPv6 will determine the extent of the 
effort needed to upgrade tactical internet applications and router software. For example, 
if IPv6 QoS will be negotiated by the RSVP protocol [Braden,96], tactical internet 
designers can ensure that support for RSVP is engineered into TDN system components 
as well as into end-user applications software. 
It remains to be seen how the flow label and priority fields in the IPv6 packet 
header will actually be used to guarantee quality of service across disparate physical 
networks. The integration ofiPv6 and ATM QoS features is especially crucial to the 
IPv6 migration plans for the entire joint tactical internet. A TM is a major part of the 
midterm joint tactical communications architecture [JIE0,95a] and may be incorporated 
into the Marine Corps architecture as well [MCCDC,95b]. Therefore stability of the 
IPv6-over-ATM specifications [Armitrage,96] may be a prerequisite to IPv6 migration. 
Finally the management of QoS and priority for data flows that span several 
subnetworks within the tactical internet is a critical issue that must be addressed. The 
case that a quality of service requirement exists has already been made in this study. It is 
good to have the technical capability to enforce quality of service, but a concept of 
employment for QoS features must also be developed. The IPv6 migration strategy must 
define how the technical.and management aspects of network QoS will be employed once 
IPv6 is deployed. 
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5. Integration of IP Layer Security Features 
IPv6 security must be addressed long before any migration commences. The 
Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol (IPSEC) [Atkinson,95] extends to both 
IPv4 and IPv6. Therefore the integration of the basic IP-layer security must be addressed 
as part of the original TDN design (based on IPv4) [MARCORSYSCOM,95a]. 
Nonetheless IPv6 will add several new security concerns that are not present in IPv4. 
IPv6 anycasting [Partridge,93] security concerns were discussed in Chapter VI. Security 
must also be considered in planning the employment of IPv6 quality of service and 
mobility features. An integrated TDN security architecture is needed that incorporates 
IPSEC features of IPv4 and also provides for a smooth transition to IPv6. 
6. Other Military Services Plans for IPv6 Migration 
The Marine Corps tactical internet will be part of the Defense Information 
Infrastructure (DII) [DISA,95] that is expected to encompass all strategic and tactical 
networks. Therefore the Corps' 1Pv6 migration strategy must consider the migration 
paths being taken by the other military services. None of the other services has yet 
enunciated an IPv6 migration plan. Therefore the Marine Corps must take the lead in 
laying out the roadmap to a 1Pv6-based tactical architecture. 
7. Migration Issues Summary 
Developers of the Marine Corps' 1Pv6 migration strategy must address a number of 
evolving issues. The autoconfiguration and mobility features of1Pv6 must be considered 
in deciding the future direction of the TDN tactical IP addressing plan. The structure of 
1Pv6's quality of service features will impact tactical software application design as well 
as TDN network management. A TDN security architecture must be developed that 
defines the role ofiP layer security. Finally, in deciding on an 1Pv6 transition timeline 
the Marine Corps must consider not only its own needs and the maturity of1Pv6, but also 
the migration plans of the other military services. 
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E. SUMMARY 
The quality of service requirements of next generation tactical software applications 
will drive the Marine Corps' migration to IPv6. A strategy for transitioning to IPv6 must 
be mapped out now, and IPv6 compatibility must be considered while architecting and 
deploying the Tactical Data Network (TDN). An IPv6 upgrade path must be designed 
into all tactical internet systems in order to avoid costly re-engineering later. 
IPv6 must be incrementally deployed in the tactical internet utilizing the dual-stack 
IPv6 transition mechanism described in Chapter VI. This will ensure both the availability 
of IPv6 capabilities and backward compatibility with IPv4-only systems. 
The timing of the migration to IPv6 will be affected by the maturity of IPv6 as well 
as by the migration plans of the other military services. The Marine Corps must lead the 
way in laying the foundation for a joint tactical internet IPv6 migration strategy. 
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IX. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The Tactical Data Network (TDN) will be the foundation of the Marine Corps' 
tactical internet for at least the first decade of the 21st century. This tactical internet must 
be based upon open systems standards that are hardware-independent and commercially 
available. The internet's infrastructure must enable end users to seamlessly exchange 
information across disparate physical communications media. 
The internetworking needs of the Marine Corps can best be met by the Internet 
Protocol (IP). Adoption of IP as the centerpiece of the tactical internet architecture is 
essential to ensure universal interoperability and an open systems evolutionary upgrade 
path. The Marine Corps gains significant technology leverage by basing its tactical 
internet on the protocols of the global Internet. The Internet's network research 
community continues to proactively develop and refine simple, capable and robust 
protocols to support real-world applications. The importance of the Internet Protocol in 
the future of universal networking is underscored by this excerpt from "The 
Unpredictable Certainty: The Information Infrastructure Through 2000" [NRC,96]: 
It would appear at this time that the Internet and its protocols represent the 
best approach for providing a general service for the support of emerging 
applications because of the effectiveness with which the Internet protocol 
serves as a bearer service and the overall architecture functions as an Open 
Data Network. The current volume of deployed devices using Internet 
standards, together with observed level of investment in Internet-related 
products and services, constitutes a unique foundation, one for which 
there is no alternative now or in any reasonable time frame. For this 
reason, the steering committee further concluded that specific attention 
should be paid to ensuring the viability of the Internet, in terms of both 
enhancing the standards to meet evolving application needs and making 
sure that networks based on these interfaces are deployed and made widely 
available as an environment for the innovation of new applications. 
[NRC,96] 
137 
The current version of the Internet Protocol (1Pv4) is highly stable and mature, 
widely implemented and well-understood. 1Pv4 will adequately support the 
internetworking demands of the current generation of tactical data systems and software 
applications. However, the Next Generation Internet Protocol (1Pv6) will be needed to 
fulfill quality of service, security and mobility needs of the next generation of software 
applications. 1Pv6 is immature and commercial protocol software implementations are 
not expected before late 1997. The technical risk associated with 1Pv6 compels a tactical 
internet architecture and deployment plan based on 1Pv4. 
Eventually both the global Internet and the tactical internet will migrate to 1Pv6. 
Therefore 1Pv4-to-1Pv6 transition planning must be integral to the design and deployment 
of the Tactical Data Network (TDN), tactical data systems and tactical software 
applications. Failure to incorporate 1Pv6 considerations into the tactical internet 
architecture now may result in major cost, complexity and reliability consequences later. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
1. Implement the TDN Tactical IP Addressing Plan 
The IP addressing plan is a key element of the TDN architecture. The addressing 
plan proposed in this study is based on successful 1Pv4 protocols (OSPFv2) and best 
current Internet practices (Classless Inter-Domain Routing) that have a strong connection 
to 1Pv6. Implementation of this plan will facilitate a smooth transition to 1Pv6. 
2. Develop an Integrated Security Architecture for TDN 
A security architecture is needed that defines the role of each protocol layer in 
providing security for the tactical internet. The security architecture is essential for 
planning security product acquisitions and making design decisions. It is also a vital 
input to the 1Pv6 migration strategy. This security architecture can be designed using 
emerging IPSEC protocols. 
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3. Conduct Studies to Determine the True Extent of Next Generation 
Applications Software Requirements 
Since applications will drive the migration to 1Pv6, it is necessary to quantify the 
nature of tactical internet quality of service requirements. This might be accomplished 
through simulations which incorporate real-world data obtained from prototype tactical 
-data systems. 
4. Formulate an 1Pv6 Migration Strategy 
The Marine Corps' 1Pv6 migration strategy must address both the timing and the 
general method oftransitioning the tactical internet to 1Pv6. More importantly, the 
strategy must define the architectural elements affected by the 1Pv6 transition and identify 
the 1Pv6 considerations that must be factored into current and planned systems' designs. 
5. Establish a Joint Tactical Internet Architecture Working Group 
The consensus in DoD is that all future military operations will be joint. A joint 
working group must architect a tactical internet that provides seamless exchange of data 
across the entire battlespace. 
C. SUMMARY 
The Tactical Data Network will revolutionize tactical information transfer in the 
Marine Corps. A TDN design based on the proven capabilities of 1Pv4 is sound. 1Pv6 
will be needed to meet emerging requirements, and early planning for incorporation of 
1Pv6's improvements will ensure a viable tactical internet for the next century. 
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APPENDIX A. PROPOSED TACTICAL IP ADDRESS ALLOCATION PLAN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This appendix contains specific detailed information about the address allocation 
plan outlined in Chapter VII. The tactical IP address plan consists of address assignment 
tables that are accompanied by brief discussions of how those address assignments were 
developed. 
A notional Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) is used as the frame of reference for 
making tactical IP address assignments. The entire MEF is assigned a block of contiguous 
class C IP network numbers. Each major unit (battalion and above) within the MEF is 
then allocated an IP address or contiguous range of IP addresses from that block. The IP 
addresses listed in this plan are for illustration only and do not represent actual IP 
network numbers obtained from the DoD NIC. For clarity separate tables are not 
shown for every unit within the MEF. In general only one example is shown for each unit 
type (e.g. infantry battalion). 
B. TOTAL IP NETWORK NUMBER ASSIGNMENTS FOR THE MEF 
Table A. I lists the major units within the MEF and the corresponding IP network 
numbers assigned to each unit. The addresses in Table AI are to be used on the classified 
(SECRET) tactical internet. The total IP address allocations for unclassified addresses are 
listed in Table A.2. An address range is assigned to each major subordinate element of the 
MEF (GCE, ACE, CSSE) and the MEF Command Element. The number of addresses in 
these ranges must be a power of two (i.e. 2,4,8, 16,32,64, 128 ... ) so that the network 
address summarization capabilities of Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) can be 
exploited. For example, all32 class C networks within the Marine Division OSPF routing 
area can be advertised to the rest of the tactical internet as a single network number: 
NN32.0. This simplifies both routing and network management. The CIDR 
summarization model is used throughout the MEF wherever possible. 
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NAME of MEF UNIT Number of Class C Class C IP 
IP Addresses Address Range 
COMMAND ELEMENT (CE) 
Marine Forces Component HQ 2 N.N.O.O-N.N.1.0 
First Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) 4 N.N.2.0-N.N.5.0 
Second Marine Expeditionary Unit 4 N.N.6.0-N.N.9.0 
Third Marine Expeditionary Unit 4 N.N.10.0-N.N.13.0 
Contingency Joint Task Force (JTF) 2 N.N.14.0-N.N.15.0 
Marine Expeditionary Force TDN Gateway 1 N.N.16.0 
MEF Main Command Post (COC) 1 N.N.17.0 
Communications Battalion 3 N.N.18.0~N.N.20.0 
SRIG 1 N.N.21.0 
Radio Battalion 1 N.N.22.0 
MEF Forward Command Post 1 N.N.23.0 
MEF Contingency Addresses 8 N.N.24.0-N.N.31.0 
CE Total 32 N.N.O.O-N.N.31.0 
GROUND COMBAT ELEMENT (GCE) 
Marine Division TDN Gateway 1 N.N.32.0 
Division Main Command Post 1 N.N.33.0 
Division Forward Command Post I N.N.34.0 
Division Rear Command Post 1 N.N.35.0 
Division Contingency Addresses 2 N.N.36.0-N.N.37.0 
Direct Air Support Center (DASC) 1 N.N.38.0 
Combat Engineer Bn 1 N.N.39.0 
Artillery Regiment 3 N.N.40.0-N.N.42.0 
Artillery Battalions (5) 5 N.N.43.0-N.N.47.0 
Infantry Regiment 1 N.N.48.0 
Infantry Battalions (3) 3 N.N.49.0-N.N.51.0 
Infantry Regiment 1 N.N.52.0 
Infantry Battalions (3) 3 N.N.53.0-N.N.55.0 
Infantry Regiment 1 N.N.56.0 
Infantry Battalions (3) 3 N.N.57.0-N.N.59.0 
Tank Battalion 1 N.N.60.0 
Light Armored Recon Bn 1 N.N.61.0 
Assault Amphibian Bn 2 N.N.62.0-N.N.63.0 
GCE Total 32 N .N .32.0-N .N .63 .0 
Table A.1 Allocation of classified IP addresses for a notional Marine Expeditionary Force. 
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NAME of MEF UNIT Number of Class C Class C IP 
IP Addresses Address Range 
AVIATION COMBAT ELEMENT (ACE) 
Marine Air Wing TON Gateway I N.N.64.0 
Tactical Air Command Center I N.N.65.0 
Marine Wing HQ I N.N.66.0 
Marine Wing Support Group I N.N.67.0 
Marine Air Control Group HQ I N.N.68.0 
Marine Wing Communications Squadron 1 N.N.69.0 
Marine Air Wing Contingency Addresses 2 N.N.70.0-N.N.71.0 
Fixed Wing Marine Air Group #1/Marine Air I N.N.72.0 
Traffic Control Squadron 
Fixed Wing Marine Air Logistics Squadron #I I N.N.73.0 
Fixed Wing Marine Wing Support Squadron #I I N.N.74.0 
Fixed Wing Squadrons 7 N.N.75.0-N.N.81.0 
Fixed Wing Marine Air Group #2/Marine Air I N.N.82.0 
Traffic Control Squadron 
Fixed Wing Marine Air Logistics Squadron #2 I N.N.83.0 
Fixed Wing Marine Wing Support Squadron #2 I N.N.84.0 
Fixed Wing Squadrons 7 N.N.85.0-N.N.91.0 
Rotary Wing Marine Air Group #1/Marine Air I N.N.92.0 
Traffic Control Squadron 
Rotary Wing Marine Air Logistics Squadron #I I N.N.93.0 
Rotary Marine Wing Support Squadron #I I N.N.94.0 
Rotary Wing Squadrons 5 N.N.95.0-N.N.99.0 
Rotary Wing Marine Air Group #2/Marine Air I N.N.IOO.O 
Traffic Control Squadron 
Rotary Wing Marine Air Logistics Squadron #2 I N.N.IOI.O 
Rotary Marine Wing Support Squadron #2 I N.N.l02.0 
Rotary Wing Squadrons 5 N.N.l03.0-N.N.l07.0 
Marine Air Control Squadron #I I N.N.l08.0 
Marine Air Control Squadron #2 I N.N.l09.0 
Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion I N.N.IIO.O 
Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalion I N.N.lll.O 
ACE Totals 48 N.N.64.0-N.N.lll.O 
Table A.l (continued) Allocation of classified IP addresses for a notional Marine Expeditionary Force. 
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NAME of MEF UNIT Number of Class C Class C IP 
IP Addresses Address Range 
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT ELEMENT 
(CSSE) 
Force Service Support Group TDN Gateway 1 N.N.l12.0 
Force Service Support Group HQ 1 N.N.l13.0 
Combat Service Support Operations Center 1 N.N.114.0 
Supply Battalion (SMU) 1 N.N.115.0 
Maintenance Battalion 1 N.N.116.0 
Medical Battalion 1 N.N.117.0 
Dental Battalion 1 N.N.118.0 
Motor Transport Battalion 1 N.N.119.0 
Engineer Support Battalion 1 N.N.120.0 
Landing Support Battalion 1 N.N.121.0 
Combat Service Support Element # 1 1 N.N.122.0 
Combat Service Support Element #2 1 N.N.123.0 
FSSG Contingency Addresses 4 N.N.124.0-N.N.127.0 
CSSE Total 16 N.N.112.0-N.N.l27.0 
MEFTotal 128 N.N.O.O-N.N.127.0 
Table A.1 (continued) Allocation of classified IP addresses for a notional Marine Expeditionary Force. 
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NAME of MEF UNIT Number of Class C Class C IP 
IP Addresses Address Range 
COMMAND ELEMENT (CE) 
Marine Forces Component HQ 2 N.N.I92.0-N.N.I93.0 
First Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) I N.N.l94.0 
Second Marine Expeditionary Unit I N.N.I95.0 
Third Marine Expeditionary Unit I N.N.I96.0 
Contingency Joint Task Force (JTF) 3 N .N .197.0-N .N .199 .0 
Marine Expeditionary Force TON Gateway I N.N.200.0 
MEF Main Command Post (COC) I N.N.201.0 
MEF Forward CP I N.N.202.0 
Communications Battalion I N.N.203.0 
SRIG HQ and Radio Battalion I N.N.204.0 
MEF Contingency Addresses 3 N.N.205.0-N.N.207.0 
CE Total I6 N.N.I92.0-N.N.207.0 
GROUND COMBAT ELEMENT (GCE) 
Marine Division TON Gateway I N.N.208.0 
Division Main Command Post I N.N.209.0 
Rear Command Post I N.N.2IO.O 
Division Forward I N.N.2II.O 
Division Contingency Address I N.N.2I2.0 
Combat Engineer Battalion/DASC I N.N.213.0 
Tank Battalion!LAR Battalion I N.N.2I4.0 
Assault Amphibian Battalion I N.N.2I5.0 
Artillery Regiment inc! 5 Battalions 2 N.N.2I6.0-N.N.2I7.0 
Infantry Regiment incl 3 Battalions 2 N.N.2I8.0-N.N.2I9.0 
Infantry Regiment incl 3 Battalions 2 N.N.220.0-N.N.22I.O 
Infantry Regiment incl 3 Battalions 2 N.N.222.0-N.N.223.0 
GCE Total I6 N.N.208.0-N.N.223.0 
Table A.2 Allocation of unclassified IP addresses for a notional Marine Expeditionary Force. 
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NAME of MEF UNIT Number of Class C Class C IP 
IP Addresses Address Range 
AVIATION COMBAT ELEMENT (ACE) 
Marine Air Wing TDN Gateway I N.N.224.0 
Marine Wing; HQ/Tactical Air Command Center I N.N.225.0 
Marine Wing Support Group I N.N.226.0 
Marine Air Control Group HQ I N.N.227.0 
Marine Wing Communications Squadron I N.N.228.0 
Fixed Wing MAG #1 incl MALSIMWSSIMATCS I N.N.229.0 
Fixed Wing Squadrons I N.N.230.0 
Fixed Wing MAG #2 incl MALSIMWSS/MA TCS I N.N.231.0 
Fixed Wing Squadrons I N.N.232.0 
Rotary Wing MAG #I incl MALSIMWSSIMATCS I N.N.233.0 
Rotary Wing Squadrons I N.N.234.0 
Rotary Wing MAG #2 incl MALS/MWSS/MA TCS I N.N.235.0 
Rotary Wing Squadrons I N.N.236.0 
Marine Air Control Squadrons I N.N.237.0 
LAADILAAM Battalions I N.N.238.0 
Marine Air Wing Conti~gency Address I N.N.239.0 
ACE Total I6 N.N.224.0-N.N.239.0 
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT ELEMENT (CSSE) 
Force Service Support Group TDN Gateway I N.N.240.0 
Force Service Support Group HQ I N.N.241.0 
Combat Service Support Operations Center I N.N.242.0 
Medical Battalion I N.N.243.0 
Dental Battalion I N.N.244.0 
Supply Battalion (SMU) I N.N.245.0 
Maintenance Battalion I N.N.246.0 
Motor Transport Battalion I N.N.247.0 
Engineer Support Battalion I N.N.248.0 
Landing Support Battalion I N.N.249.0 
Combat Service Support Element #I I N.N.250.0 
Combat Service Support Element #2 I N.N.25I.O 
FSSG Contingency Addresses 4 N.N.252.0-N.N.255.0 
CSSE Total I6 N.N.224.0-N.N.255.0 
MEFTotal 64 N.N.I92.0-N.N.255.0 
Table A.2 (continued) Allocation of unclassified IP address for a notional Marine Expeditionary Force. 
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The assumption was made that the Marine Corps will operate its primary tactical 
internet at the SECRET security level. Most units will be fielded only one TDN Server 
which will operate a local-area network at only one classification level. Unclassified 
network access by these units will be accomplished by using devices such as the 
Motorola Network Encryption System (NES) to tunnel the unclassified data across the 
SECRET internet. In general it is expected that the smaller and more mobile a unit is, the 
fewer unclassified users the unit will have. Therefore, most of the unclassified IP 
addresses are allocated to large units and/or units whose mission is primarily combat 
service support (CSS). 
Each Tactical Data Network Gateway is assigned both a classified and unclassified 
class C network number. Each TDN Gateway has two complete suites of equipment that 
can support two physically separate IP networks. TDN Gateways are expected to be the 
major data networking hubs in the Marine Corps tactical internet. However the concept 
of employment for the TDN Gateway is not yet weli-defined and it is uncertain exactly 
what its IP address requirements will be. Therefore sufficient IP address space is 
allocated to each of the Gateways to ensure maximum employment flexibility. 
C. COMMAND ELEMENT 
1. Marine Component HQ 
The actual structure, employment and support of a Marine component command 
headquarters in the field has not been well established in doctrine. This is an area that is 
the subject of much development effort within the Marine Corps. Therefore, two class C 
network numbers (512 IP host addresses) are assigned to each MARFOR headquarters 
but no internal address assignment is shown. 
2. Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) 
Four class C addresses were assigned to each MEU. A MEU consists of a 
command element, an infantry battalion landing team, an aircraft squadron and a combat 
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service support unit. Due the unpredictable nature of MEU operations and the 
discontinuous topology ofMEU networks, four class C network addresses (one for each 
element) were assigned to each MEU. However, the internal breakdown of the MEV's 
address assignment is not shown. 
3. Contingency Joint Task Force (JTF) 
Each MEF is required to maintain a contingency capability to deploy as a nucleus 
Joint Task Force Headquarters. The IP address requirements for this nucleus JTF are 
unknown but two class C addresses is consistent with that of the MARFOR headquarters. 
Further, additional IP addresses can be provided from the MEF's contingency address 
block if necessary. 
4. Marine Expeditionary Force Command Element 
a. MEF Main Command Post (CP) 
In a large scale expeditionary operation, the MEF is the principal warfighting 
entity of the Marine Corps. The MEF main command post is also the principal 
networking hub for FMF units in the area of operations. The MEF TDN Gateway will 
serve as the Marine Corps' connection to the joint internet, interconnecting the Division, 
Wing, and FSSG TDN Gateways. The proposed standard address assignment for the 
MEF TDN Gateway is shown in Table A.3. The IP address space for the Gateway is 
partitioned into variable length subnets for maximum use of the class C address. The first 
subnet generally follows the generic template example shown in Chapter VII. Subnets 
NN 16.160 and NN 16.17 6 are for use in connecting the TDN Servers in the MEF 
command post to the Gateway and to each other. The remainder of the class C address is 
partitioned into 4-bit subnets that can be used on serial communications links between 
routers, with the last four reserved for dial-in access, The other class C network assigned 
to the MEF command post is for use in the MEF combat operations center (COC) and the 
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UNIT/ORG NETWORK# SUBNET# HOST RANGE COMMENTS 
MEFTDNGW N.N.16.0 N.N.16.0 N.N.16.1-6 router 
{3 bit subnet) N.N.16.7 OMS IMTA 
N.N.16.8 SNS/NES/INE 
N.N.16.9 DNS server 
N.N.16.10 DHCP server 
N.N.16.11 SMTP mail server 
N.N.16.12-13 management 
workstations 
N.N.16.14-17 UPSs and printers 
N.N.16.18-21 Ext Drives/RAID 
N.N.16.22-26 TCIMs 
N.N.16.27-30 repeaters 
N.N.16.31 subnet broadcast 
3 bit subnets-> N.N.16.32 N.N.16.33-62 users/ devices 
N.N.16.64 N.N.16.65-95 users/ devices 
N.N.16.96 N.N.16.97-126 users/ devices 
N.N.16.128 N.N.16.129-158 users/ devices 
start 4 bit subnets-> N.N.16.160 N.N.16.161-174 Server subnet 
N.N.16.176 N.N.16.177-190 Server subnet 
start 6 bit subnets-> N.N.16.192 N.N.16.193-194 16 serial line 
N.N.16.196 N.N.16.197-198 PPP subnets 
N.N.16.200 N.N.16.201-202 with 2 endpts 
N.N.16.204 N.N.16.205-206 per subnet 
N.N.16.208 N.N.16.209-210 







N.N.16.240 N.N.16.241-242 Dial up PPP subnet 
N.N.16.244 N.N.16.245-246 Dial up PPP subnet 
N.N.16.248 N.N.16.249-250 Dial up PPP subnet 
N.N.16.252 N.N.16.253-254 Dial up PPP subnet 
Table A.3 Example IP address assignment for the MEF TDN Gateway. 
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MEF staff section areas (G sections). It is anticipated that the MEF CP will utilize two 
TDN Servers to connect all of its LAN users. 
Therefore the MEF main CP class C address is partitioned into two subnets of 
128 host addresses each as shown in Table A.4. The assignment within the subnets 
follows the generic TDN LAN addressing template. If the MEF employs a Forward CP, it 
would be addressed in accordance with Table A.8. Eight (8) additional class C addresses 
have been reserved for the MEF's use in case of contingencies. 
b. Communications Battalion 
The Communications Battalion provides the communications and networking 
support for the MEF Command Element. The Battalion will almost always colocate with 
the MEF main command post and will establish its own internal local-area network. The 
Communication Battalion IP address assignment is shown in Table A.5. Although the 
assignment follows the generic template, note that two class C network numbers are 
reserved for IP addressing of communications equipment. 
c. Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group (SRIG) 
Headquarters and Radio Battalion 
SRIG is a subordinate unit of the MEF Command Element. The SRIG is 
composed of the Communications Battalion, the Radio Battalion, and a number of 
smaller units that utilize remote sensors (UAVs and ground sensors). Therefore, the 
SRIG's IP network number was partitioned as shown in Table A.6 to allow sufficient 
address for these remote sensors to given IP addresses. 
The Radio Battalion is concerned mainly with signal~ intelligence and 
electronic warfare. This battalion will typically establish a command center in close 
proximity to the SRIG/MEF command post. Radio Battalion contains many items of 
communications-electronic equipment which may ultimately be networked. Therefore 
Radio Battalion is allocated sufficient addresses (Table A. 7) to establish its own LAN 
and permit IP addressing of its many communication-electronic devices. 
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--------------~--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--
UNIT/ORG NETWORK# SUBNET# HOST RANGE COMMENTS 
MEFCOC N.N.17.0 N.N.17.0 N.N.17.1-5 router 
(1 bit subnet) N.N.17.6 LAN file server 
N.N.17.7 DMSMTA 
N.N.17.8 SNS/NES/INE 
N.N.17.9 DNS server 
N.N.17.10 DHCP server 
N.N.17.11 SMTP mail server 








N.N.17.34 main TCO workstation 
N.N.17.35-126 MEF COC users 
N.N.17.127 subnet broadcast 
MEF G sections N.N.17.0 N.N.17.128 N.N.17.129-133 router addresses 
(1 bit subnet) N.N.17.134 LAN file server 
N.N.17.135 DMSMTA 
N.N.17.136 SNS/NES/INE 
N.N.17.137 DNS server 
N.N.17.138 DHCP server 
N.N.17.139 SMTP mail server 




N.N.17.145-148 External drives/RAID 
N.N.17.149-152 TCIMs 
N.N.17.153-158 repeaters 
N.N.17.159-254 MEF G section users 
N.N.17.255 subnet broadcast 
Table A.4 Example IP address allocation for the MEF Main Command Post. 
151 
--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~----~-------
UNIT/ORG NETWORK# SUBNET# HOST RANGE COMMENTS 
Communications Bn N.N.18.0 None N.N.18.1-5 router 
N.N.18.6 LAN file server 
N.N.18.7 OMS MTA 
N.N.18.8 SNS/NESIINE 
N.N.18.9 DNS server 
N.N.18.10 DHCP server 
N.N.18.11 SMTP mail server 









N.N.18.34 main TCO workstation 
N.N.18.35-254 Comm Bn users 
N.N.18.255 subnet broadcast 
Communications Bn N.N.19.0 None N.N.19.1-254 reserved for future IP 
addressing of comm 
equipment 
Communications Bn N.N.20.0 None N.N.20.1-254 reserved for future I P 
addressing of comm 
equipment 
Table A.5 Example IP address plan for Communications Battalion. 
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UNIT/ORG NETWORK# SUBNET# HOST RANGE COMMENTS 
SRIG Headquarters N.N.21.0 N.N.21.0 N.N.21.1-5 router 
(1 bit subnet) N.N.21.6 LAN file server 
N.N.21.7 DMSMTA 
N.N.21.8 SNS/NESIINE 
N.N.21.9 DNS server 
N.N.21.10 DHCP server 
N.N.21.11 SMTP mail server 








N.N.21.34 main TCO workstation 
N.N.21.35-126 SRIG HQ users 
N.N.21.2127 subnet broadcast 
SRIG Sensing Units N.N.21.0 N.N.21.128 N.N.21.129-254 reserved for IP 
(1 bit subnet) addressing of remote 
sensing equipment 
Table A.6 Example IP address plan for the Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group. 
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UNIT/ORG NETWORK# SUBNET# HOST RANGE COMMENTS 
Radio Battalion N.N.22.0 None N.N.22.1-5 router 
N.N.22.6 LAN file server 
N.N.22.7 OMS MTA 
N.N.22.8 SNS/NES/INE 
N.N.22.9 DNS server 
N.N.22.10 DHCP server 
N.N.22.11 SMTP mail server 








N.N.22.34 main TCO workstation 
N.N.22.35-126 Radio Bn users 
N.N.22.127 subnet broadcast 




Table A.7 Example IP address plan for Radio Battalion. 
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UNIT/ORG NETWORK# SUBNET# HOST RANGE COMMENTS 
MEF Forward N.N.23.0 None N.N.23.1-5 router· 
Command Post 
N.N.23.6 LAN file server 
N.N.23.7 DMSMTA 
N.N.23.8 SNS/NESIINE 
N.N.23.9 DNS server 
N.N.23.10 DHCP server 
N.N.23.11 SMTP mail server 








N.N.23.34 main TCO workstation 
N.N.23.35-254 MEF FWD CP users 
N.N.23.255 subnet broadcast 
Table A.8 Example IP address plan for M~F Forward Command Post. 
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D. GROUND COMBAT ELEMENT (GCE) 
1. Marine Division Main Command Post (CP) 
The Division Main CP is the intemetworking hub fo~ the entire ground combat 
element in a large scale operation. The IP address assignment table for the Division's 
TDN Gateway is shown in Table A.9. The assignment patterns for all TDN Gateways is 
identical. The IP address assignments for the Division Main Combat Operations Center 
(COC) and Division staff sections is shown in Table A.l 0. This assignment is very 
similar to the MEF CP address allocation table. It is expected that the Division will 
employ two TDN servers in the Division Main command post, one for classified and one 
for unclassified. Therefore each of the Division Main class C network numbers (one 
classified and one unclassified) is partitioned between the COC and the staff sections. 
2. Division Forward and Rear Command Posts 
It is uncertain whether the Division Forward CP will employ a TDN Server LAN or 
not. If so, IP addresses would be assignment in the ·same manner shown for the MEF 
Forward CP in Table A.8. The Division Rear CP may employ two TDN LANs, one for 
classified and one for unclassified. Therefore the Division Rear CP is provided its own 
class C network addresses. 
3. Direct Air Support Center (DASC) 
The DASC will typically locate with the Division Fire Support Coordination Center 
(FSCC) in the Division Main CP, For this reason, the D ASC is assigned a network 
number out of the GCE address block and not out of the ACE block. Because the DASC 
can also locate with infantry regiments on smaller operations, it was provided its own 
network number instead of a subnet number from the Division CP. 
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UNIT/ORG NETWORK# SUBNET# HOST RANGE COMMENTS 
Division TON GW N.N.32.0 N.N.32.0 N.N.32.1-6 router 
(3 bit subnet) N.N.32.7 OMS IMTA 
N.N.32.8 SNS/NESIINE 
N.N.32.9 DNS server 
N.N.32.10 DHCP server 
N.N.32.11 SMTP mail server 
N.N.32.12-13 management 
workstations 
N.N.32.14-17 UPSs and printers 
N.N.32.18-21 Ext Drives/RAID 
N.N.32.22-26 TCIMs 
N.N.32.27-30 repeaters 
N.N.32.31 subnet broadcast 
3 bit subnets-> N.N.32.32 N.N.32.33-62 LAN users/ devices 
N.N.32.64 N.N.32.65-95 LAN users/ devices 
N.N.32.96 N.N.32.97-126 LAN users/ devices 
N.N.32.128 N.N.32.129-158 LAN users/ devices 
Division TON GW start 4 bit subnets-> N.N.32.160 N.N.32.161-174 Server-server subnet 
N.N.32.176 N.N.32.177-190 Server-server subnet 
start 6 bit subnets-> N.N.32.192 N.N.32.193-194 16 serial line 
N.N.32.196 N.N.32.197-198 PPP subnets 
N.N.32.200 N.N.32.201-202 with 2 endpts 
N.N.32.204 N.N.32.205-206 per subnet 








N.N.32.240 N.N.32.241-242 Dial up PPP subnet 
N.N.32.244 N.N.32.245-246 Dial up PPP subnet 
N.N.32.248 N. N.32.249-250 Dial up PPP subnet 
N.N.32.252 N.N.32.253-254 Dial up PPP subnet 
. . . Table A.9 Example IP address plan for the Manne DIVISion TDN Gateway . 
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UNIT/ORG NETWORK# SUBNET# HOST RANGE COMMENTS 
Division COC N.N.33.0 N.N.33.0 N.N.33.1-5 router 
(1 bit subnet) N.N.33.6 LAN file server 
N.N.33.7 DMSMTA 
N.N.33.8 SNS/NES/INE 
N.N.33.9 DNS server 
N.N.33.10 DHCP server 
N.N.33.11 SMTP mail server 








N.N.33.34 main TCO workstation 
N.N.33.35-126 DIV COC users 
N.N.33.127 subnet broadcast 
Division G sections N.N.33.0 N.N.33.128 N.N.33.129-133 router addresses 
( 1 bit subnet) N.N.33.134 LAN file server 
N.N.33.135 OMS MTA 
N.N.33.136 SNS/NES/INE 
N.N.33.137 DNS server 
N.N.33.138 DHCP server 
N.N.33.139 SMTP mail server 




N.N.33.145-148 External drives/RAID 
N.N.33.149-152 TCIMs 
N.N.33.153-158 repeaters 
N;N.33.159-254 Division G section 
users 
N.N.33.255 subnet broadcast 
Table A. I 0 Example IP address plan for the Marine Division Main Command Post. 
158 
4. Combat Engineer Battalion (CEB) 
The Combat Engineer Battalion (CEB) is a separate battalion under the direct 
command of the Marine Division. In practice CEB often establishes its battalion 
command post near the Division main CP. Nonetheless CEB is an independent unit with 
its own TDN network and is assigned its own SECRET class C network number. CEB 
shares an unclassified network address with the DASC. Internal IP address assignment is 
according to the generic template. 
5. Artillery Regiment 
There is one Artillery Regiment in the Division. The Headquarters Battery ofthe 
Artillery Regiment is quite large with a wide variety of support personnel. The . 
regimental main command post consists of a Fire Direction Center (FDC) that will 
support at least eight AF A TDS terminals in addition to two TCO terminals and other 
tactical data systems. The regiment also maintains a large maintenance capability that 
may be located in the main CP or in a logistics support area (LSA). It is expected that an 
artillery regiment will establish two or three TDN LANs, therefore three class C network 
numbers are allocated. The FDC address is partitioned into user subnets and serial line 
subnets that are used to connect the artillery battalions to the regiment. It is expected that 
most of the traffic at the Artillery Regiment and below will be classified, and that at most 
one unclassifed TDN Server will be employed. Therefore two unclassified network 
addresses are allocated to cover the regiment and its artillery battalions. 
6. Artillery Battalions 
Artillery battalions are data-intensive organizations. As the digitization of fire 
support continues, the artillery must be fully intemetworked down to the gun line. Each 
artillery battalion will receive one TDN Server which will certainly be employed at the 
battalions' main CPs. However there is a need to assign IP addresses to all fire support 
devices and AF A TDS terminals in the battalion. Therefore a class C network number 
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UNIT/ORG NETWORK# SUBNET# HOST RANGE COMMENTS 
Artillery Regiment N.N.40.0 N.N.40.0 N.N.40.1-5 router 
Main Command Post (2 bit subnet) N.N.40.6 LAN file server 
N.N.40.7 OMS MTA 
N.N.40.8 SNS/NES/INE 
N.N.40.9 DNS server 
N.N.40.10 DHCP server 
N.N.40.11 SMTP mail server 








N.N.40.34 main TCO workstation 
N.N.40.34-62 Regtimental FDC LAN 
users/ devices 
2 bit subnets-> N.N.40.64 N.N.40.65-126 Regt FDC users/devices 
N.N.40.128 N.N.40.129-190 Regt FDC users/devices 
Arty Main CP Server start 6 bit subnets-> N.N.40.192 N.N.40.193-194 16 serial line 
N.N.40.196 N.N.40.197 -198 PPP subnets 
N.N.40.200 N.N.40.201-202 with 2 endpts 
N.N.40.204 N.N.40.205-206 per subnet 












. Arty Logistics Support N.N.41.0 N.N.41.1-254 Arty LSA LAN 
Arty Regt FWD CP N.N.42.0 N.N.42.1-254 Arty FWD CP LAN 
Table A. II Example IP address plan for an Artillery Regiment. 
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was allocated to each artillery battalion and partitioned to give each battery a group of 
subnet addresses. A sample artillery battalion allocation is shown in Table A.12. 
7. Infantry Regiments 
There are usually three infantry regiments in the Marine Divison. Each regiment 
will receive three TDN Servers. The infantry regiment typically installs a LAN only at its 
main command post because its forward CP is highly mobile. Infantry regimental 
headquarters are not large enough to support rear CPs. Therefore each infantry regiment 
was allocated one classified network address and two unclassified addresses which must 
be shared among itself and its three infantry battalions. As shown in Table A.13, the 
partitioning of the infantry regiment's class C network address as similar to that of the 
artillery regiment's FDC address. 
8. Infantry Battalions 
There are three infantry battalions in each regiment. Each battalion has three rifle 
companies and one weapons company. One TDN Server will be fielded to each infantry 
battalion. Since a battalion can operate independently, each battalion was assigned a 
separate network number. The proposed IP address assignment shown in Table A.14 is 
identical to the generic template. Currently infantry battalions only occasionally set up 
LANs, but this will not be the case in the future. Advances in radio-based networking 
will allow battalions to remain fully intemetworked with the MEF at all times. Further, 
the infantry battalion is likely to see a proliferation of handheld data communications 
devices which must all be assigned IP addresses. Therefore a class C network number is 
needed to ensure sufficient address space to accommodate these changes. 
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UNIT/ORG NETWORK# SUBNET# HOST RANGE COMMENTS 
1st Artillery Battalion N.N.43.0 N.N.43.0 N.N.43.1-5 router 
Main Command Post (1 bit subnet) N.N.43.6 LAN file server 
N.N.43.7 DMSMTA 
N.N.43.8 SNS/NESIINE 
N.N.43.9 DNS server 
N.N.43.10 DHCP server 
N.N.43.11 SMTP mail server 








N.N.43.34 mainTCO workstation 
N.N.43.35-126 Battalion FDC LAN 
users/ devices 
Artillery Batteries 3 bit subnets start-> N.N.43.128 N.N.43.129-158 A Battery LAN 
N.N.43.160 N.N.43.161-190 B Battery LAN 
N.N.43.192 N.N.43.193-222 C Battery LAN 
N.N.43.224 N.N.43.225-254 Spare 
-···-
Table A.12 Example IP address plan for an Artillery Battalion. 
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UNIT/ORG NETWORK# SUBNET# HOST RANGE COMMENTS 
1st Infantry Regiment N.N.48.0 N.N.48.0 N.N.48.1-5 router 
Main Command Post (2 bit subnet) N.N.48.6 LAN file server 
N.N.48.7 OMS MTA 
N.N.48.8 SNS/NESIINE 
N.N.48.9 DNS server 
N.N.48.10 DHCP server 
N.N.48.11 SMTP mail server 








N.N.48.34 main TCO workstation 
N.N.48.35-62 Regt LAN users 
2 bit subnet-> N.N.48.64 N.N.48.65-126 Regt LAN users 
2 bit subnet-> N.N.48.128 N.N.48.129-190 Regt LAN users 
start 6 bit subnets-> N.N.48.192 N.N.48.193-194 16 serial line 
N.N.48.196 N.N.48.197-198 PPP subnets 
N.N.48.200 N.N.48.201-202 with 2 endpts 
N.N.48.204 N .N .48.205-206 per subnet 












Table A.l3 Example IP address plan for an Infantry Regiment. 
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UNIT/ORG NETWORK# SUBNET# HOST RANGE COMMENTS 
1st Infantry Bn, 1st N.N.49.0 None N.N.49.1-5 router 
Infantry Regiment 
N.N.49.6 LAN file server 
N.N.49.7 DMSMTA 
N.N.49.8 SNS/NESIINE 
N.N.49.9 DNS server 
N.N.49.10 DHCP server 
N.N.49.11 SMTP mail server 








N.N.49.34 main TCO workstation 
N.N.49.35-254 lnf Bn and 
lnf Company users 
N.N.49.255 · subnet broadcast 
Table A.l4 Example IP address plan for an Infantry Battalion. 
9_. Tank Battalion/Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion 
These two battalions are similar in the structure of their networks. Each unit can 
either operate as a whole or can detach its companies to support other units. Since the 
armored vehicles will certainly have addressable devices in them, separate subnets were 
assigned to each company in addition to the subnet for the battalion LAN. This 
breakdown is shown in Tables A.l5 and A.l6. 
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UNIT/ORG NETWORK# SUBNET# HOST RANGE COMMENTS 
Tank Battalion N.N.60.0 N.N.60.0 N.N.60.1-5 router 
Main Command Post N.N.60.6 LAN file server 
N.N.60.7 OMS MTA 
N.N.60.8 SNS/NES/INE 
N.N.60.9 DNS server 
N.N.60.10 DHCP server 
N.N.60.11 SMTP mail server 




N.N.60.17-20 External drives/RAID 
N.N.60.21-24 TCIMs 
N.N.60.25-30 repeaters 
N.N.60.31 subnet broadcast 
3 bit subnet-> N.N.60.32 N.N.60.34 main TCO workstation 
N.N.60.35-62 Tank Bn LAN users 
3 bit subnets-> N.N.60.64 N.N.60.65-95 Tank Bn LAN users 
Anti-Tank Company N.N.60.96 N.N.60.97-126 Anti-Tank Company 
Tank Companies N.N.60.128 N.N.60.129-158 Tank Company 
N.N.60.160 N.N.60.161-190 Tank Company 
N.N.60.192 N.N.60.193-222 Tank Company 
N.N.60.224 N.N.60.225-254 Tank Company 
Table A.l5 Example IP address plan for Tank Battalion. 
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UNIT/ORG NETWORK# SUBNET# HOST RANGE COMMENTS 
LAV/LAR Battalion N.N.61.0 N.N.61.0 N.N.61.1-6 router 
Main Command Post N.N.61.6 LAN file server 
N.N.61.7 OMS MTA 
N.N.61.8 SNS/NES/INE 
N.N.61.9 DNS server 
N.N.61.10 DHCP server 
N.N.61.11 SMTP mail server 




N.N.61.17 -20 External drives/RAID 
N.N.61.21-24 TCIMs 
N.N.61.25-30 repeaters 
N.N.61.31 subnet broadcast 
3 bit subnet-> N.N.61.32 N.N.61.34 main TCO workstation 
N.N.61.35-62 LAR Bn LAN users 
3 bit subnets-> N.N.61.64 N.N.61.65-95 LAR Bn LAN users 
LAV/LAR Companies N.N.61.96 N.N.61.97-126 LAV/LAR Company 
N.N.61.128 N.N.61.129-158 LAV/LAR Company 
N.N.61.160 N.N.61.161-190 LAV/LAR Company 
N.N.61.192 N.N.61.193-222 LAV/LAR Company 
N.N.61.224 N.N.61.225-254 LAV/LAR Company 
Table A.l6 Example IP address plan for Light Annored Reconnaissance Battalion. 
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10. Assault Amphibian Battalion 
The Assault Amphibian Battalion is the largest battalion in the Division. The 
battalion contains nearly 200 amphibious assault vehicles (AA Vs) each of which has 
numerous radio and electronic equipment on board. In addition to the battalion 
headquarters LAN IP address requirements, there will be a need to assign at least one IP 
address to every AA V. Further, the AA V command and control variant (AA VC-7) will 
require an entire subnet itself. Given the current equipment suite in the AA VC-7, and 
that projected for the follow-on AAA V, 16 addresses per vehicle should be sufficient. 
The allocation of the two class C network numbers assigned to the AA Battalion is shown 
in Table A.l7. 
E. AVIATION COMBAT ELEMENT (ACE) 
1. Marine Air Wing Headquartersffactical Air Command Center (TACC) 
The TACC is the command and control hub for Marine aviation in the area of 
operations. Therefore, the TACC is accompanied by the major networking equipment of 
the Air Wing. It is expected that the Wing TDN Gateway will be located in the same 
command post with the TACC and the Wing headquarters staff. The address allocation 
for the Wing TDN Gateway shown in Table A.18 is identical that of the MEF Gateway. 
The TACC will have its own TDN Server to network its many tactical data systems. 
Table A.19 shows the notional assignment ofT ACC IP addresses. In addition to the 
subnets provided for general TACC LAN users, separate subnets (64 IP addresses per 
subnet) are allocated for both the Advance Tactical Air Command Center (ATACC) and 
the Contingency Theater Air Planning System (CTAPS). The ATACC system currently 
consists of 10 end systems and the TACC employs approximately 20 CTAPS terminals. 
It is anticipated that most of the TACC data traffic will be SECRET, so the TACC and 
the Wing headquarters will share a class C unclassified network number. 
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UNIT/ORG NETWORK# SUBNET# HOST RANGE COMMENTS 
AA V Battalion N.N.62.0 N.N.62.0 N.N.62.1-5 router 
Main Command Post N.N.62.6 LAN file server 
N.N.62.7 DMSMTA 
N.N.62.8 SNS/NESIINE 
N.N.62.9 DNS server 
N.N.62.10 DHCP server 
N.N.62.11 SMTP mail server 








N.N.62.34 main TCO workstation 
N.N.62.35-126 AA V Bn LAN users 
4 bit subnets-> N.N.62.128 N.N.62.129-130 AAVC7 
N.N.62.144 N.N.62.145-146 AAVC7 
N.N.62.160 N.N.62.161-174 AAVC7 
N.N.62.176 N.N.62.177-190 AAVC7 
N.N.62.192 N.N.62.193-206 AAVC7 
N.N.62.208 N.N.62.209-222 AAVC7 
N.N.62.224 N.N.62.225-238 AAVC7 
N.N.62.240 N.N.62.241-254 AAVC7 
AAV Line Companies N.N.63.0 N.N.63.0 
--
N.N.63.1-62 ACoAAV Bn 
2 bit subnets-> N.N.63.64 N.N.63.65-126 B CoAAV Bn 
N.N.63.128 N.N.63.129-190 C CoAAV Bn 
N.N.63.192 N.N.63.193-254 D CoAAVBn 
Table A.l7 Example IP address plan for Assault Amphibian Battalion. 
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UNIT/ORG NETWORK# SUBNET# HOST RANGE COMMENTS 
Marine Air Wing N.N.64.0 N.N.64.0 N.N.64.1-6 router 
TDNGW 
N.N.64.7 OMS IMTA 
N.N.64.8 SNS/NES/INE 
N.N.64.9 DNS server 
N.N.64.10 DHCP server 
N.N.64.11 SMTP mail server 
N.N.64.12-13 management 
workstations 
N.N.64.14-17 UPSs and printers 
N.N.64.18-21 External drives/RAID 
N.N.64.22-26 TCIMs 
N.N.64.27-30 repeaters 
N.N.64.31 subnet broadcast 
3 bit subnets-> N.N.64.32 N.N.64.33-62 LAN users/ devices 
N.N.64.64 N.N.64.65-95 LAN users/ devices 
N.N.64.96 N.N.64.97-126 LAN users/ devices 
N.N.64.128 N.N.64.129-158 LAN users/ devices 
MAWTDNGW start 4 bit subnets-> N.N.64.160 N.N.64.161-174 Server-server subnet 
N.N.64.176 N.N.64.177-190 Server-server subnet 
start 6 bit subnets-> N.N.64.192 N.N.64.193-194 16 serial line 
N.N.64.196 N.N.64.197-198 PPP subnets 
N.N.64.200 N.N.64.201-202 with 2 endpts 
N.N.64.204 N.N.64.205-206 per subnet 
N.N.64.208 N.N.64.209-210 
N.N.64.212 N.N.64.213-214 






N.N.64.240 N.N.64.241-242 Dial up PPP subnet 
N.N.64.244 N.N.64.245-246 Dial up PPP subnet 
N.N.64.248 N.N.64.249-250 Dial up PPP subnet 
N.N.64.252 N.N.64.253-254 Dial up PPP subnet 
Table A.l8 Example IP address plan for the Marine Air Wing TDN Gateway. 
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UNIT/ORG NETWORK# SUBNET# HOST RANGE COMMENTS 
Tactical Air Command N.N.65.0 N.N.65.0 N.N.65.1-5 router 
Center (TACC) 
N.N.65.6 LAN file server 
N.N.65.7 OMS MTA 
N.N.65.8 SNS/NES/INE 
N.N.65.9 DNS server 
N.N.65.10 DHCP server 
N.N.65.11 SMTP mail server 




N.N.65.17-20 External drives/RAID 
· N.N.65.21-24 TCIMs 
N.N.65.25-30 repeaters 
N.N.65.31-33 reserved 
N.N.65.34 main TCO workstation 
N.N.65.35-62 TACC LAN users 
2 bit subnets-> N.N.65.64 N.N.65.66-126 ATACC 
N.N.65.128 N.N.65.129-190 CTAPS 
N.N.65.192 N.N.65.193-222 TACC LAN users 
N.N.65.224 N.N.65.225-254 TACC LAN users 
Table A.l9 Example IP address plan for the Tactical Air Command Center. 
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The Wing headquarters and staff sections will have their own LAN using a separate 
TDN Server. Therefore a separate class C address is provided for Wing headquarters. 
The IP address assignment for the Wing HQ is shown in Table A.20. 
2. Marine Wing Support Group (MWSG) and Marine Air Control 
Group(MACG) 
These two elements of the Marine Air Wing typically co locate with the TACC and 
Wing HQ. However, each will have its own TDN Servers and many LAN users. 
Therefore each of these units was allocated both a classified and unclassified class C 
network. Internal allocations of addre~ses are in accordance with the basic template and 
therefore are not shown in a separate table. 
3. Marine Wing Communications Squadron 
The communications squadron provides the communications interconnectivity for 
the TACC, the Wing HQ and most ofthe Marine Air Wing's subordinate units. The 
communications squadron headquarters area is in the command post with the TACC and 
Wing HQ. The squadron will have its own LANs and TDN servers, so it is provided 
separate class C network numbers. The assignment of these addresses is shown in Table 
A. 21. Like the communications battalion, the communications squadron may need IP 
addresses to assign to it communications equipment in the future. 
4. Fixed/Rotary Wing Marine Air Groups (MAGs) 
There are two fixed wing MAGs and two rotary wing MAGs in the Marine Air 
Wing. Each MAG is an independent unit and will have its own network, therefore each is 
assigned its own class C network number. The partitioning or'the MAG's class C address 
is shown in Table A.22. Note that a MAG will be located at an airfield. Therefore, a 
subnet is dedicated to connecting all of the squadron LANs together, and two subnets are 
provided to the Marine Air Traffic Control Squadron detachment at the airfield. 
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UNIT/ORG NETWORK# SUBNET# HOST RANGE COMMENTS 
Marine Wing Command N.N.66.0 None N.N.66.1-5 router 
Element 
N.N.66.6 LAN file server 
N.N.66.7 DMSMTA 
N.N.66.8 SNS/NES/INE 
N.N.66.9 DNS server 
N.N.66.10 DHCP server 
N.N.66.11 SMTP mail server 








N.N.66.34 main TCO workstation 
N.N.66.35-254 Wing staff sections 
LAN users 
N.N.66.255 network broadcast 
Table A.20 Example IP address plan for Marine Air Wmg Command Element 
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UNIT/ORG NETWORK# SUBNET# HOST RANGE COMMENTS 
Marine Wing N.N.69.0 N.N.69.0 N.N.69.1-5 router 
Communication Sqdn {1 bit subnet) 
N.N.69.6 LAN file server 
N.N.69.7 DMSMTA 
N.N.69.8 SNS/NES/INE 
N.N.69.9 DNS server 
N.N.69.10 DHCP server 
N.N.69.11 SMTP mail server 








N.N.69.34 main TCO workstation 
N.N.69.35-126 Comm SQDN LAN 
users 
N.N.69.127 subnet broadcast 
Communication N.N.69.128 N.N.69.129-254 reserved for IP 
Squadron {1 bit subnet) addressing of 
communications 
equipment 
Table A.21 Example IP address plan for Manne Wmg Commumcat10ns Squadron. 
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UNIT/ORG NETWORK# SUB NET# HOST RANGE COMMENTS 
Fixed Wing MAG 
MATCS 
N.N.72.0 N.N.72.0 N.N.72.1-5 router 
(1 bit subnet) N.N.72.6 LAN file server 
N.N.72.7 DMSMTA 
N.N.72.8 SNS/NES/INE 
N.N.72.9 DNS server 
N.N.72.10 DHCP server 
N.N.72.11 SMTP mail server 








N.N.72.34 main TCO workstation 
N.N.72.35-126 MAG HQ LAN users 
N.N .. 72.127 subnet broadcast 
3 bit subnets-> N.N.72.128 N.N.72.129-158 Airfield server to 
server LAN 
N.N.72.160 N.N.72.161-190 reserved for router 
and server functions 
N.N.72.192 N.N. 72.193-222 MATCS LAN users 
N.N.72.224 N.N.72.225-254 MATCS LAN users 
Table A.22 Example IP address plan for a Fixed Wing Marine Air Group 
and Marine Air Traffic Control Squadron. 
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5. Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron (MALS) and Marine Wing Support 
Squadron (MWSS) 
Each MAG has both a MALS and an MWSS. These units provide maintenance, 
engineering and overall combat service support to the MAG and its squadrons. MALS 
and MWSS will typically colocate with the MAG headquarters at an airfield. Since they 
are independent units with a potentially large number of LAN users, each was given its 
own class C network address. The internal address assignment is accordance with the 
basic template. 
6. Fixed/Rotary Wing Squadrons 
Although there are more fixed wing than rotary wing squadrons, networks of the 
two squadron types will be quite similar. Each squadron, like each infantry battalion, is 
capable of independent employment and each receives its own class C network number. 
The assignment of squadron IP addresses is just like that of the infantry battalion shown 
in Table A.l4. 
7. Marine Air Control Squadron (MACS) 
There are two MACS in each Marine Air Wing. The mission of the MACS is to set 
up the Tactical Air Operations Center (TAOC) which is the center for air defense in the 
Marine area of operations. Doctrinally, two TAOCs might be set up in the same area of 
operations, so each squadron was allocated its own class C network number. The IP 
address assignment within the MACS LAN is according to the basic template. The 
TAOC contains many communications and information systems devices that may 
eventually need to be given IP addresses. 
8. Low Altitude Air Defense (LAAD) Battalion 
The LAAD battalion is similar in structure to an artillery battalion. There is a 
headquarters element and several LAAD batteries. Since LAAD is an independent unit it 
is assigned a separate class C network number. Table A.23 shows the partitioning of the 
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LAAD network address. The LAAD batteries have tactical data system devices that will 
eventually require IP addresses, so each battery was given its own subnet. 
9. Light Antiaircraft Missile (LAAM) Battalion 
There is currently only one LAAM battalion in the Marine Corps. Nonetheless, 
each Marine Air Wing was provided an address to use for the LAAM battalion if it 
should be reactivated. The allocation of the LAAM class C network number is very 
similar to that of the LAAD battalion. 
F. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT ELEMENT (CSSE) 
1. Force Service Support Group (FSSG) Headquarters 
The FSSG establishes a Combat Service Support Operations Center (CSSOC) as its 
tactical "command po$t." The FSSG itself is highly task-organized and it is difficult to 
know exactly how it will be employed on a given operation. The FSSG will employ a 
TDN Gateway to internetwork its many battalions and Combat Service Support Elements 
(CSSEs) and Combat Service Support Detachments (CSSDs). The FSSG Gateway will 
be addressed in the same way as the Division and Air Wing TDN Gateways. A TDN 
Server will be fielded to each battalion in the FSSG and four Servers will be fielded to the 
FSSG HQ. To maintain maximum flexibility of addressing, one classified class C 
network number and one unclassified class C network number were assigned to each 
FSSG battalion, the FSSG headquarters (staff), and the CSSOC. 
2. FSSG Battalions 
Each of the FSSG's battalions will establish a LAN. The Supply Battalion will 
certainly have both classified and unclassified LANs because it must process and track 
automated requisitions throught the SASSY Management Unit (SMU). The Medical 
Battalion will install a network that connects to medical facilities in the U.S. for 
telemedicine purposes. 
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UNIT/ORG NETWORK# SUBNET# HOST RANGE COMMENTS 
LAAD Battalion N.N.110.0 N.N.110.0 N.N.110.1-5 router 
(3 bit subnet) N.N.110.6 LAN file server 
N.N.110.7 DMSMTA 
N.N.110.8 SNS/NES/INE 
N.N.110.9 DNS server 
N.N.110.10 DHCP server 
N.N.110.11 SMTP mail server 




N.N.110.17-20 External drives/RAID 
N.N.110.21-24 TCIMs 
N.N.110.25-30 repeaters 
N.N.110.31 subnet broadcast 
3 bit subnet-> N.N.110.32 N.N.110.34 main TCO workstation 
N.N.11 0.35-62 LAAD Bn LAN users 
3 bit subnets-> N.N.110.64 N.N.11 0.65-95 LAAD Bn LAN users 
LAAD Batteries N.N.110.96 N.N.110.97-126 LAAD Battery 
N.N.110.128 N.N.110.129-158 LAAD Battery 
N.N.110.160 N.N.110.161-190 LAAD Battery 
N.N.110.192 N.N.110.193-222 LAAD Battery 
N.N.11 0.224 N.N.11 0.225-254 LAAD Battery 
Table A.23 Example IP address plan for the Low Altttude Atr Defense Battalion. 
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G. SUMMARY 
The Tactical Data Network IP address allocation plan presented in this study is 
consistent with current best practices in the IP internetworking field. It provides enough 
address space for not only current tactical IP address requirements but also provides room 
for future growth. With the advent of Internet Protocol version 6 address space will 
become less of a concern, but address hierarchy will continue to be critical to routing 
efficiency. CIDR is the prototype for next generation hierarchical routing, and OSPFv2 
is currently being upgraded to work with IPv6. By employing Classless Inter-Domai~ 
Routing (CIDR) and OSPFv2 in TDN, the Marine Corps positions itself to make a 

































APPENDIX B. ACRONYMS 
A TM Adaptation Layer 
Amphibious Assault Vehicle 
Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle 
Aviation Combat Element 
Air Force Forces Commander 
Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System 
Application Programming Interface 
Army Forces Commander 
Advanced Tactical Air Command Center 
Asynchronous Transfer Mode 
Automatic Digital Network 
Border Gateway Protocol version 4 
Battalion 
BOOTstrap Protocol 
Bits per second 
Command and Control 
Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence 
Conditioned DiPhase 
Compact Disc Read Only Memory 
Command Element 
Classless Inter-Domain Routing 
Connectionless Network Protocol 
Combat Operations Center 
Common Operating Environment 
Common Operational Picture 
Commercial Off-The-Shelf 
Command Post 
Central Processing Unit 
Communications Support System/Combat Service Support 
Combat Service Support Element 



































Digital Automated Communications Terminal 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
Direct Air Support Center 
Data Communications Equipment 
Distributed Collaborative Planning 
Defense Data Network 
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol 
Defense Information Infrastructure 
Distributed Interactive Simulation 
Defense Information Systems Agency 
Defense Information Systems Network 
Defense Messaging System 
Domain Name System 
Department of Defense 
Defense Switched Network 
Defense Secure Network 1 (SECRET) 
Defense Secure Network 2 (TOP SECRET) 
Defense Secure Network 3 (TOP SECRET SCI) 
Digital Subscriber Voice Terminal 
Data Terminal Equipment 
Environmental Control Unit 
Encapsulating Security Payload 
Fire Direction Center 
Fiber Distributed Data Interface 
Fleet Marine Force 
Fire Support Coordination Center 
Force Service Support Group 
File Transfer Protocol 
Global Broadcast Service 
Global Command and Control System 
Ground Combat Element 
Government Open Systems Interconnection Profile 



































Graphical User Interface 
Tactical Data Network Gateway 
Hard Drive 
Headquarters 
HyperText Markup Language 
HyperText Transport Protocol 
Internet Architecture Board 
Internet Assigned Number Authority 
Intelligence Analysis System 
Identifier 
Improved Direct Air Support Center 
Integrated Digital Network Exchange 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
Internet Engineering Steering Group 
· Internet Engineering Task Force 
Intermediate Message Transfer Agent 
Inline Network Encryptor 
Institut National de Recherche en lnformatique et en Automatique 
Internet Network Information Center 
Internet Protocol 
Internet Protocol Next Generation (also 1Pv6) 
Internet Protocol Next Generation Working Group (IETF) 
Internet Protocol Security Architecture 
Internet Protocol version 4 
Internet Protocol version 6 (also IPng) 
Integrated Services Digital Network 
International Organization for Standardization 
Internet Society 
Integrated Tactical-Strategic Data Network 
International Telecommunications Union 
Joint Interoperability Engineering Organization 
Joint Maritime Command Information System 
















Joint Task Force 
Joint World-wide Intelligence Communications System 
inline encryption device 
Low Altitude Air Defense 
Light AntiAircraft Missile 
Local-Area Network 
Link Access Protocol B 
Light Armored Reconnaissance 
Light Armored Vehicle 
Logical Link Control 
Marine Air Control Group 
Marine Air Control Squadron 
Marine Air Group 
Marine Air-Ground Task Force 
MALS Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 
MARCORSYSCOM Marine Corps Systems Command 


















Marine Forces Atlantic 
Marine Forces Pacific 
Marine Air Wing 
Multicast Backbone 
Marine Corps Combat Development Command 
Marine Combat Service Support Command and Control System 
Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity 
Marine Expeditionary Force 
Marine Expeditionary Unit 
Military Standard 
Multimedia Terminal 
Mobile Subscriber Equipment 
Message Transfer Agent 
Maximum Transfer Unit 



































Marine Wing Communications Squadron 
Marine Wing Support Group 
Marine Wing Support Squadron 
Negative Acknowledgement 
Navy Forces Commander 
Naval Command Control and Ocean Surveillance Center 
Naval Computer and Telecommunications Area Master Station 
Network Encryption System (Motorola Inc.) 
Network Information Center/Network Interface Card 
National Information Infrastructure 
Non-secure IP Router Network 
Naval Postgraduate School 
National Research Council 
Open Data Network 
Operational Requirements Document 
Open Systems Interconnection 
Open Shortest Path First 
Open Shortest Path First Protocol version 2 
Personal Computer 
Personal Computer Memory Card International Association 
Privacy Enhanced Mail 
Power Entry Panel 
Portable Operating System Interface for Computer Environments 
Point-to-Point Protocol 
Quality of Service 
Redundant Array of Inexpensive Disks 
Regiment 
Request For Comments 
Resource Reservation Protocol 
30-line portable digital tactical circuit switch 
Special Compartmented Information (TOP SECRET) 
Signal Entry Panel 



































Simple Internet Protocol Plus 
Secure IP Router Network 
Switched Multimegabit Data Service 
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol 
Simple Network Management Protocol 
Simple Network Management Protocol version 2 
Secure Network Server 
Squadron 
Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Intelligence Group 
Standard (Internet Standard) 
Standardized Tactical Entry Point 
Tactical Air Command Center 
Tactical Data Links 
Tactical Data Information Exchange System 
Tactical Secure Data Communications 
Tactical Communications Interface Module 
Tactical Combat Operations 
Transmission Control Protocol 
Theater Deployable Communications 
Tactical Data Network 
Tactical Data System 
Virtual terminal protocol in TCPIIP protocol suite 
Tactical Name Server 
Tactical Packet Network 
Analog Technical Control System 
Digital Technical Control System 
150-line capacity digital tactical circuit switch system 
Time-To-Live 
TOP SECRET Support System 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
User Datagram Protocol 
Uninterruptable Power Supply 














World Wide Web 
ISO packet-switching protocol standard 
ISO electronic mail protocol standard used in DMS 
ISO network directory services protocol standard used in DMS 
Xpress Transport Protocol 
Virtual Network System (Banyan Inc.) 
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APPENDIX C. ON-LINE AVAILABILITY 
This thesis is available on the World-Wide Web. The HyperText Markup 
Language (HTML) version can be found at 
http://www.stl.nps.navy.mill-jenierle/thesis.html 
and can be viewed on-line using a Web browser such as Netscape Navigator [NCC,96]. 
For ease of downloading and printing, a PostScript version of this thesis is available at 
http:llwww.stl.nps.navy.mil/-jenierle!PostScript.html 
When downloaded, these PostScript files may be printed directly to any PostScript-
compatible printing device or viewed on a terminal with a PostScript document viewer. 
Instructions on how to obtain and use PostScript viewers are available at 
http://www.math. washington.edu/-kaupe/teaching/307_ spring96/PostScript.html 
In order to reduce download time, some of these thesis PostScript files have been 
compressed. Most Web browsers are (or can be) configured to automatically decompress 
files once downloaded. If your browser cannot access the appropriate decompression 
utility, you will have to save the downloaded binary files to disk and decompress them 
off-line before printing or viewing. 
The Information Infrastructure Research Group (IIRG) at the Naval Postgraduate 
School maintains a Web page [IIRG ,96] that has a link to this thesis and to other 
completed and in-progress work by IIRG group members. The IIRG Web page is 
available at http://www.stl.nps.navy.mil/-iirg. 
Questions regarding on-line access to this thesis should be directed to the 
Information Infrastructure Research Group at iirg@stl.nps.navy.mil or to Don Brotzman 




Adamson, R., "Internetworking the Navy," IPng: Internet Protocol Next Generation, 
Addison-Wesley, Reading Massachusetts, 1996. 
Armitrage, Grenville, IPv6 and Neighbor Discovery over ATM, work in progress, 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), 29 April1996. Available at 
ftp://ietf. cnri. reston. va. us/internet-drafts/ draft-ietf-ipatm-ipv6nd-02. txt 
Atkinson, R., Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol, Request for Comments 
1825, Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), August 1995. Available at 
ftp://ds. internic. netlrfclrfcl825. txt · 
Baker, Steven, "The Future of Major Protocols," UNIX REVIEW, vol. 12 no. 5, pp. 23-29, 
May 1994. 
Bigelow,R., Internetworking: Planning and Implementing a Wide-Area Network for K-12 
Schools, Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey California, September 
1995. Available at http://www.stl. nps. nary. mill~rjbigelo/thesis. html 
Borden, M., Crawley,E., Davis, B. and Batsell, S., Integration of Real-Time Services in 
an IP-ATM Network Architecture, Request for Comments 1821, Internet Engineering 
Task Force (IETF), August 1995. Available at ftp://ds.internic.netlrfc/rfcl821.txt 
Bound, J., ''Implementing IPng on a BSD Host," IPng: Internet Protocol Next 
Generation, Addison-Wesley, Reading Massachusetts, 1996. 
Braden, R.~ Clark~ D. and Shenker, S., Integrated Services in the Internet Architecture: an 
Overview, Request for Comments 1633, Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), June 
1994. Available at ftp://ds.internic.net!rfc!rfc1633.txt 
Braden, R., Zhang, L., Berson, S., Herzog, S. and Jamin, S., Resource Reservation 
Protocol (RSVP) Functional Specification, work in progress, Internet Engineering Task 
Force (IETF), 18 March 1996. Available at 
ftp://ietf. cnri. reston. va. us/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-rsvp-spec-11. txt 
Bradner, Scott 0. and Mankin, Allison, editors, IPng.' Internet Protocol Next Generation, 
Addison-Wesley, Reading Massachusetts, 1996. · 
189 
Bradner, Scott 0., The Internet Standards Process Revision 3, work in progress, Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF), April1996. Available at 
ftp://ietf cnri. reston. va. us/internet-drafts/ draft-ietf-poised9 5-std-proc-3 -06. txt 
Braudes, R. and Zabele, S., Requirements for Multicast Protocols, Request for Comments 
1458, Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), May 1993. 
Available at ftp://ds.internic.net!rfc/rfcl458.txt 
Bruno, L.," Internet Security: How Much Is Enough?," DATA COMMUNICATIONS, 
vol. 25 no. 5, April 1996. 
Brotzman, Donald P. and Reimers, Stephen, "Internet Protocol over Seawater (IP/SW): 
Towards Interoperable Underwater Networks," Unmanned Untethered Submersibles 
Technology 95, Northeastern University, Nahant Massachusetts, pp. 444-457, September 
25-27 1995. Available at ftp://taurus.cs.nps.navy.mil/publauv!ipoversw.ps 
Brotzman, Donald P., "Graphics Internetworking: Bottlenecks and Breakthroughs," 
Digital Illusions, Clark Dodworth editor, Addison-Wesley, Reading Massachusetts, 1996. 
Available at http://www.stl. nps. navy.mill~brutzman/vrml!breakthroughs. html 
Buddenberg, R., Computer Networking and C3I Systems for Emergency Services, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 1995. Available at 
http://dubhe. cc. nps. navy. mill~budden/book/table _contents. html 
Carl-Mitchell, Smoot, "The New Internet Protocol," UNIX REVIEW, vol. 13 no. 7, 
pp. 31-38, June 1995. 
Cerf, V., The Internet Activities Board, Request for Comments 1160, Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF), May 1990. Available at 
ftp://ds. internic. net!rfc/rfcl 160. txt 
Chmielewski, B., Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AF ATDS) Project 
Officer, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, interview, 28 March 1996. 
Cisco Systems Inc., Increasing Security on IP Networks, technical tips Web page, San 
Jose California, 1995. Available at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/701/31.html 
Cisco Systems Inc., Designing Large-Scale IP Internetworks, informational brochure, 
San Jose California, 1995. Additional information available at http://www.cisco.com 
Comer, Douglas E., Internetworking with TCPIIP Volume I: Principles, Protocols, and 
Architecture, third edition, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs New Jersey, 1995. 
190 
Commandants Warfighting Laboratory (WARLAB), Technology Exploration and 
Exploitation Plan, United States Marine Corps, Quantico Virginia, 1995. Available at 
http://138.156.204.100/www/cwl/planch1.htm 
Cortese, A., "Here Comes the Intranet," BUSINESSWEEK, pp. 76-85,26 February 1996. 
Cummiskey, J., Interoperability of Palmtop Computers with the US. Marine Corps Data 
Automated Communications Terminal (DACT) to Rapidly Disseminate Combat Order 
Message Packets Over Wired and Wireless Channels, Masters thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, September 1996. Available at http://www.stl.nps.navy.mil/-jccummis 
Deering, S., Host Extensions for IP Multicasting, Request for Comments 1112, Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF), August 1989. Available at 
ftp://ds.internic.net/rfclrfcl 112.txt 
Deering, S. and Hinden, R., Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification, Request for 
Comments 1883, Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), December 1995. 
Available at ftp://ds. internic. netlrfc!rfcl 883. txt 
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), Defense Information Infrastructure 
Master Plan: Executive Summary, Web page, Washington DC, 28 July 1995. Available 
at http://www. dis a. mill dii/ diiexe/execsum1. html 
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), Defense Information Systems Network 
(DISN) Strategy, Web page, Washington DC, July 1995. Available at 
http://www. dis a. mil/disnldisnhome. html 
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), Global Command and Control System 
(GCCS), Web page, 1996. Available at http:/1164.117.208.50/newgoal.html 
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), Department of Defense (DoD) Network 
Information Center (NIC), Web page, 1996. Available at http://nic.ddn.mil 
DeLoria, Wayne, "DMS: The Journey from Here to the Desktop," CHIPS, Naval 
Computer and Telecommunications Area Master Station LANT, pp. 10-19, January 1996. 
Available at http://www. chips. nary. mil/chips/ archives/96 _jan/ contents. htm 
Department of the Army, Department of the Army C4I Technical Architecture 
version 3.1, 31 March 1995. Available at 
· http :I /www. seas. gwu. edulseas/fa5 3/ta/techarch. html 
191 
Droms, R., Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol, Request for Comments 15 41, 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), October 1993. Available at 
ftp://ds.internic.net/rfc/rfcl541.txt 
Droms, R., Dynamic Host Configuration Working Group, Web page, Internet 
Engineering Task Force, 1996. Available at 
http :llwww. ietf. cnri. reston. va. uslhtml. charters/ dhc-charter. html 
Eastlake, D. and Kaufman, C., Domain Name System Security Extensions, work in 
progress, Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), 30 January 1996. Available at 
ftp://ftp. ietf. cnri.reston. va. us/internet-drafts /draft-ietf-dnssec-secext-09. txt 
Emswiler, Tracey, Internetworking: Using the Multicast Backbone (MBone) for Distance 
Learning, Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey California, September 
1995. Summary video available at 
http://www.stl.nps.navy.mill~iirglemswiler/emswiler.qt.Z 
Fleischman, E., "IPng and Corporate Resistance to Change," IPng: Internet Protocol Next 
Generation, Addison-Wesley, Reading Massachusetts, 1996. 
Floyd, S., Jacobson, V., Liu, C., McCanne, S. and Zhang, L, A Reliable Multicast 
Framework for Light-weight Sessions and Application Level Framing, ACM SIGCOMM 
95, pp. 342-356, August 1995. Available atftp://ftp.ee.lbl.gov/papers/link.ps.Z 
Fuller, V., Li, T., Yu, J. and Varadhan, K., Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR): An 
Address Assignment and Aggregation Strategy, Request for Comments 1519, Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF), September 1993. Available at 
ftp:/ Ids. internic. net/rfc/rfcl519. txt 
Galvin, P. and McCloghrie, Security Protocols for version 2 of the Simple Network 
Management Protocol (SNMPv2), Request for Comments 1446, Internet Engineering 
Task Force (IETF), 3 May1993. Available at ftp://ds.internic.netlrfc/rfcl446.txt 
Gaunter, C., Captain U.S. Marine Corps, Banyan Worldwide Support Officer, Marine 
Corps Systems Command-East, telephone interview, Quantico Virginia, 10 April 1996. 
Ghosh, S., "Defining the Key Issues in Mobile TCPIIP Networking," 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, vol. 27 no. 12, pp. 37-42, December 1993. 
Gilligan, R. and Nordmark, E., Transition Mechanisms for /Pv6 Hosts and Routers, 
Request for Comments 1933, Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), April 1996. 
Available at ftp://ds.internic.net/rfc/rfcl933.txt 
192 
Grehan, P., "IPv6 Implementation," electronic mail message, Ipsilon Networks Inc., Palo 
Alto California, 10 April 1996. 
Handley, M. and Jacobson, V., SDP: Session Description Protocol, work in progress, 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), 22 November 1995. Available at 
ftp://ietf. cnri. reston. va. us/internet-drafts/ draft-iet.f-mmusic-sdp-0 1. txt 
Henderson, Scott, "Deployment ofNetwork Systems Security Products within the DoN to 
Support DMS," CHIPS, Naval Computer and Telecommunications Area Master Station 
LANT, pg. 26, January 1996. Available at 
http://www. chips~ navy. mil/chips/ archives/96 _jan/ contents. htm 
Hinden, Robert., IP Next Generation Overview, Web page, 14 May 1995. 
Available at http://playground.sun. com/pub/ipng/html/INET-IPng-Paper. html 
Hinden, R., IP version 6 Addressing Architecture, Request for Comments 1884, Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF), December 1995. Available at 
ftp:/1 ds. internic. net/rfclrfc 1884. txt 
Hinden, R., IP Next Generation, Web page, 1996. Available at 
http ://playground. sun. comlpub/ipng/htmlipng-main. html 
Hovey, R. and Bradner, S., The Organizations Involved in the Internet Standards 
Process, work in progress, Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), April1996. 
Available at ftp://ietf. cnri. reston. va. us/internet-draftsldraft-ietf-poised95-ietf-org-O 1. txt 
Hughes, Kevin, "Entering the World Wide Web: A Guide to Cyberspace," Enterprise 
Integration Technologies, Palo Alto California, 1994. Available at 
http:/ lwww. eit. com/web/www.guide/ 
Imielinski, T. and Navas, J., GPS-Based Addressing and Routing, work in progress, 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), 8 March 1996. Available at 
ftp://ds.internic.net/internet-draftsldraft-rfced-exp-navas-OO.txt 
Information Infrastructure Research Group (IIRG), Web page, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey California, 1996. Available at http://www.stl.nps.navy.mil/-iirg 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Secretariat, IPng Working Group Charter, Web 
page, 1996. Available at http://ietf. cnri. reston. va. us/html. charters/ipngwg-charter. html 
Internet Network Information Center (InterNIC), InterNIC, Web page, Herndon Virginia, 
1996. Available at http:/ lrs.internic. net 
193 
Ipsilon Networks Inc., IP Switching: The Intelligence of Routing, the Performance of 
Switching, Ipsilon technical white paper, February 1996. Available at 
http://www. ipsilon. com/productinfo/techwp 1. html 
Jacobson, V ., Multimedia Conferencing on the Internet, tutorial presented at 1994 
SIGCOMM Conference (SIGCOMM '94), University College London, London, 30 
August 1994. 
Jeffries, Ron, "Three Roads to Quality of Service: ATM, RSVP, and CIF," 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, vol. 30 no. 4, pg. 77, April1996. 
Joint Interoperability Engineering Organization (JIEO), Joint Task Force Tactical 
Communications Architecture, llEO Report 8125, March 1995. 
Joint Interoperability Engineering Organization (JIEO), Integrated Tactical Strategic 
Data Networking (ITSDN) "Quick Fix" Engineering Plan, inter-agency coordination 
draft, 25 June 1995. 
Joint Staff, C4Ifor the Warrior, Washington DC, 12 June 1993. 
Knight, J., Multicast Transport Protocols, Web page, Loughborough University of 
Technology, Leicestershire United Kingdom, 1996. Available at 
http://hill.lut.ac. uk/DS-Archive!MTP. html 
Kumar, V., MBone: Interactive Multimedia on the Internet, New Riders Publishing, 
Indianapolis Indiana, 1996. 
Kumar, V., The MBone Information Web, Web page, 1996. Available at 
http://www. best. com/--prince/techinfo!MBone. html 
Lotus Development Corporation, www.lotus.com, Web page, 1996. 
Available at http:/ /www.lotus. com 
Macedonia, Michael R. and Brotzman, Donald P., "MBone Provides Audio and Video 
Across the Internet," IEEE COMPUTER, vol. 27 no. 4, April1994, pp. 30-36. Available 
at ftp:/ /taurus. cs. nps. navy. mil/pub/ 13la/mbone. html. 
Macedonia, Michael R., A Network Software Architecture for Large Scale Virtual 
Environments, Ph.D. Dissertation, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey California, June 
1995. Available at 
http:/ lwww. cs. nps. navy. mil/research/npsnetlpublications/Michael. Macedonia. thesis.ps. Z 
194 
Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), Operational Requirements 
Document (ORD) for the Tactical Data Network (I'DN), Quantico Virginia, July 1995. 
Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), United States Marine Corps 
Technical Architecture version 1.0, Quantico Virginia, 5 October 1995. 
Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM), MAGTF C41 Transition to the 
Global Command and Control System (GCCS) Common Operating 
Environment, Quantico Virginia, 15 March 1994. 
Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM), Tactical Data Network System 
Description,Quantico Virginia, September 1995. 
Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM), Tactical Data Network (I'DN) 
Server Specification, Quantico Virginia, 16 October 1995. 
Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM), Tactical Data Network (I'DN) 
Gateway Performance Specification, Quantico Virginia, 16 October 1995. 
Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity (MCTSSA), Tactical Combat 
Operations (I'CO): Fielding Plan, Camp Pendleton California, 1995. 
Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity (MCTSSA), Advance Tactical Air 
Command Central (ATACC), Web page, Camp Pendleton California, 1996. 
Available at http://mctssa-gw. usmc.millprojects.html 
McCann, J., Deering, S. and Mogul, J., Path MFU Discovery for!P version 6, work in 
progress, Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), 22 April1996. Available at 
ftp://ietf. cnri. reston. va. us/internet-drafts/ draft-ietf-ipngwg-pmtuv6-02. txt 
McNealis, Martin, "IPv6 Implementation," electronic mail message, Cisco Systems Inc., 
San Jose California, 10 April 1996 . 
. Medlin, B., "1Pv6 Host Implementation," electonic mail message, Hewlett-Packard Inc., 
Cupertino California, 16 April 1996. 
Morales, J., Tactical DMS: A Global Broadcast Service Option, Masters Thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey California, June 1996. 
Moy, J., OSPF Version 2, Request for Comments 1583, Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF), March 1994. Available at ftp://ds.internic.net/rfc/rfcl 583.txt 
195 
Murai, J., Nakamura, 0., Tominaga, A. and Teraoka, F., Problems and Solutions of 
DHCP: Experiences with DHCP Implementation and Operation, WIDE Project online 
report, 28 April 1995. Available at 
http://info. isoc. org/HMPIP AP ER/127/html/paper. html 
National Research Council, NRENAISSANCE Committee, Realizing the Information 
Future: the Internet and Beyond, National Academy Press, Washington DC, 1994. 
Available at http://www. nap. edu/nap/online/rtif/ 
National Research Council, Nil 2000 Steering Committee, The Unpredictable Certainty: 
Information Infrastructure through 2000, National Academy Press, Washington DC, 
1996. Available at http://www.nap.edu/nap/onlinelunpredictable/ 
Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center (NCCOSC), IP Addressing 
Study (IPADD), San Diego California, 1995. 
Netscape Communications Corporation (NCC), Download Netscape Navigator Software, 
Web page, Mountain View California, 1996. Available at 
http://www. netscape. com/comprodlmirrorlclient download html 
also available atftp2.netscape.com 
Partridge, C., Mendez, T. and Milliken, W., Host Anycasting Service, Request for 
Comments 1546, Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), November 1993. Available at 
ftp://ds.internic.net/rfc/rfc1546.txt 
Passmore, David, "Next Generation IP: Construction Ahead", BUSINESS 
COMMUNICATIONS REVIEW, pp. 18-20, March 1995. 
Perkins, C. and Johnson, D., Mobility Support in IPv6, work in progress, Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF), January 1996. Available at 
ftp://ietf cnri. reston. va. us/internet-drafts/ draft -ietf-mobileip-ipv6-00. txt 
Perkins, C., editor, IP Mobility Support, work in progress, Internet Engineering Task 
Force (IETF), February 1996. Available at 
ftp://ietf cnri. reston. va. us/internet-drafts/dra.ft-ietf-mobileip-protocol-16. txt 
Postel, J., editor, Internet OfficiatProtocol Standards, Standard 1 (STD-1), Internet 
Architecture Board, March 1996. Available atftp://venera.isi.edu/in-notes/std/std1.txt 
Rekhter, Y. and Li, T., A Border Gateway Protocol (BGP-4), Request for Comments 
1654, Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), 21 July 1994. Available at 
ftp://ds. internic. net/rfc/rfc1654. txt 
196 
Rekhter, Y. and Li, T., An Architecture for IPv6 Unicast Address Allocation, Request 
for Comments 1887, Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), December 1995. 
Available at ftp://ds.internic.netlrfclrfcl887.txt 
Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., Groot, G. and Lear, E., Address Allocation 
for Private Internets, Request for Comments 1918, Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF), February 1996. Available at ftp://ds.internic.netlrfclrfcl918.txt 
Rekhter, Y., Lothberg, P., Hinden, R., Deering, S. and Postel, J., editors, An IPv6 
Provider-Based Unicast Address Format, work in progress, Internet Engineering Task 
Force (IETF), March 1996. Available at 
ftp :1 lietf. cnri. reston. va. us/internet -drafts/ draft -ietf-ipngwg-unicast-addr-fmt-04. txt 
Reitzel, Andrea, editor, "Internet Engineering Task Force December 1995 Meeting 
Report," Mitre Corporation, January 1996. 
Rescoria, E. and Schiffman, A., The Secure Hypertext Transfer Protocol, work in 
progress, Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), February 1996. 
Available at ftp:/ /ftp. ietf. cnri. reston. va. us /internet-drafts/ draft-ietf-wts-shttp-0 1. txt 
Rogers, Amy, "Ready for the 'Net?,"COMMUNICATIONS WEEK, 4 March 1996. 
Russell, D. and Gangemi, G., Computer Security Basics, O'Reilly and Associates, 
Sebastopol California, 1991. 
Sawyers, W., Performance Testing for the Marine Air Ground Task Force Tactical 
Warfare Simulation, Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey California, 
September 1995. 
Spector, A., "Army Tactical Name Server," electronic mail message, SAIC, San Diego 
California, 12 April1996. 
Starburst Communications Inc., Star burst MFTP™ Compared to Today's File Transfer 
Protocols, white paper, Concord Massachussetts, 1996. Available at 
http://www.starburstcom. com/white. htm 
Symington, S., Wood, D. and Pullen, J., "Use ofiPng in Combat Simulation," IPng: 
Internet Protocol Next Generation, Addison-Wesley, Reading Massachusetts, 1996. 
Tallerico, D. and Reitzel, A., The Next Generation Internet Protocol, Mitre Inc., 28 
September 1995. 
197 
Thomson, Susan and Narten, Thomas, IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration, work in 
progress, Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), December 1995. Available at 
ftp :1/ietf. cnri. reston. va. uslinternet-drafts/draft-ietj-addrconf-ipv6-auto-O 7. txt 
Tiddy, M., Internetworking: Economic Storage and Retrieval of Digital Audio and Video 
for Distance Learning, Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, September 1996. 
Available at http:/ lwww. stl. nps. navy. mill~metiddy/thesis. html 
Trepanier, D., Internetworking: Recommendations on Network Management for K-12 
Schools, Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, September 1995. 
Trinity College, IPng: Internet Protocol Next Generation, Web page, Dublin Ireland, 
1995. Available at http ://ganges. cs. ted iel 4ba2/ipnglindex. html 
United States Army, Force XXI, Web page, 1996. Available at 
http:l/140.139.18.189: 1100/force21/j21hoome.html 
Vixie, P., Rekhter, Y., Bound, J. and Thomson, S., Dynamic Updates in the Domain 
Name System, work in progress, Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), 14 March 1996. 
Available at ftp://ietf cnri.reston. va. us/internet-drajts/draft-ietj-dnsind-dynDNS-09. txt 
Voigt,R., A Hierarchical Approach to Multicast in a Datagram Internetwork, PhD 
Dissertation, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey California, March 1996. Available at 
ftp://jtp.nps.nary.millpublecelrjvoigtlcharm.ps.z 
Walker, Richer, & Quinn (WRQ), IP Addressing, technical support Web page, 1995. 
Available at http://www.wrq.com 
Waters, G., User-Based Security Model for SNMPv2, Request for Comments 1910, 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), 28 February 1996. Available at 
ftp://ds.internic.netlrfc/rfc1910.txt 
Weaver, Alfred, Whatis the Xpress Transport Protocol?, information paper, Network 
Xpress Inc., Charlottesville Virginia, 1994. Available at 
http :1 !Www. cs. virginia. edul~netlab/xtp _stuff/what _is_ xtp.ps (postscript file) 
Wobus, John, DHCP FAQ, frequently asked questions Web page, 12 April1996. 
Available at http://web.syr. edul~jmwobus/comfaqsldhcpjaq. html 
198 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 2 
8725 John J. Kingman Rd, STE 0944 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 22060-6218 
2. Dudley Knox Library 2 
Naval Postgraduate School 
411 Dyer Rd. 
Monterey, California 93943-5101 
3. Director, Training and Education 1 
MCCDC, Code C46 
1019 Elliot Road 
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5027 
4. Director, Marine Corps Research Center 1 
MCCDC, Code C40RC 
2040 Broadway Street 
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5107 
5. Director, Studies and Analysis Division 1 
MCCDC, Code C45 
3300 Russell Road 
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5130 
6. Commandant of the Marine Corps 1 
C4I Directorate, Code CS 
Washington, DC 20380-0001 
7. Commanding General, Marine Corps Systems Command 2 
Attn: CAPT D. Beutel USMC, TDN Project Officer 
C4I/COMM-S 
2033 Barnett Ave. Suite 315 
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5080 
8. Commanding Officer,Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity 1 
Attn: CAPT D. Wells USMC, TDN Project Officer 
Communications Systems Division 
Camp Pendleton, California 92055-5000 
199 
9. Defense Modeling and Simulation Office 1 
1901 N. Beauregard St., Suite 510 
Alexandria, Virginia 22311 
10. Professor Dan C. Boger, Code CC 1 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 93943 
11. Assistant Professor Don Brotzman, Code UW /Br 2 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 93943 
12. Rex Buddenberg, Code SM/Bu 1 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 93943 
13. Erik Chaum 1 
Naval Undersea Warfare Center 
Code 2251, BLDG 1171-3 
1176 Howell St. 
Newport, Rhode Island 02841-1708 
14. Keith Davis 1 
SPA WAR 
2 Littlebrook Circle 
Fredricksburg, Virginia 22405 
15. Cynthia Martin 1 
Defense Information Systems Agency 
10701 Parkridge Blvd. 
Reston, Virginia 22091 
16. Major Theresa Orihuela USA 1 
ITSDN Program Manager 
DISA Westhem, WE3351 
11440 Isaac Newton Square 
Reston, Virginia 22090-5087 
17. Captain James E. Nierle USMC 2 
Joint Interoperability Test Command 
Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613-7020 
200 
